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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the effects of constraints imposed on economic interactions by 
limitations due to natural resources, among which oil and urban land play a curcial role in the 
context of climate change. These dimensions, often neglected in existing analyses, have an 
ambiguous effect since they suggest both the risk of enhanced costs if carbon limitations 
reinforce the sub-optimalities caused by pre-existing constraints, but also, conversely, the 
possibility of co-benefits if the climate policy helps to correct some pre-existing imperfections 
of socio-economic trajectories. To investigate this issue, an innovative modeling framework 
of the enrgy-economy interactions is elaborated that embarks the specificities of the 
deployment of oil production capacities and the issues related to the spatial organization in 
urban areas. We demonstrate that, beyond the carbon price, the costs of climate policy 
essentially depend on the sequencing of complementary measures, with a crucial role of 
spatial policy designed to control transport-related emissions through mobility. 
 
Résumé 
 
Cette thèse analyse les effets de contraintes sur les interactions économiques imposées par les 
ressources naturelles, parmi lesquelles le pétrole et la terre urbaine jouent un rôle crucial dans 
le contexte du changement climatique. Ces dimensions, souvent négligées dans les études 
existantes, ont un effet ambigu puisqu’elles suggèrent à la fois le risque de coûts exacerbés 
par les contraintes, mais aussi de potentiels de co-bénéfices si la politique climatique aide à 
corriger certaines sous-optimalités des trajectoires socio-économiques. Pour analyser ces 
effets, une architecture de modélisation innovante des interactions énergie-économie est 
développée, qui prend en compte les spécificités du déploiement des capacités de production 
pétrolières et les enjeux de l’organisation spatiale dans les aires urbaines. Nous montrons en 
particulier que, au-delà de la tarification du carbone, les coûts d’une politique climatique 
dépendent du tuilage des différentes mesures d’accompagnement mises en œuvre, avec un 
rôle essentiel pour les politiques spatiales construites pour contrôler les émissions liées au 
transport via la mobilité  
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Twenty years after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, its ojectives are more topical than ever, 
namely “achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” 
Indeed, progress in the scientific understanding of climate change and of its impacts has 
permitted to reach a large consensus to acknowledge both the responsibility of emissions from 
human activity (essentially from fossil fuel burning) in the acceleration of climate change 
over the last decades1 and its potentially catastrophic socio-economic effects, especially in 
developing countries2. A review of the literature suggests in addition that the socio-economic 
costs of carbon reduction measures may remain limited to a few percentage points of GDP 
even with the most ambitious stabilization objectives3.   
But, in parallel, the annual Conferences of the Parties, created by UNFCCC to organize the 
political negotiations on climate issues, have failed in their mission to elaborate a tangible 
agreement on emission reduction objectives and policies to be implemented for this purpose. 
The more recent occurences in Copenhague, Cancun and Durban have even reinforced the 
scepticism about this political process since, despite a wide mobilization and numerous 
declarations of intent, no significant political advancement could be made. Here lies the 
paradox of climate issues: the scientific alerts on the necessity and urgency of acting before 
the end of the opportunity window for ambitious climate action seem not audible for 
politicians. We take the point that this paradox is not only a matter of free-riding attitudes, but 
                                                     
1 The analysis of global carbon cycle proves that man-made fluxes are the main positive contributors to the 
accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere (AR4, WGI, Table 7.3). This accumulation is estimated to be 
responsible of 1.6 W.m-2 of total forcing of climate over 1750- 2005, to which natural solar irradiance adds noly 
0.18 W.m-2 (AR4, WGI, Table 2.12). This dominance of human emissions in climate effects is confirmed by 
climate models, which can reproduce observed trends of global temperature changes only if they use 
anthropogenic forcings (AR4, WGI,fig SPM4) 
2 A review of the literature demonstrates that impacts of climate change may lead to 1.5% to 3.5% GDP losses at 
the world level, and that developing countries are the more exposed regions (Section 20.6 in (Yohe et al, 2007)). 
By including non-market impacts on health and the environment, the possibility that the climate system may be 
more responsive to greenhouse gas emissions than previously thought and the disproportionate share of the 
climate-change burden falling on poor regions, Stern (2007) obtains that welfare reductions (measured in 
equivalent consumption per head) may reach 20%. 
3 Average aggregate losses remain below 5.5% in 2050 (Table SPM-6 in (IPCC, 2007)). These estimates of the 
economic effects of greenhouse gas emission reductions are based on the use of numerical modeling tools, which 
are appropriate to provide quantitative assessments of mechanisms at play in complex systems, like the ones 
considered in energy-economy-environment interactions. This type of analysis has developed in parallel with 
exponential improvements of computer techniques allowing for a fast growth of the number of models and 
scenarios, as illustrated by the 177 scenarios compiled in (IPCC, 2007). This multiplicity of results provides a 
wide spectrum of assumptions and then helps delineate the ranges of uncertainties of the results, which is crucial 
information in such a controversial issue as the long-term impacts of climate policies. 
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reveals also a gap between scientific methodologies adopted to assess carbon mitigation costs 
and politicians’ expectations in terms of policy-relevant messages. 
This gap is not surprinzing when considering the assumptions of most models used for 
climate policy assessment: 
“Most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and with 
universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and 
thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st century” 
(IPCC, 2007, Box SPM.3). 
Athough these assumptions can be acceptable to provide a normative vision, they fail to 
capture the role of constraints which may push economic trajectories away from their first-
best trajectory. Among these constraints, we distinguish inertia effects limiting the flexibility 
of economic adjustments (missing mechanisms) and market imperfections pushing prices 
above marginal cost (missing market). These two characteristics are particularly important 
when scarce resources are used as production factor, because they introduce limitations on 
supply and potentials for market power behaviors according to the regional distribution of the 
resource.  
This thesis considers two scarce resources, oil and urban land use, which have in common a 
close interplay with transport trends, a crucial sector for climate policy. Indeed, oil markets 
determine the cost of fuels and the profitability of substitutes, whereas urban forms drive 
constrained mobility at the local scale. To provide audible insights on the interplay between 
oil, urban land use and climate policy, we propose methodological advancements to represent 
that climate policies apply in a world with pre-existing constraints due to: 
(a) inertia mechanisms because, respectively, of geopolitical, technical and geological 
constraints on the time-profile of oil markets, and of spatial and infrastuctural constraints on 
production relocation and changes in urban structure.   
(b) imperfect markets because the owners of a scarce resource can impose rent prices over 
marginal cost for the exhaustible oil resource and the land close to urban centers, respectively.  
These dimensions, often neglected in existing analyses, offer some new perspectives in terms 
of climate policy analysis. They suggest both the risk of enhanced costs if carbon limitations 
reinforce the sub-optimalities caused by pre-existing constraints, but also, conversely, the 
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possibility of co-benefits if the climate policy helps to correct some pre-existing 
imperfections.  
Section 1 of this introduction identifies the constraints in interaction driving inertia 
mechanisms that will be considered in this thesis, and section 2 makes a detour via the theory 
of rents to identify the determinants of pricing mechanisms on imperfect markets. Section 3 
synthetizes this information and gives the outline of the thesis.  
I. Climate policy and inertia constraints 
 
As we have seen, most models use first-best assumptions and hence do not represent short-
term inertia constraints, but much attention has been devoted to the long-run inertia effects 
related to technological constraints. This dimension of climate policies has been investigated 
in number of modeling exercises, including with hybrid models able to incorporate sector-
based expertise on technolgies and technological change into a macroeconomic framework 
(Hourcade, 2006).4 More recently, second-best policies have been envisaged to account for 
climate negotiation constraints, which could lead to an agreement involving exemptions or 
delayed participation for some regions and/or limitations in the use of some low-carbon 
technologies.5  
We go one step further by considering the inertias that affect the functioning of economic 
interactions in the short-run and impose departures from steady growth pathways. More 
precisely, this means that we consider the interplay between three types of constraints (a) the 
technical and political constraints, which affects the flexibility of capital adjustements 
especially under imperfect foresight and impose distortions of economic interactions to satisfy 
some public objectives; (b) the climate constraint, which has no reason to be optimal with 
respect to economic dynamics but is rather political decisions imposing a time path for 
                                                     
4 Among the more recent studies on the topic: the EMF-19 project, which deals with the role of cost and 
performance of current and future technologies for global climate policies (Weyant, 2004); the IMCP project 
which studies the role of endogenous technological change on the cost of climate policies (Edenhofer et al, 
2006); or the EMF-21 project, which incorporates non-CO2 gases, such as those from land uses and agriculture 
(Weyant et al. 2007). 
5 This issue is in particular investigated in: the EMF-22 project, which studies the impact of the architecture of 
climate policies on the possibility to reach a given stabilization target and on the associated costs (Clarke et al, 
2010); the ADAM project, which analyses the feasibility and costs of very low stabilization in function of 
technology availability (Edenhofer et al, 2010); and the RECIPE project, which investigates the effects of 
delayed participation by certain regions (Jakob et al, 2010), restrictions on the availability of a large set of low-
carbon technologies (Tavoni et al., 2011) and quota allocation rules (Luderer et al, 2010). 
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limitations of CO2 emissions emitted by human activity; (c) resource constraints, which 
impose a limit on a scarce resource use as a production factor. We consider more specifically 
on oil and of urban land, which play a crucial role in climate context. 
1- Constraints on the functioning of economic interactions: the second-best economy 
 
When considering the implementation of ambitious climate policies implying important 
departures from current socio-economic trends, complex interactions in the economic system 
and unexpected shocks driving the long-term dynamics of prices, quantities and investment 
decisions cannot but be imperfectly anticipated with the information at the agents’ disposal. In 
this context, it therefore appears appropriate to go beyond the standard assumption of perfect 
foresight to adopt instead adaptive expectations, which are formed on the extrapolation of past 
and current trends and are refined as agents get information (for example, on the nature of 
climate constraints).  
These imperfections in expectations play an even more important role when taking into 
account the constraints that limit the flexibility of economic adjustments and hence prevent 
the immediate correction of past decisions once information arrives. These constraints 
concern notably (i) the rigidities on labor markets, which limit the adjustments of labor costs 
in the production process, (ii) the pace of diffusion of new technologies as constrained by 
limited R&D potentials and the cumulative effects of learning-by-doing processes, (iii) the 
renewal of installed technologies, equipments and infrastructure, especially for long-lived 
equipments in housing and transport sectors, (iv) the behavioral inertias, which limit the pace 
of structural changes in consumption and production patterns, and (v) the basic needs on vital 
items (e.g., food, housing), which limit consumption adjustments by imposing a floor level for 
these specific goods. 
Independently from climate concerns, numbers of policies are active and influence socio-
economic interactions. They are not necessarily adopted for economic efficiency reasons but 
rather to satisfy a specific objective, like the supplying of public service that must be satisfied 
at any cost (e.g, State’s commitment to ensure a certain level of public services like security, 
justice, education, health), the preservation of a certain level of intra- and inter-generational 
redistribution or the internalization of some indirect economic, social or environmental effects 
that would otherwise be ignored by economic tradeoffs. These policies move economic 
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trajectories away from their optimal trajectory and distort the structure of prices and quantities 
(quotas) and/or the technical standards (norms).  
In this context, measures adopted for climate concerns have ambiguous consequences, since 
they can have synergies, or, on the contrary, reinforce pre-existing suboptimalities. This issue 
is at the core of the debate on the double dividend of climate policies, which is built on the 
idea that a carbon fiscal reform can potentially lead to absolute economic gains if the 
redistribution of the product of carbon taxation is used to suppress the more distortive effects 
of the pre-existing fiscal system (Goulder, 1994; Ligthart, 1998). 
The investigation of the interplaying effect of these inertias causing limits in the flexibility of 
technical adjustments with a climate policy are at the core motivation for a series of analyses 
carried out at the Center for the Environment and Development (CIRED): 
• (Crassous, 2008) demonstrates how those features condition the time profile of carbon 
prices and of associated economic losses. This study demonstrates in particular that, 
contrary to most analyzes predicting a steady increase of carbon prices, the second-
best nature of the economy leads to: a fast increase in the early period to overcome 
the constraints imposed by inertias and correct the imperfect expectations about the 
carbon constraint; a medium-term stagnation permitted by the co-benefits of the 
climate policy, which contributes to correct some sub-optimalities of the baseline 
scenarios; and a fast long-term increase to reach the high-cost mitigation potentials in 
the transport sector. This study also investigates the potentials offered by sectoral and 
regional differentiation of the climate measures, beyond the standard framework of a 
unique carbon price.  
•  (Sassi, 2008) analyzes the interplay between technological evolutions and structural 
change resulting from endogenous interactions between technical potentials, 
consumption patterns and location choices. In the context of a climate policy, 
ambiguous effects appear, since technical change towards less carbon-intensive 
patterns favors the reduction of emissions, but also negatively affects technical 
progress in non-energy sectors via a crowding-out effect on available investments. 
these effects are even more important when endogenous technical change increase the 
risk of technological, structural and behavioral lock-in effects.  
• (Guivarch, 2010) considers more specifically the role of rigidities on labor markets 
and of pre-existing fiscal systems, which prove to be crucial determinants of the 
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consequences of increases in the cost of energy, like those happening under climate 
policy. On the one hand, a flexible labor market favors the adjustments of production 
processes via decreases of labor costs, which moderates the surge of production costs; 
on the contrary, rigidities on labor markets prevent such adjustments and enhance the 
costs. On the other hand, synergies between climate policies and pre-existing 
distortions of the fiscal system are investigated on the example of the power sector in 
India. This sector is characterized by pre-existing subsidies to foster investments and 
insufficient capacities, which can be corrected at the occasion of a climate policy 
imposing tariff reforms, demand-side management and improvement in the 
production/distribution structure.  
• (Combet et al, 2010) investigates the interactions between the design of a carbon tax 
reform, economic efficiency and distributional issues. This study analyzes to what 
extent a restructuration of the fiscal system on the occasion of a carbon tax reform can 
have positive effects by redirecting the levy from production to those revenues that 
are disconnected from production (rent and transfer incomes). 
 
2- The carbon constraint 
 
The choice of a quantified objective for carbon emission reductions and the modalities of its 
implementation (in terms of regional and sectoral distribution of the efforts) is the 
consequence of a political appraisal of number of dimensions beyond pure economic 
efficiency, like energy security, inter-generational equity, a “common but differentiated 
responsibility” between regions or social aspects (political acceptability of the measures, 
impacts on development in emerging economies or distributional issues). The importance of 
these different aspects means that climate policy architecture has no reason to be 
economically optimal, even more since the uncertainties on climate damages and mitigation 
costs make it difficult to define a priori an optimal climate policy. We adopt a more realistic 
definition of the climate constraint, as imposed by a political choice on the ultimate 
stabilization objective. Table 0.1, taken from (IPCC, 2007), describes how the choice of a 
climate objective translates into a constraint on the time profile of carbon emissions.  
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Table 0.1: Characteristics of post-TAR stabilization scenarios 
 
 
The climate objective can be expressed in terms of radiative forcing (second column of Table 
0.1), increase of mean temperature with respect to pre-industrial level (fifth column), 
concentration of greenhouse gas or carbon in the atmosphere (third or fourth column), with a 
certain equivalence between these measures. The decision of the climate objective then comes 
down to choosing between categories I to VI in Table 0.1, ordered from the most ambitious to 
the less ambitious objective. Despite the absence of scientific certainty about the costs of 
stabilization and residual damages for different stabilization levels, a political consensus tends 
to promote a limitation of climate warming to +2°C with respect to pre-industrial levels. This 
objective can be satisfied with a probability higher than 50% only with a stabilization of the 
concentration of all greenhouse gases at 450 ppm-CO2éq, corresponding to the more binding 
constraint in category I. Since concentration is now around 430 ppmCO2-eq (against 280 
ppmCO2-eq before Industrial Revolution) and current emission trends correspond to a 2 to 3 
ppmCO2-eq yearly increase of this concentration, this objective supposes a drastic change of 
current trends with a fast decrease of emissions (before 2015) and a continuous pursuing of 
decarbonization efforts towards a 50% to 85% decrease of emissions in 2050 with respect to 
current levels. This is possible only of restrictive conditions are satisfied: full and immediate 
participation of all countries, high degree of flexibility in technical adjustments and the 
possibility to generate a large amount of negative emissions before 21006 (Krey and Riahi, 
2009; van Vuuren et al, 2010). Satisfying simultaneously those conditions imposes to adopt 
an optimistic vision of the political, technical and behavioral barriers that may affect the 
patterns along which the second-best economy considered in this thesis develops.  
                                                     
6The technology envisaged to realize negative emissions is biomass-fueled power plants with sequestration, 
which raises questions linked to land-use competition and large-scale availability of CCS. 
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We adopt more conservative assumptions, which leads us to retain less extreme (but still 
ambitious) stabilization scenarios, corresponding to categories II and III. This means 
prescribing a trajectory of carbon emissions that satisfies the twofold condition: a decrease of 
emissions before 2030 (sixth column of Table 0.1) and around 30% decrease of carbon 
emissions in 2050 with respect to current levels (seventh column of Table 0.1).  
 
3-The resource constraint  
 
We consider here the specific role of constraints imposed by the use of scarce natural 
resources as production factors. In a first-best vision, explicitly accounting for these 
additional constraints could not but lead to an increase of mitigation costs and, conversely, a 
climate policy could not but increase the negative economic consequences of resource 
scarcity. But, if the analysis of economic interactions is extended to represent pre-existing 
suboptimalities, the additional constraint on resource availability can have ambiguous effects 
in its interactions with the climate constraint. We will focus more specifically on the effects 
associated to oil and urban land, which are simultaneously essential to the production process 
and play a crucial role in the context of climate policy because of their complex interactions 
with a limitation of carbon emissions.  
On the one hand, climate change, energy security and the depletion of oil resources are 
closely related issues because of their common focus on the decline of consumption and 
production of this fossil energy, which is both an important source of carbon emissions, a 
central determinant of international trade flows and a crucial component of the energy mix. 
The climate policy indirectly delays the exploitation of oil, slows down its depletion and gives 
an early signal of the long-term scarcity of this exhaustible resource. In addition, climate 
policies affect the geopolitical dimension of oil markets by calling for a strategic response of 
major oil producers to this threat on their exportation revenues. This interplay plays a crucial 
role in climate negotiations as demonstrated by the claim by OPEC countries for 
compensations for those losses of revenues in exchange for their compliance to climate 
agreements (see the Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC and the article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol). 
Conversely, constraints on oil availability can be seen as positive for the long-term objective 
of a climate policy by limiting the amount of oil-related carbon emissions. But, these 
constraints may also enhance the costs of the transition towards a low-carbon economy by 
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affecting the distribution of mitigation efforts among fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) towards an 
important decrease of oil even though this source of energy is the most difficult to abstract 
from in the short- and medium-term due to its captive uses (transport). 
On the other hand, the allocation of sites between different uses (residential, agricultural, 
industrial…) and the resulting land-use patterns are crucial determinants of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the most important sectors. We limit our analysis to the passenger transportation 
sector, in which location choices and infrastructure networks in the urban environment drive 
constrained mobility (commuting, shopping), and the freight transportation sector, in which 
the location of production units and consumers determines the logistics organization and the 
transport intensity of production/distribution processes. The mitigation potentials offered by 
changes in land-use patterns in these activities can be active only in the long-term because 
they involve changes of long-lived infrastructures. Conversely, the adoption of a climate 
policy favors the redirection of investments towards less carbon-intensive spatial 
organizations, but also limits the availability of investments for infrastructure projects at the 
core of these relocations because of the crowding-out effect of climate policy-related 
investments in the energy sector. 
 
4. The triptych carbon price - oil price - land price 
 
The economic consequences of a limitation of carbon emissions depend on its complex 
interplay with the set of other constraints that pre-exist in the economy, whether they are 
related to the second-best nature of economic interactions or to the limitations imposed by the 
use of scarce natural resources. This thesis aims at complementing existing studies of second-
best economies and policies to provide an approach that encompasses all the relevant 
dimensions of climate policy analysis in a consistent framework. This means in particular 
including the specific mechanisms associated with oil and land as non-renewable resources at 
the heart of climate issues. 
This leads us to reconsider the analysis of the costs of a climate policy, co,ventionnaly 
focused on the effects of the carbon price as the essential driver of the increase of end-use 
energy prices affecting households’ purchase power and firms’ production costs. However, 
this vision neglects the feedback effect of the climate policy on oil prices, which is yet a 
crucial determinant of the end-use costs of fossil energies, and the role of land prices, which 
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measure relocation possibilities permitting a reduction of transport dependency and related 
emissions. To summarize, a high carbon price in a context of low oil and land prices may 
have less negative economic effects than a moderate carbon price applied in a very 
constrained context characterized by high oil and land prices. 
The objective of this thesis is to propose a framework for a quantified analysis of these 
interactions between carbon price, oil price and land prices. This supposes giving a detailed 
representation of the formation of prices for non-renewable resources, which are submitted to 
mechanisms that are essentially different from traditional goods, in particular because of the 
importance of rent formation.    
II- The price of scarce resources: a detour via the theory of rents 
 
This section proposes an overview of the theoretical debates about the notion of rent, which 
will serve to identify the major mechanisms at play in the formation of scarce resource prices. 
 
1. The birth of the notion of rent  
 
 The concept of rent appears in economic thought with the concept of the “net 
product”, at the heart of physiocracy. This theory, developed by French economists during the 
18st century, was funded on the idea that all wealth comes from agricultural production, 
consistently with the dominant role of this sector in the economy at that time. In this vision, 
land is the source of value creation and the “net product” represents total agricultural 
production minus the cost of past investments and the payment to farmers cultivating land. 
This notion plays a crucial role in the “Economic Table”, invented by Quesnay in 1759, which 
constitutes the first attempt to represent consistent economic flows between different types of 
economic agents. In this primitive version of input-output tables formalized by Leontief in 
1930, the economy is reduced to a unique production sector – agriculture – and three types of 
agents: the "Productive" class consisted of all agricultural laborers, the "Sterile" class made up 
of artisans and merchants and the "Proprietary" class consisted of landowners. Landowners 
perceive the “net product” from farmers in exchange for the right to cultivate the land they 
own in accordance with their “natural rights”. This source of income, which appears as crucial 
to ensure the closure of economic flows, is not directly related to production (landowners do 
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not participate to the production process if not by allowing farmers to work on their land) and 
then constitutes remuneration that has certain similarities with what will be later called rent. 
 The first explicit reference to the notion of rent appears in the analysis of income 
distribution by Adam Smith. Rent is there considered as the third source of income to be 
considered in parallel with wages perceived by workers and profits of capital owners. In line 
with previous analyses of the agricultural sector, land rent is formulated as a driver of prices, 
the possession of land giving right to remuneration similarly to the possession of capital. The 
existence of rents then depends on the use of the land, only food production ensuring 
systematically a revenue to landowners:  
« Human food seems to be the only produce of land which always and necessarily 
affords some rent to the landlord. Other sorts of produce sometimes may and 
sometimes may not, according to different circumstances. » (Smith, 1776, chapter 
11) 
 This specific role of food production in rent formation must be put back in the context 
of an essentially agricultural economy, in which land is the only factor of production ensuring 
the production of more wealth that the total of what has been consumed in the production 
process. Economic theory will long attribute a specific role to agricultural production in rent 
formation, but the appearance of new dominant types of production will lead to extensions of 
this notion and the appearance of rents will be more generally associated to the use of a 
production factor that is submitted to a certain form of scarcity. Mining resources, at the core 
of energy-intensive production patterns of the Industrial Revolution, are an emblematic 
example:  
« Whether a coal-mine, for example, can afford any rent depends partly upon its 
fertility, and partly upon its situation. A mine of any kind may be said to be either 
fertile or barren, according as the quantity of mineral which can be brought from it 
by a certain quantity of labour is greater or less than what can be brought by an 
equal quantity from the greater part of other mines of the same kind. » (Smith, 
1776, chapter 11) 
The existence of a rent is then conditioned by the characteristics of the resource under 
exploitation when compared to similar resources, which constitutes the basis of the 
differential theory that will be formalized later by Ricardo.  
23 
 
2. Rent: cause or consequence of prices? 
 
In a first approach, Adam Smith considers that the amount of rent reflects the maximum level 
that landowner can obtain from the farmers. It corresponds to a tradeoff on the revenue 
perceived by the landowner, which must be sufficiently high to provide an incentive to put 
their land in exploitation, but sufficiently low to ensure that farmers have enough revenues to 
live once this transfer to landowner has been done. In this case, the level of rent is associated 
to a situation of monopoly and will be a determinant of the final price of the good:  
«The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the land, is 
naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may 
have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he can afford to take; 
but to what the farmer can afford to give. » (Smith, 1776, chapter 11) 
In a second approach, rent is a source of income essentially different from wages and profits 
because it can be modified without affecting directly production. This means that rent is a 
consequence of prices, which appears only when considering resources creating a residual 
revenue (or surplus) above production costs so that high rent is conditioned by high prices  
« Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the price of 
commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low wages and 
profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the effect of it. » 
(Smith, 1776, chap 11) 
Malthus elaborates on this second interpretation of rent as a surplus over production costs by 
pointing the necessity to analyze the reasons for high prices of commodities. These must be 
distinguished from monopoly prices associated to supply restrictions since the appearance of 
high commodity prices is driven by the constrained demand for those essential goods:  
« by applying occasionally the term monopoly to the rent of land, without 
stopping to mark its more radical peculiarities, [Adam Smith] leaves the reader 
without a definite impression of the real difference between the cause of the high 
price of the necessaries of life, and of monopolized commodities. » (Malthus, 
1815) 
Malthus then puts forward a three-step mechanism explaining high prices and hence rent 
formation for those essential goods. First, the quality of the soil as a production factor is a pre-
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requisite for the appearance of rents since it allows for a production level that exceeds the 
amount necessary to pay farmers. Second, a demand exists for this surplus over production 
costs because of the basic needs for these essential goods. Third, fertile land is scarce and the 
increase of demand with demographic growth imposes to exploit less and less fertile land. 
This rise in demand drives an increase of the exchange value of the good and hence of its 
price, which enhance the surplus obtained on the more fertile land still in operation. This 
analysis conducts Malthus to identify four sources of rent formation, which combine the 
decrease of production costs and the increase of the exchange value of the good: capital 
accumulation decreasing their return, population increase decreasing wages, technical 
progress improving the efficiency of the production process and demand intensification 
fostering an increase of the final price.  
 This fragmented vision of rents – sometimes cause, sometimes consequence of prices 
– was a symptom of the necessity to develop a theoretical framework for thinking this notion. 
This is the differential surplus theory, whose fundamentals were already present in the above 
analysis, but which was consistently formalized by David Ricardo. 
 
3. The differential theory of rents and extensions 
 
The fundamentals of rent in David Ricardo’s theory are close to the approach developed by 
previous authors. It is indeed justified by the inherent characteristics of the land: 
« [rent is] that portion of the product of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use 
of original and indestructible power of the soil » (Ricardo, 1817, chapter 2) 
However, Ricardo can be distinguished by his successful attempt to go beyond the analyses 
that attribute the “power of the soil” to a gift from nature by describing it instead as an 
economic phenomenon resulting from the interplay between land and labor. Indeed, the 
quality of the land is not limited to its intrinsic characteristics but is measured by its 
productivity, namely the quantity of labor necessary for the production process on this land. 
This means that agricultural products are produced from a human effort measured by the 
quantity of labor incorporated in the good. The more fertile the land, the higher the production 
level for the same quantity of capital and labor (or, equivalently, the lower the labor needs for 
the same production level), and hence the lower the production costs. Price formation obeys 
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to a law that prefigures marginalist principles: price is set at the production cost on the less 
fertile land under exploitation. As a consequence, the possessors of the more fertile land 
benefit from a surplus over their production costs, which is identified as a rent: rent is a 
consequence of prices. This approach, which combines the theory of incorporated value, 
marginalist principles and rents is known as the “differential theory of rents”. It allows 
overcoming some apparent contradictions of previous approaches, like for example explaining 
why, contrary to Smith’s assertion, land may offer no rent in case of low population density. 
Indeed, in this case, only the more fertile lands are exploited because they are sufficient to 
satisfy the whole demand so that prices remain low, at the level corresponding to production 
costs over these very productive lands. On the contrary, rent appears under the pressure of 
increasing demand, which forces extending production to less fertile lands: 
« It is only, then, because land is not unlimited in quantity and uniform in quality, 
and because in the progress of population, land of an inferior quality, or less 
advantageously situated, is called into cultivation, that rent is ever paid for the use 
of it. » (Ricardo, 1817, chapter 2) 
 The differential theory also permits to unify approaches previously developed by 
Adam Smith, who arbitrarily distinguished rents resulting from land use and those arising 
from mines exploitation, the former being supposed to be the only type ensuring 
systematically a rent. By generalizing the differential principles to any natural resource with 
heterogeneous characteristics, Ricardo demonstrates that mining resources can lead to the 
emergence of rents in a similar manner than agricultural land. The only reason why it may not 
be the case is a low demand for mining products in the agricultural-dominated economy that 
Adam Smith experienced, which makes the exploitation of less fertile mines not necessary.  
 This unification of the rent theory for land and all other resources is formulated by 
John Stuart Mill, who introduces the idea that land is a productive capital, admittedly 
particular, but which must follow the standard laws of returns to production factors. To this 
aim, he distinguishes two types of land revenues: the land rents associated to its intrinsic 
characteristics like in Ricardo’s approach vs. the revenues permitted by additional capital 
investments on this land. In some cases, this latter category must be considered as a rent, 
especially when they result from important investments aimed at improving long-term land 
productivity:  
26 
 
« with regard to capital actually sunk in improvements, and not requiring 
periodical renewal, but spent once and for all in giving the land a permanent 
increase of productiveness, it appears to me that the return made to such capital 
loses altogether the character of profits, and is governed by the principles of rent.» 
(Mill, 1871, p. 408.) 
  
This means that economic agents can influence the amount of rents, and in particular that 
rents can emerge from uniformly fertile lands, provided heterogeneous distribution of 
installed capital. Here, land is not the source of rents by itself, which is rather due to its 
heterogeneous characteristics as a production factor. This approach opens the way to a 
generalization of the differential theory to all production factors without limitations to land: 
« All advantages, in fact, which one competitor has over another, whether natural 
or acquired, whether personal or the result of social arrangements, assimilate the 
possessor of the advantage to a receiver of rent. » (Mill, 1871, p 459) 
  
4. Scarcity rents  
 
The differential theory of rents considers that the value of a good depends on the quantity of 
labor incorporated in its production, including the amount corresponding to capital 
investments necessary for production, and is therefore focused on the supply-side 
characteristics as determinants of prices and hence of rents. The marginalist approach, 
initiated by Jevons, Menger and Walras, adopts a complementary vision of price formation, 
focused on the demand-side of economic interactions. According to this theory, the exchange 
value of a good depends on the utility it provides, which, according to the decreasing marginal 
utility principle, is even higher than consumption levels are low. This means in particular that 
scarce goods are characterized by high prices, which are not due to their production costs but 
rather to the limits on their availability enhancing competition between agents. The possessor 
of these scarce goods then benefit from rents in the form of surplus over their production 
costs. This suggests a reinterpretation of the notion of rents at the basis of the notion of 
“scarcity rent”, which pays the services offered by the good as measured by the utility it 
provides. These two approaches – differential rents and scarcity rents – may seem 
contradictory but have been reconciled by Marshall, for whom it is only two aspects of the 
same problem know as “economic rent”: 
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« In a sense all rents are scarcity rents, and all rents are differential rents. But in 
some cases it is convenient to estimate the rent of a particular agent by comparing 
its yield to that of an inferior (perhaps a marginal) agent, when similarly worked 
with appropriate appliances. And in other cases it is best to go straight to the 
fundamental relations of demand to the scarcity or abundance of the means for the 
production of those commodities for making which the agent is serviceable. » 
(Marshall, 1890, BookV, Chapter 9) 
  
 The major innovation introduced to bridge the gap between these two notions is to 
consider the temporal dimension as a determinant of the formation of rents. The selling prices 
of goods and hence the surplus over production costs indeed depends on the temporal horizon 
considered: 
« The conditions which govern the amount of this surplus and its relations to 
value depend not so much on the nature of the industry as on the period of time 
for which the calculation is made. »  (Marshall, 1893) 
 
In the short term, there exists a period of time over which the producer cannot modify his 
production capacities because of inertias of production systems. These supply-side constraints 
drive a temporary increase of prices and create temporary scarcity rents or “quasi rents”, 
which disappear after the long term adjustments of the production processes. Over the long 
term, only remain the differential rent arising from the surplus over production costs. Here, in 
addition to the above identified determinants of rents (intrinsic characteristics of land and 
productivity improvements due to capital investments), Marshall adds a third component 
encompassing all elements that can justify a difference between prices and the value 
incorporated in the produced good. It can be either the relative scarcity created by an 
intensification of demand (for example due to population growth) or the external advantages 
associated to the environment or the localization (proximity to markets, intra-industry 
agglomeration effects, accessibility, transport costs). These latter dimensions affect the value 
of land because they define its production potentials over a multiplicity of potential uses, and 
restricting the use of a given plot of land to a specific type of production imposes to pay it at a 
sufficiently high level to compensate for the advantages that it could provide if devoted to 
other uses:  
« The full rent […] is made up of three elements; the first being due to the value 
of the soil as it was made by nature; the second to improvements made in it by 
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man; and the third, which is often the most important of all, to the growth of a 
dense and rich population and to facilities of communication by public roads, 
railroads, etc. » (Marshall, 1890, Book IV, Chapter 3) 
  
Synthesis: Rents and price formation  
 
We will understand rents as the payment of a production factor in excess with respect to the 
minimum level to obtain the expected service from it. As we have seen, different approaches 
have been proposed to explain the mechanisms driving the emergence of these rents, their 
amount and their distribution. We will retain the twofold distinction: 
 
• differential rent vs. scarcity rent. The former focuses on the supply-side specificities as 
sources of rent formation in the cases where production costs are heterogeneous, 
whereas the latter insists on the specificities of demand in terms of competition for the 
possession of goods providing a high level of utility. This opposition refers to different 
visions of economic adjustments, either dominated by supply-side or demand-side 
dimensions.  
• surplus rent vs. monopoly rent. The former approach attributes the emergence of rents 
to the excess of prices over production costs and defines them as a consequence of 
prices decided by market interactions. The latter considers instead that producers have 
the possibility to act strategically to force an increase of prices and the will to capture 
rents is then a cause of the price increase.  
  
We do not consider these distinctions as revealing internal contradictions, but consider instead 
that they offer complementary answers to the two fundamental questions associated to 
markets where rents play an important role: what mechanism drives the formation of price? 
What is the equilibrium price level?  
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III- Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized around six chapters. This succession follows the parallel elaboration 
of a modeling framework embarking the constraints identified in section I and II, including 
those imposed by oil and urban land, and of new policy-relevant insights on the interplay 
between climate policy, oil markets and urban land use. Note that the chapters can also be 
read independently, each of them being conceived to provide an autonomous vision of a 
distinctive step of the analysis.  
Part A considers the fundamentals of the interactions between long-term oil markets, socio-
economic trajectories and climate policies under technical and resource constraints. Chapter 1 
describes the modeling assumptions adopted to represent inertias on oil markets in a modeling 
framework for the assessment of climate policy under second-best economy. This framework 
is used to analyze oil markets and their macroeconomic consequences on both oil-exporting 
and oil-importing economies at different time horizons. This analysis serves to discuss the 
rationale of different geopolitical decisions from major oil exporters and hence to delineate 
the future of the interplay between oil markets and the macroeconomy. Chapter 2 introduces 
the climate policy, and discusses its adverse impact on major oil producers, in the form of 
exportation revenue losses and slowing down of domestic macroeconomic growth. This 
analysis serves as a basis for the discussion of geopolitical dimensions of the interplay 
between oil markets and a climate policy, with a focus on the issue of monetary 
compensations and the actual participation of major oil producers to the climate coalition. 
Chapter 3 considers more generally the time profile of mitigation costs consecutive to the 
implementation of an ambitious climate policy at the world level over the period 2010-2100. 
It identifies in particular the role of oil markets in driving these profiles in the form of both 
high risks of important short-term losses and opportunities of co-benefits ensuring relative 
gains thanks to the correction of imperfections in baseline scenarios. This chapter concludes 
by demonstrating the role of complementary policies to carbon pricing that help decreasing 
mitigation costs by reducing the dependence on mobility and even create room for negative 
mitigation costs over the long term. 
Part B introduces location patterns and the spatial dimension of economic activities as a 
crucial determinant of energy and environmental effects. Chapter 4 proposes a theoretical 
model of the interplay between economic activity, location decisions and climate change in 
the light of the New Economic Geography. This is done by representing the stock effect of 
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pollutants affecting welfare in function of their accumulation over time and the potentials for 
catastrophic event at low environmental quality in the long-term. This model serves as a basis 
for an analysis of the interplay between trade patterns, regional spatial structure and long-term 
stabilization objectives of pollutant stocks. Chapter 5 develops a model of the interactions 
between a multiplicity of agglomerations, their interplay being described according to NEG 
principles and their internal structure (including the price of urban land) being represented in 
line with urban economy theory. This framework is calibrated on explicit datasets for the 74 
largest OECD agglomerations, its dynamics is tested against past historical data and it 
represents the specificities of agglomerations driving urban dynamics. Chapter 6 embarks this 
analysis of location choices into the energy-economy model developed in Part A for the 
analysis of climate change issues. This allows representing both the impact of macroeconomic 
trends on urbanization patterns and, conversely, the feedback effect of urban development on 
the macroeconomy. This framework is used to reassess the costs of climate policies and to 
evaluate in particular the potentials offered by densification policies at the urban scale as a 
mean to reduce mobility dependency and related carbon emissions. 
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Part A 
Oil markets and climate policies 
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This introductory section derives lessons from the general analysis of rents (see General 
Introduction) to define the modes of representation for oil markets that will be adopted in this 
thesis 
I- Short- and long-term scarcity rents  
 
The formation of oil prices is governed by the limitations on the deployment of production 
capacities and on the potentials for reducing demand, the magnitude of these two constraints 
depending on the temporal horizon considered. 
  In the short-term, oil markets combine a very inelastic demand with important 
constraints on the deployment of production capacities that make oil rents belong to the 
category of “quasi rents” in the sense of Marshall (1890). On the one hand, the short-term 
inelasticity of oil demand is notably due to the dominant role of the transport sector (52% of 
world oil demand in 2006 according to (IEA, 2008)), which imposes specific constraints in 
reason of (a) the low potentials for substitution towards other energy sources that limit the 
decoupling between oil demand and transport activity, since other potential sources of liquid 
fuels (biofuels and coal liquefaction) are not immediately available at a large scale, and (b) 
the dependence on mobility that cannot be reduced overnight because of the constraints 
imposed by long-lived infrastructure. On the other hand, the deployment of oil production 
capacities is submitted to strong inertias associated to the high costs of findings and 
developments (around 20$/Barrel according to Figure 13.6 in (IEA, 2008)) and the delays 
before production can effectively start. This means that the potentials for production increase 
are economically and technically limited in the short-term. 
 In the long run, the existence of oil rents is more fundamentally  due to its exhaustible nature 
since oil is a capital given by nature that humans cannot produce. Moving from a resource 
which can be consumed without affecting its capital (land) to an exhaustible resource whose 
consumption at the current date affects the availability in the future (oil) makes necessary the 
representation of intertemporal effects. This dimension has been treated by Hotelling (1931), 
who proposes a theoretical framework for analyzing the behavior of producers exploiting an 
exhaustible resource. He demonstrates that the production profile that optimizes producers’ 
profits is obtained by an exponential increase of prices and a progressive decline of supply. 
The resulting rent is essentially different from a differential rent since it exists even with a 
homogenous resource with zero production costs. 
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II- Resource heterogeneity and differential rents 
 
When accounting for the heterogeneity of a natural resource, differential rents can emerge  as 
illustrated by the direct parallel with the mechanisms at play with lands of different fertilities 
established by Ricardo on the example of mines: 
«There are mines of various qualities, affording very different results, with equal 
quantities of labour. […] The return for capital from the poorest mine paying no 
rent, would regulate the rent of all the other more productive mines. […] Since 
this principle is precisely the same as that which we have already laid down 
respecting land, it will not be necessary further to enlarge on it. » (Ricardo, 1817, 
chapter 3). 
 
The example of mines can be directly transferred to oil resources, since intrinsic differences 
of oil fields (deepness, accessibility, location, nature of the resource) introduce differences of 
production costs, which play the role of the “quality” of the resource. This heterogeneity is 
illustrated in Figure 0.1, which reports the capital costs necessary for putting different types of 
oil resource in exploitation. It demonstrates the high difference in the cost of putting a barrel 
on the market according to the regions and the types of oil under consideration. For example, 
upstream investments are four times higher in the North Sea than in Middle-East and even 
seven times higher when extending the range of oil resources to non-conventional oil like oil 
sands. 
  
Figure 0.1: Average capital cost of upstream projects under development (IEA, 2008, Figure 13.10) 
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However, these differences are the source of differential rents only if demand is too strong to 
be satisfied only by the low-cost categories. The empirical analysis confirms that this is 
actually the case in the real world, since low-cost oil resources (principally located in Middle-
East regions) only contribute to a minority of total production, the rest of demand being 
satisfied by higher-cost categories (Table 0.2) 
 
Table 0.2: Oil production in 2007, in MBarrel per day (source: IEA, 2008) 
Middle-
East 
Rest of 
OPEC 
North 
America 
Rest of 
OECD 
Latin 
America 
Rest of the 
World 
TOTAL 
23.7 12.2 13.8 5.5 3.5 25.6 84.3 
 
This production scheme may seem surprising given the abundance of low-cost reserves that 
could potentially meet the whole demand, but the simultaneous exploitation of different oil 
categories is due to number of specificities that limit the expansion of existing capacities: (a) 
under given technology, the extraction rate tends to decrease with the exploitation of an oil 
field so that additional investments triggering an increase of production costs are necessary to 
maintain the flow of production. This means that the exploitation of low-cost categories is less 
favorable when depletion approaches and it may be appropriate to turn to other categories 
which, although initially more expensive, are less advanced in their depletion process, (b) the 
limited quantity of low-cost categories is limited and the exploitation of high-cost categories 
is unavoidable. When accounting for the already mentioned inertias in the deployment of new 
production capacities, the producers of the high-cost categories must anticipate their entrance 
into the market and start production, and (c) the interests of producers in different regions of 
the world pushes even the possessors of high-cost categories to put their reserves into 
exploitation to benefit from a small amount of rent without waiting for their categories to be 
the more profitable remaining resource 
 
III- Market power and monopoly rents 
  
Finally, major oil producers grouped in the OPEC have both the possibility and the will to 
control production in order to satisfy their rent-seeking objective. This is possible since they 
benefit from a high market share, which is likely to be reinforced within the next decade 
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because of the decline of conventional production in other regions of the world. Although the 
coordination of this oligopoly is sometimes erratic, it remains that this group of suppliers have 
the possibility to act strategically to influence oil prices through their decisions on the 
deployment of production capacities, as typically demonstrated by the oil shocks of the 70’s 
resulting from sudden changes of OPEC’s production decisions. In this case, the oil rent has a 
strong “monopoly rent” component.1  
 
IV. Specifications for the representation of oil markets 
 
The superposition of the different types of rents above described is at the core of the 
representation of oil prices. Given the above analysis, their fundamentals can be summarized 
as follows: 
 
• On the demand side, the main determinants to be considered are those explaining the 
low elasticity at short- and long-term as a consequence of the interplay between 
technical constraints (availability of alternatives to oil, limits on the decoupling 
between oil demand and economic activity), consumption patterns (preferences) and 
location choices (constrained mobility) 
• On the supply side, it is necessary to represent the short-term inertias on the expansion 
of production capacities, the long-term limitations imposed by resource depletion, the 
heterogeneity of the oil resource in terms of regional distribution and production costs, 
and OPEC’s market power, which let them affect world prices through their decisions 
of production expansion. 
 
Chapter 1 describes and discusses the modeling choices adopted to capture these specificities 
of oil markets. This architecture will serve in the remaining of this thesis as a tool to 
investigate the interplay between oil markets and climate policy. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
adverse impacts of climate policies on major oil exporters and discusses the crucial 
geopolitical issue of monetary compensations. Chapter 3 investigates the cost of climate 
policies with in particular the co-benefit in terms of reduced vulnerability to oil scarcity. 
                                                     
1 It must be noted that the 2008-2009 rise of oil prices, commonly considered as the third oil shock, cannot be 
attributed to such a rent-seeking behavior, but rather belongs to the scarcity rent category described in section I. 
It was indeed due to the very fast increase of oil demand consecutive to economic growth in emerging 
economies and to the impossibility to deploy immediately sufficient production capacities. 
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Chapter 1  
Peak Oil through the lens of a  
general equilibrium assessment  
 
This first chapter* examines the interactions between the determinants of oil markets – oil 
supply, fuel demand and oil substitutes – and disentangles their impact on the time profile of 
oil prices and the macroeconomy. To this aim, we elaborate a general equilibrium model in 
which production and prices endogenously emerge from the interplay between the technical, 
macroeconomic and geopolitical determinants of oil markets under non-perfect expectations. 
This allows in particular to represent Peak Oil profiles and their macroeconomic effects at 
different time horizons. We consider two oil price profiles corresponding to alternative 
strategies of Middle-East producers, which prove to have weak influence on the date of Peak 
Oil but important macroeconomic effects on OECD and Middle-East growth trajectories. To 
test the robustness of our findings, we investigate Middle-East’s trade-off for different 
objectives (maximisation of oil revenues or households’ welfare) and a large set of 
assumptions about conventional oil resources and deployment of non conventional oil.  
 
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is a reproduction of : Waisman H, Rozenberg J, Sassi O and Hourcade JC (2011). Peak Oil 
through the lens of a general equilibrium assessment, submitted to Energy Policy. 
44 
  
45 
In public debates, Peak Oil relays concerns about the date at which world oil production will 
start declining inexorably. The debates have been focused on the date of this Peak Oil and are 
essentially conducted under the assumption that oil production profiles are determined by 
exogenous assumptions on the total amount of oil resources (see (Al-Husseini, 2006) for a 
review). This vision is supported by the generalization, at a global level, of bell-shaped 5 
profiles used by Hubbert to predict the decline of US production in the 70’s ((Hubbert, 1956, 
1962); Deffeys (2002)). Note that these curves are meant to capture geological constraints in 
the form of depletion effects and inertias on the deployment of production capacities. 
This paper finds its starting point in the idea that the focus on the geological origin and the 
date of Peak Oil distracts the attention from the core determinants and the economic 10 
consequences of the end of cheap oil. Setting aside controversies about the generalization at a 
macro level of the Hubbert approach (Lynch, 2003), this paper argues that what matters is not 
so much the date of Peak Oil than the abruptness of the unanticipated break in oil trends at 
that period and the capacity of the economies to adapt to it. 
This abruptness and its economic consequences are determined by the relative evolution rates 15 
of oil supply, fuel demand and oil substitutes under imperfect expectations and inertia 
constraints. To investigate the interplay between these dimensions, we use a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model, which incorporates a comprehensive description of the 
determinants of oil markets, including the geological constraints behind the Hubbert curves. 
This framework pictures a world with imperfect foresight, endogenous technical change and 20 
inertia on the deployment of end-use equipments and oil substitutes. Section 1 describes and 
justifies this modeling option. 
Section 2 conducts a comparative analysis of the economic consequences of two oil pricing 
trajectories: high short-term prices caused by a limited deployment of production capacities 
vs. moderate short term prices caused by a market flooding behavior. The former allows high 25 
short-term revenues for oil-producing countries, while it limits the vulnerability of oil-
importing economies to Peak Oil by accelerating oil-free technical change; the latter 
discourages oil-saving technical change and triggers high prices in the Peak Oil period.  
Section 3 conducts a sensitivity analysis on the results by considering different assumptions 
regarding the amount of oil resources and the extent of inertias that characterize non-30 
conventional production. We assess their impact on economic outcomes and show in 
particular the parameter sets under which the temporary sacrifice of short-term oil profits 
under the market flooding option may prove beneficial for Middle-East producers thanks to 
the later increase of their revenue. 
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I. Endogenizing Peak Oil in a second-best economy 
Long run general equilibrium interactions between oil markets and economic growth are 
conventionally investigated either with models picturing exhaustible resource exploitation à 
la Hotelling (1931) which conclude, instead of a Peak Oil, to a steady decline of production 
over time (see, for example, Anderson (1972), Solow (1974) or Stiglitz (1974) and 5 
Krautkraemer (1998) for a review)1, or with energy-economy models which conventionally 
assume steady growth pathways and aggregate supply curves (IPCC, 2007). With these 
approaches, meant to explore long run pathways, the geological constraints on short term 
adaptability of oil production do not really matter because they are anticipated and/or because 
the oil demand, driven by steady growth, evolves smoothly. 10 
The short-term effects are considered through two independent traditions. On the one hand, 
econometric analyses developed after the oil shocks investigate the transmission channels 
between oil prices and GDP but do not account for long term resource depletion because of 
their short-term focus (Hamilton (2008)). These studies demonstrate that modeling exercises 
can better reproduce the observed magnitude of the economic effect of oil price variations if 15 
they include 1) mark-up pricing to capture market imperfections (Rotemberg and Woodford, 
1996); 2) partial utilization rate of capital when the full utilization of installed production 
capacities cannot be achieved due to limits in the substitution between capital and energy 
(Finn, 2000); 3) a putty-clay description of technologies to represent the inertias in the 
renewal of capital stock (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999); 4) frictions in the reallocation of capital 20 
across heterogeneous sectors causing differentiated levels of idle production capacities 
(Bresnahan and Ramey, 1993); 5) frictions in the reallocation of labor across heterogeneous 
sectors causing differentiated levels of unemployment (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001). On the 
other hand, recursive partial equilibrium analyses of supply/demand adjustments can predict 
Peak Oil but fail to consider their macroeconomic impacts (see (Fattouh, 2007) for a review). 25 
This group of studies teaches us the crucial role played by geological constraints, geopolitical 
dimensions, technical inertias and imperfect foresight on short-run oil supply adaptability. 
The CGE model IMACLIM-R bridges the gap between these different branches of the literature 
by capturing the general equilibrium effects of short-term dynamics in second-best 
economies at different time horizons. 30 
                                                     
1 A notable exception is in Holland (2008) who obtains a peak of production in an Hotelling-like framework by 
embarking forces that increase the equilibrium production and counterbalance the decreasing trend imposed by 
the depletion effect  
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1- Modeling the impact of oil markets on macroeconomic dynamics 
IMACLIM-R is a recursive CGE model of the world economy, divided in 12 regions and 12 
sectors (see Annex A for technical details). It is calibrated for the 2001 base year by 
modifying the set of balanced input-output tables provided by the GTAP-6 dataset 
(Dimaranan, 2006) to make them fully compatible with 2001 IEA energy balances (in Mtoe) 5 
and data on passengers’ mobility (in passenger-km) from (Schafer and Victor, 2000). The 
model was tested against historic data up to 2006 (Guivarch et al., 2009) and covers the 
period 2001-2050 in yearly steps through the recursive succession of static equilibria and 
dynamic modules. It incorporates the above listed five features identified from econometric 
analyses as crucial for the representation of energy-economy interactions.  10 
The static equilibrium represents short-run macroeconomic interactions at each date t under 
technology and capacity constraints. It is calculated assuming Leontief production functions 
with fixed intermediate consumption and labor inputs, decreasing static returns caused by 
higher labor costs at high utilization rate of production capacities (Corrado and Mattey, 1997) 
and fixed mark-up in non-energy sectors (feature 1). Households maximize their utility 15 
through a tradeoff between consumption goods, mobility services and residential energy uses 
considering fixed end-use equipments. Market clearing conditions can lead to a partial 
utilization of production capacities (feature 2) given the fixed mark-up pricing and the 
stickiness of labor markets (feature 5). This equilibrium provides a snapshot of the economy 
at date t in terms of relative prices, wages, employment, production levels and trade flows.  20 
The dynamic modules are reduced forms of bottom-up models, which describe the evolution 
of structural and technical parameters between t and t+1 in response to past and current 
economic signals. Available techniques at date t result from the structure and amount of 
cumulated learning-by-doing processes within the innovation possibility frontier 
characterizing explicitly the ultimate potentials on the supply and demand side (Ahmad, 25 
1966). Technical choices modify only new input-output coefficients and not those of 
techniques embodied in equipments resulting from past choices. This putty-clay description 
helps to capture inertias on the renewal of technologies (feature 3) and capital (feature 4). 
Note that this description of inertia also enables a realistic reproduction of the heterogeneity 
in technical dynamics across regions. The new technical coefficients and investment choices 30 
are sent back to the static module in the form of updated input-output coefficients and 
production capacities to calculate the equilibrium at date t+1.  
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The consistency of the iteration between the static equilibrium and dynamic modules relies 
on ‘hybrid matrices’ (Hourcade et al., 2006), which ensure a description of the economy in 
consistent money values and physical quantities (Sands et al., 2005). This dual description 
represents the material and technical content of production processes and allows abandoning 
standard aggregate production functions, which have intrinsic limitations in case of large 5 
departures from the reference equilibrium (Frondel et al., 2002) and deep changes of 
production frontiers over several decades. 
In this multisectoral framework with partial use of production factors, effective growth 
patterns depart from the natural rate (Phelps, 1961) given by exogenous assumptions on 
active population (derived from UN medium scenarios) and labor productivity (satisfying a 10 
convergence hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) informed by historic trajectories 
(Maddison, 1995) and ‘best guess’ assumptions (Oliveira-Martins et al., 2005)). The structure 
and rate of effective growth at each point in time are endogenously determined by a) the 
allocation of the labor force across sectors, which is governed by the final demand addressed 
to these sectors b) the sectoral productivities which result from past investment decisions 15 
governing learning by doing processes c) the shortage or excess of productive capacities 
which result from past investment decisions under adaptive expectations. 
2- Modeling the long-term dynamics of oil markets 
 
The determinants of oil markets are described in dynamic modules which include lessons 20 
from partial equilibrium analyses of supply/demand adjustments on oil markets. They 
represent: the technical constraints (including geology) on the short-term adaptability of oil 
supply and the influence of Middle-East countries on production decisions (section 1.2.1); 
technical inertias on the deployment of oil substitutes (1.2.2); and  consumers’ short-term 
trade-offs in a set of technical and economic conditions (1.2.3).  25 
 
2-1 Oil supply 
IMACLIM-R distinguishes seven categories of conventional and five categories of non-
conventional oil resources in each region. Each category i is characterized by the amount of 
ultimate resources ,iQ∞  (given by the sum of resources extracted before 2001 and recoverable 30 
resources) and by a threshold selling price above which producers initiate production, (0) ( )p i . 
This price is a proxy for production costs and accessibility. Table 1.1 gives our numerical 
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assumptions of the amount of ultimate resources in the main groups of regions. The figures 
are consistent with conservative estimates (USGS, 2000; Greene et al., 2006; Rogner, 1997) 
and a sensitivity analysis in section 3 will investigate the effect of more pessimistic or 
optimistic assumptions. Note that oil shales are not included because the specificities of their 
exploitation process and the associated high production cost lead us to consider them as an 5 
alternative to oil instead of a new category of oil. 
Table 1.1. Assumptions about oil resources in the central case (Trillion bbl) 
Resources extracted 
before 2001 
Recoverable resources beyond 2001* 
Conventional oil 
Non-conventional oil  
(Heavy oil and Tar sands) 
Middle-East RoW Canada Latin America RoW 
0.895 0.78 1.17 0.220 0.38 0.4 
* « recoverable resources » are 2P reserves (Proven+Probable) remaining in the soil, which has been identified 
as the relevant indicator to investigate global oil peak (Bentley et al,, 2007) 
 10 
Each oil category is submitted to geological constraints (inertias in the exploration process 
and depletion effects), which limit the pace of expansion of their production capacity. In line 
with (Rehrl and Friedrich, 2006), who combine analyzes of discovery processes (Uhler, 
1976) and of the “mineral economy” (Reynolds, 1999), the maximum rate of increase in 
production capacity for an oil category i at date t, max ( , )Cap t iΔ , is given by: 15 
( )
( )
0,
0,
( )
max
( )
. 1( , )
( , ) 1
i i
i i
b t t
i
b t t
b eCap t i
Cap t i e
− −
− −
−Δ = +                                                  (1) 
The parameter bi (in t-1) controls the intensity of constraints on production growth: a small 
(high) bi means a flat (sloping) production profile to represent slow (fast) deployment of 
production capacities. We retain bi=0.061/year for conventional oil as estimated by Rehrl and 
Friedrich (2006) and, for the sake of simplicity, the same value for non-conventional oil in 20 
the median case (Section 3 relaxes this hypothesis by considering both lower and higher 
values of the b-parameter for non conventional oil). The parameter t0,i represents the date at 
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which production capacities of the concerned oil category are expected to start to decline due 
to depletion effects. It is endogenous and varies in time since it depends on the amount of oil 
remaining in the soil given past exploitation decisions. 
Non-Middle-East producers are seen as ‘fatal producers’ who do not act strategically on oil 
markets. Given the selling oil price oilp , they invest in new production capacity if an oil 5 
category becomes profitable: they develop production capacities at their maximum rate of 
increase max ( , )Cap t iΔ for least-cost categories ( (0) ( )oilp p i> ) but stop investments in high-
cost categories ( (0) ( )oilp p i< ). If prices continuously increase, production capacities of a 
given oil category follow a bell-shape trend, whereas their deployment profile passes through 
a plateau if prices decrease below the profitability threshold.  10 
Middle-East producers are ‘swing producers’ who are free to strategically time their 
investment decisions and, until they reach their depletion constraints, to control oil prices 
through the utilization rate of their production capacities (Kaufmann et al, 2004). This 
possibility is justified by the temporary reinforcement of their market power due to the 
stagnation and decline of conventional oil in the rest of the world. They can in particular 15 
decide to slow the development of production capacities below its maximum rate in order to 
adjust the oil price according to their rent-seeking objective. 
Total production capacity at date t is given by the sum over oil categories of investment 
decisions which are conditioned by different production costs (captured by different (0) ( )p i  
threshold). This means that projects of various merit orders coexist at a given point in time, 20 
consistently with the observed evidence and theoretical justifications2. 
 
2-2 Substitutes to oil  
The first large-scale substitute to oil for liquid fuels production consists in first and second 
generation biofuels from renewable land resources. Their diffusion is controlled by supply 25 
curves borrowed from IEA (2006): at each date, biofuels’ market share is an increasing 
function of oil prices which captures in a simplistic manner the competition between biofuels 
and oil-based liquid fuels (everything else being equal, the former are more competitive and 
                                                     
2 (Kemp and Van Long, 1980) have indeed demonstrated that, in a general equilibrium context, the lowest-cost 
deposits are not necessarily exploited first. (Holland, 2003) even demonstrates that least-cost-first extraction rule 
does not hold in partial equilibrium under capacity constraints, like those envisaged for geological reasons here. 
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their penetration into the market is more prominent when higher oil price make the latter 
more expensive). These supply curves consider explicit limits on production due to land 
availability and competition with other biomass uses and are modified from one date to the 
other to account for learning-by-doing improvements.  
The second alternative to oil is Coal-To-Liquid (CTL). We consider it as an inexhaustible 5 
backstop technology submitted to deployment capacity constraints. In line with Amigues et al 
(1998), production of the inexhaustible substitute starts before all the least-cost deposits of 
the exhaustible resource are exploited: CTL enters the market when oil prices exceed a 
threshold value, pCTL , set for the sake of simplicity at pCTL= 100$/bbl for all scenarios. Once 
this threshold is crossed, CTL producers are willing to fill the gap between total liquid fuel 10 
demand, D(t), and total supply by other sources (refined oil and biofuels), S(t). But, CTL 
production may be limited by constraints on delivery capacity due to past investment 
decisions if, due to imperfect foresight, profitability prospects for CTL were underestimated. 
These prospects are an increasing function of oil prices at each point in time3 and cumulative 
investment on CTL over time is then a function of the sum of past oil prices: 15 
( )
2010
( )
t
cum oil
i
p t p i
=
= ∑ . The share s of the potential market for CTL D(t)- S(t) that is actually 
available to CTL is thus an increasing function of ( )cump t . As soon as oil price exceeds pCTL , 
CTL production is then given by:  
( ) ( ) [ ]( ) . ( ) S( )cumCTL t s p t D t t= −                                                (2) 
 20 
2-3 Liquid fuels’ demand  
In IMACLIM-R, final demand for liquid fuels is derived from households’ and industry’s 
demand for energy services derived from utility and profit maximization respectively. 
Bottom-up modules describe the dynamics of technological constraints in the three major oil-
consuming sectors (industry, residential, transport). Because of inertias in the renewal of end-25 
use equipment and the pace of learning-by-doing processes, a significant decoupling between 
liquid fuel demand and economic growth can be obtained only after the renewal of several 
capital vintages, all the more so under imperfect foresight. In the transport sector, passengers’ 
mobility and modal distribution depend on (i) households’ choices from an explicit portfolio 
                                                     
3  Indeed, higher oil prices drive higher prices of liquid fuels, including those produced from coal, and then 
higher profitability prospects for CTL. 
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of vehicles (including electric vehicles) according to minimization of the total user-costs and 
(ii) the availability and efficiency (including congestion effects) of road infrastructures and 
alternative options (railways, soft modes) driving the saturation of the time budget the 
consumer can allocate to transportation. In the long-run, the decoupling between liquid fuel 
demand and economic growth is constrained by (i) higher energy service demand (mobility, 5 
residential uses) along with wealth increase (ii) technical asymptotes for fuel switching and 
energy efficiency, (iii) limited potentials for non-fossil energies including political obstacles 
for nuclear (iv) increasing trends in freight mobility imposed by international trade and just-
in-time processes (v) rebound effects in passenger mobility (Greening et al, 2000).  
II. Peak Oil profiles and their macroeconomic dimensions 10 
In this section, we study the implications of two oil pricing trajectories resulting from 
alternative strategic options for Middle-East producers under the same assumptions on the 
determinants of liquid fuel demand. We define two counterfactual scenarios4: 
- The Market Flooding scenario (MF): Middle-East producers expand their production 
capacities and bring the oil price back to its pre-2004 level, plow = 50$/bbl. This floor level is 15 
assumed to be sufficient to maintain the stability in the cartel and guarantees a minimum 
level of income to highly populated countries. 
- The Limited Deployment scenario (LD): Middle-East producers refrain from investing 
in new capacity and maintain the medium term oil price around phigh=80$/bbl. They adopt 
local fiscal policies to secure domestic social stability by moderating the increase of energy 20 
prices for the consumers of the region. 5 
1- Beyond Peak Oil, contrasting dynamics of oil markets  
The world oil production profile proves to be bell shaped in both scenarios, peaking in 2025 
in the Market Flooding scenario and in 2028 in the Low Deployment scenario (Figure 1.1). In 
the Market Flooding scenario, oil-intensive growth patterns are fostered by low prices which 25 
                                                     
4 These scenarios are built on a single set of assumptions about natural growth rates, which intentionally do not 
represent the current economic crisis for the sake of simplicity. But, the analysis carried out in this paper 
provides important insights on the medium term dynamics of the economic recovery phase, which will be 
critically determined by the economic interactions on oil markets. Further investigation will be necessary to 
consider the feedback effect of the current economic crisis on the real behaviors of oil markets, specifically 
because of the inertia of re-launching investments in both conventional and non conventional oil.  
5 The values of plow and phigh are expressed in 2001$ and correspond respectively to around 60$/bbl and 100 
$/bbl in current currency. They represent a low and high value for medium-term oil price, around the estimate of 
78$/bbl by the Short-Term Energy Outlook 2010 (available at: 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html). 
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accelerate the exhaustion of conventional resources and leads to an early Peak Oil. This 
corresponds to a pronounced bell-shaped profile with significant break in production trends at 
the Peak Oil date and fast decrease after that. In the Low Deployment scenario, on the 
contrary, higher short-term prices foster moderation of demand and lead to a flatter profile; 
the reversal of production trends around the Peak Oil period is smooth and production 5 
volumes decrease at a moderate pace in the long term. Total supply even becomes higher than 
in the Market Flooding case after 2040. 
Figure  1.1.World oil production (Million b/d)  
  
 10 
 The small gap in the Peak Oil dates masks indeed important differences in the 
production profile. The peak level is 20% higher in volume in the Market Flooding scenario 
(120 Million b/d) and the reversal of production trends after the Peak Oil is more abrupt (the 
production declines by 31% in the Market Flooding scenario and only 17% in the Low 
Deployment scenario over the twenty years following Peak Oil). Logically indeed, lower 15 
energy prices in the first period (a) induce intensive consumption causing faster exhaustion 
and sharper decline of conventional oil, and (b) deter investment in non-conventional 
production capacities and limit their availability in the post-Peak Oil period. 
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Figure  1.2. World oil price ($/bbl)  
   
 
 In the Market Flooding scenario, a steep and lasting surge in oil prices begins just 
before Peak Oil (Figure 1.2). It is triggered by tension between high demand, which cannot 5 
be reduced overnight due to inertias, and the constraints on the deployment of oil and oil 
substitutes’ production capacities. Conversely, prices in the Low Deployment scenario 
increase smoothly and are lower than prices in the Market Flooding scenario after 2035, 
because high early price signals foster a timely penetration of oil substitutes and trigger 
energy efficiency abroad (Figure 2). Over the very long run, oil prices return to the price of 10 
the backstop CTL (100$/b) in both scenarios, but inertias in the penetration of this technology 
prevent this convergence during the period 2010-2050 considered in this paper.  
2- The terms of the economic trade-off for oil producers 
The time-profile of Middle-East oil profits (Figure 1.3) results from the volume and price 
effects described in section 2.1. Short-term oil revenues are higher under the Low 15 
Deployment scenario than in the Market Flooding scenario, but the situation is reversed after 
Peak Oil. In both scenarios, the post-Peak Oil rise of oil prices induces a surge of oil 
revenues; this surge is amplified in the Market Flooding scenario because of higher long-term 
oil prices. In this scenario, Middle-East countries can thus expect a reward for sacrificing 
short-term revenues and the trade-off between these two strategies depends on the objective 20 
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function of Middle-East countries. Let us consider two polar objective functions as extreme 
cases where they put all weight on private interests (by maximizing oil revenues) or on the 
public welfare (by maximizing domestic households’ surplus).  
 
Figure  1.3. Middle-East annual oil profits (Billion$)  5 
 
 
 In the first case, Middle-East oil companies act as profit maximizing firms 
independent from any political influence. They choose their strategy based on discounted 
cumulated oil revenues (Table 1.2) and adopt the Market Flooding option only for discount 10 
rates lower than 6%. This is far below the high internal rates of returns demanded by private 
oil companies (17.26% to 21.97%, according to the Texas Comptroller’s Property Tax 
Division6). Even though the recent financial crisis casts doubts upon the persistence of so 
high a profitability ratio, a breakeven point as low as 6% suggests that the adoption of the 
Market Flooding scenario is unlikely under this decision criterion (see Adelman (1986) for a 15 
more detailed analysis of discounting in the specific case of major oil producing countries). 
 
                                                     
6 Determination of 2002 Discount Rate Range for Petroleum and Hard Mineral (available at: 
http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/proptax/drs02/) 
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Table 1.2. Middle-East’s discounted oil profits (Billion  $) 
Discount rate* 
Limited Deployment
 Scenario 
Market Flooding 
 Scenario 
0% 38.9 43.6 
1% 28.9 31.8 
2% 21.9 23.6 
5% 10.6 10.8 
6% 8.7 8.6 
7% 7.2 7.0 
15% 2.4 2.2 
*We present results for a selection of discount rates around the threshold values 5-6% defining the range of 
interest for the analysis, 
Let us now assume that Middle-Eastern companies are managed in function of long-
term public objectives. This means that Middle-East countries impose upon oil companies 5 
and sovereign funds to adopt pricing and investment decisions that maximize their 
households’ surplus and to compare the general equilibrium effects of the two pricing 
strategies. Table 1.3 reports the variation of the population’s surplus SΔ  between the two 
scenarios: S R CVIΔ = Δ − , where RΔ  and CVI  are the effective and compensative variation 
of income respectively, the latter measuring the amount of income that would leave utility 10 
unchanged, given changes in relative prices. With this criterion, the Market Flooding scenario 
becomes a workable alternative because the social discount rate is lower than the private one, 
and because the range of discount rates for which the Market Flooding scenario is desirable 
proves to be much wider than with the oil profit maximization criterion: [ ]0% 13%− instead 
of [ ]0% 7%−  15 
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Table  1.3. Difference in Households’ Surplus in the LD scenario with respect to the MF scenario (Billion  $) 
Discount rate*
Discounted surplus in
LD w.r.t. MF 
5% -1862 
10% -251 
13% -30 
14% +3 
15% +26 
20% +58 
*We present results for a selection of discount rates around the threshold values 13-14% defining the range of 
interest for the analysis, 
 
The difference between the two results originates in the long term macroeconomic 5 
effects of the two investment strategies. For a given assumption about the balance of 
payments, high short-term oil export revenues in the Low Deployment scenario are consistent 
with higher imports of industrial goods and a higher exchange rate of local currencies. This 
penalizes local industry and slows the transition of Middle-East countries away from oil-
based revenues towards industrialization. Conversely, in the Market Flooding scenario, lower 10 
oil revenues allow for lower exchange rates. The development of local industry partially 
offsets short-term losses in oil revenues and better prepares Middle-East countries for the 
post oil era. Short-term inflows of oil revenues come at a pace compatible with the absorption 
capacity of the local economy, and the high post-Peak Oil inflows benefit to a more mature 
industrial structure. This captures in a simple form the ‘natural resource curse’ (Sachs and 15 
Warner, 2001) and the ‘Dutch Disease’: high resource rents do not guarantee sustainable 
growth patterns if limits in the absorption capacity of the economy weaken efficient re-
investment in non-rent production sectors.  
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3- The adverse effects of cheap oil in oil-importing countries 
Over the 2010-2050 time period, average GDP growth rates in the OECD are estimated to be 
1.57% in the Low Deployment scenario vs. 1.53% in the Market Flooding scenario. These 
differences appear to be small in terms of discounted consumption (0.92% with a 2% pure 
time preference) or when translated into a growth delay (13 months). However, these 5 
aggregate indicators hide more significant discrepancies in the time profile of economic 
growth in OECD (Table 1.4).  
 
Table 1.4. Average growth rates in OECD (%) 
  
Total 
(2010-
2050) 
Short-term 
Period 
(2010-2025) 
Peak Oil 
Period 
(2025-2040) 
Long-term 
Period 
(2040-2050)
Natural growth rates 1.42% 1.69% 1.30% 1.19% 
Effective 
growth 
rates 
 
Limited Deployment 
scenario 1.57% 1.93% 1.43% 1.24% 
Market Flooding 
scenario 1.53% 2.00% 1.29% 1.18% 
 10 
An interesting indicator to investigate the importance of these time dependencies is the 
difference between natural and effective growth at different time horizons. Indeed, when 
effective growth is lower than (or very close to) the natural rate, it is impossible to avoid 
tensions in sectors or regions that are below this average effective growth, and to absorb the 
total labor force at constant wages. This happens in particular when investment and technical 15 
constraints inhibit the reallocation of the labor force towards the more productive sectors. 
Table 4 shows that the effective growth exceeds natural growth over the whole “pre-Peak Oil 
period” in the Market Flooding scenario and logically allows for higher OECD growth rates 
due to cheaper oil imports and cheaper energy for households and enterprises. During the 
“Peak Oil period”, the slowing down of economic growth starts sooner in the Market 20 
Flooding scenario and is more intense because Peak Oil hurts a more oil-dependent economy. 
During that period, the effective growth rate falls below the natural one for 10 years (2030-
2040) in the Market Flooding scenario and continues to do so between 2040 and 2047. This 
corresponds to periods with high risks of social tensions. This situation never happens in the 
Low Deployment scenario. 25 
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 These results lead to the conclusion that low energy prices over the short term are not 
necessarily beneficial for oil-importing countries since they may trap them in an oil 
dependency causing a strong variability of economic activity and lasting economic stagnation 
around and after the Peak Oil.  
III. Uncertainties and their economic implications 5 
After focusing on median assumptions for major determinants of oil markets, let us now 
conduct a sensitivity analysis to show the linkages between the main economic indicators and 
alternative assumptions on: 
- the regional and total amount of oil resources; given controversies between 
pessimistic and optimistic views about these resources, we test a number of alternative 10 
scenarios in which the amount of resources is a weighted average between two extremes: 3.5 
Trillion (1012) bbl as a higher bound (2.3 Trillion bbl remaining conventional and 1.2 Trillion 
bbl of non conventional resource, in line with IEA (2008) estimates which gives a range for 
non conventional resources from 1 to 2Trillion bbl) and 2.4 Trillion bbl as a lower bound (1.6 
Trillion bbl conventional and 0.8 Trillion bbl of non conventional), in line with estimates 15 
from the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO). The weighting factor m takes the 
value 0 and 1 for the lower and higher bounds respectively, and 0.5 in the central scenario 
analyzed in section II. 
- the inertias affecting the deployment of non-conventional production; we consider 
four values of the parameter b to represent uncertainties on the rate of deployment of non-20 
conventional oil:  0.07; 0.06 (value used in section II); 0.05, and 0.04.  A higher b-value 
means an easier exploitation and faster deployment of non-conventional resources. 
1- Early or late ‘Peak Oil’? Geological uncertainties matter more that OPEC strategies  
Figure 1.4 demonstrates a wide range of Peak Oil dates, from 2017 to 2039. Unsurprisingly, 
the size of the ultimate oil resource is the major determinant of this 22 year range, as shown 25 
by the strong increase of all curves from left to right. This figure also confirms the diagnosis 
of the median case analysis: for moderate assumptions on oil reserves, Peak Oil dates are 
weakly sensitive to the short-term price trajectory (the difference between Market Flooding 
and Low Deployment scenarios does not exceed five years for m<0.5).  
In contrast, in case of abundant reserves, the sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the Peak 30 
Oil date depends significantly on other determinants. With m=1, the Peak Oil date varies by 
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11 years with respect to the selected pricing trajectory and technical parameters on non-
conventional oil. This represents half the range of variations in Peak Oil dates and confirms a 
basic intuition of the paper, namely that, although the amount of reserves is an important 
factor, other economic and technical parameters may also play a key role in the determination 
of Peak Oil date. 5 
Figure  1.4. Sensitivity of the date of Peak Oil with respect to the amount of resources and inertia in the 
deployment of non-conventional oil 
 
 
2- Long-term oil prices after Peak Oil  10 
We now investigate the sensitivity of the average value of oil prices in the post-Peak Oil 
period, which is an indicator of tensions on oil markets (Figure 1.5). First, higher ultimate 
resources result in lower long-term oil prices as captured by the decreasing trend of all cruves 
from left to right. Indeed, ceteris paribus, higher resource gives a longer period for deploying 
oil-saving technologies and makes the economy less oil-dependent after Peak Oil. Second, 15 
long-term prices are always higher under a Market Flooding scenario because, misled by low 
price signals, oil-importing economies adopt more oil dependent consumption patterns 
triggering high demand. Third, optimistic views on non-conventional oil logically favor 
lower long-term prices by allowing a timely diffusion of substitutes to conventional oil, and 
hence helping to reduce the supply-side constraints on oil markets. 20 
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Figure  1.5. Mean oil price during the post-Peak Oil period with respect to the amount of resources and inertia 
on the deployment of non-conventional oil 
 
Interestingly, the comparison of sensitivity tests in 3.1 and 3.2 confirms that the date of Peak 
Oil says nothing about the time profile of oil prices. Indeed, in low resource cases, the date of 5 
Peak Oil is almost independent of parametric assumptions on pricing trajectories and inertias 
on the deployment of non-conventional oil, but these assumptions have a strong influence on 
long-term oil prices because they determine the abruptness of the break in demand and supply 
trends. Conversely, under high reserves, the wide range of Peak Oil dates hardly affects long-
term oil prices, which remain moderate in all cases; indeed, Peak Oil happens late (not before 10 
2028 under the more optimistic reserve assumption) so that oil-free technical change and the 
diffusion of substitutes to conventional oil have sufficiently progressed to limit the abruptness 
of the break in production and consumption trends at the Peak Oil period.  
 
3- Macroeconomic effects and oil uncertainties 15 
The analysis in Figure 1.6 shows that, unsurprisingly, more abundant reserves foster faster 
OECD growth by offering more abundant resource to these oil-importing economies. It also 
confirms for all parametric assumption that the Low Deployment scenarios are more 
profitable for OECD economies as they reduce their vulnerability to Peak Oil. On average 
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this benefit is small and rather insensitive to parametric assumptions (less than 0.1% 
difference between the more extreme cases).  
Figure  1.6. Average growth rate in OECD countries with respect to the amount of resources and inertia on the 
deployment of non-conventional oil 
 5 
However, like in the median case, a much more contrasted picture is obtained when 
considering the time profiles. In particular, with low reserves, strong inertias on the 
deployment of non conventional oil and low short term oil prices, economic growth remains 
quite below the natural growth rate during 25 years after Peak Oil (Table 1.5), which is 
indicative of long lasting economic tensions. 10 
Table 1.5. Sensitivity tests on the time profile of OECD growth rates (%) 
  
Short-term Period
(2010-2025) 
Peak Oil Period 
(2025-2040) 
Long-term Period
(2040-2050) 
Natural growth rates 1.69% 1.30% 1.19% 
Effective growth rates
 
Minimum  1.85% 1.19% 1.10% 
Maximum  2.05% 1.48% 1.26% 
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The situation is different for oil exporters, which appear more sensitive to parametric 
assumptions even for aggregate indicators like discounted revenues and discounted economic 
activity. We analyze these effects by delineating the domains of discount rates and resources 
over which each pricing scenario is dominant for Middle-East producers under the two 
decision criteria described in section 2.2 (figure 1.7).  5 
Figure 1.7. Dominant scenario for Middle-East countries with respect to the amount of resources and discount 
rate in terms of oil profits (left panel) and surplus (right panel).  
 
 
In all scenarios, higher resources decrease discounted Middle-East oil revenues, since later 10 
Peak Oil postpones the bubble of long-term oil revenues and limits its magnitude due to 
lower long-term oil prices. The magnitude of this effect depends on the scenario considered 
whilst the amount of reserves also infleunces Middle-East producers’ trade-off between the 
MF and Low Deployment scenarios. 
 When producers act as private companies, the threshold value for discount rates 15 
remains low (5-7%) and the trade-off favors the Low Deployment scenario for all 
assumptions (Figure 7, left panel). When considering social surplus, threshold discount rates 
are much higher and delineate a notably wider dominant domain for the Market Flooding 
scenario (Figure 7, right panel).  
 More remarkably, for economically meaningful reasons, the trend of the curves with 20 
respect to the amount of resources depends on the decision criterion. The downward oriented 
slope in (Figure 7, left panel) demonstrates that the Market Flooding scenario is penalized by 
high resources with private assessments. Indeed, higher resources lead to a longer period of 
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technical change before constraints on oil supply appear, and oil-importing economies are 
less oil-dependent when hit by ‘Peak Oil’. This leads to a delayed and lower long-term 
bubble of oil profits which affects the reward for the short-term sacrifice.  
 When considering social assessments instead, the upward oriented slope in (Figure 7, 
right panel) demonstrates that the Market Flooding scenario is favored by high resources. 5 
This is due to the impact of oil resources on the magnitude and duration of the Dutch Disease 
mechanism and on the length of the period during which oil importers are directed towards 
oil-intensive pathways. Higher resources extend the period during which lower oil revenues 
in the Market Flooding scenario force the development of local industrial production in 
Middle-East countries. In this way, the long-run absorption capacity of Middle-East 10 
economies is improved after Peak Oil, i.e. at the moment when they get the bubble of oil 
revenues. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper reviews the notion of Peak Oil in a general equilibrium modeling framework that 
represents the limits on the short term adaptability of oil supply, oil substitutes and fuel 15 
demand. In this framework, inertia and imperfect foresight create the possibility of a sudden 
acceleration in oil price increases if importing economies are very oil-dependent when 
entering the period of oil depletion.  
By considering two counterfactual scenarios, sensitivity tests show that the date of Peak Oil 
is sensitive to short-term oil price only in case of high reserves and that Peak Oil dates that 20 
differ only slightly may lead to very different time profiles of oil prices, rent formation and 
growth patterns.  
From oil exporters’ point of view, low oil prices undermine short-term exportation revenues; 
but they encourage oil consumption, make oil-importing economies more oil-dependent at the 
Peak Oil date and create room for a bubble of long-term oil exportation revenues. It thus may 25 
be in the interests of oil producers to accept a temporary sacrifice in their short-term export 
revenues so as to benefit from higher long-term revenues in the post-Peak Oil period. But, 
they will do so only if they consider long-term macroeconomic objectives (including 
industrialization and hedging against Dutch Disease) instead of the maximization of 
discounted oil revenues. This option is all the more attractive in case of high reserves.   30 
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From oil importers’ point of view, long periods of low energy prices make the economy more 
vulnerable to Peak Oil and may not ultimately be beneficial. It may thus be in their interest to 
correct potentially misleading price-signals by using complementary measures  to secure 
steady technical change. Among them, international climate policies can be envisaged as a 
hedging strategy against the negative long-term economic outcome of the uncertainty on oil 5 
markets (Rozenberg et al, 2010). This possibility, in turn, raises the question of Middle-East 
countries’ reaction to these measures. 
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Chapter 2  
Climate policy and oil exporters: 
a general equilibrium assessment of 5 
monetary compensations 
This second chapter* extends the modeling exercise of Chapter 1 to consider the effect of a 
climate policy on oil markets and the macroeconomy. This allows us to disentangle the 
interactions between a worldwide carbon price, oil prices and production patterns, and to 
quantify the consequences on Middle-East producers’ economy in terms of exportation and 10 
macroeconomic losses. This assessment gives the magnitude of monetary transfers oil 
producers may claim to compensate for their losses, an often discussed point in climate 
negotiations. The evaluation of macroeconomic effects on both the receivers and the 
contributors of these transfers proves that, because of its magnitude and time profile, the 
compensation of GDP losses is both more acceptable and efficient than the compensation of 15 
oil exportation revenue losses. We finally consider the case where these compensations are 
not Middle-East countries do not participate to the climate coalition. By comparing the policy 
costs of the additional carbon burden with those due to monetary compensations under two 
oil pricing trajectories, we delineate the geopolitical interactions between oil markets and 
climate negotiations.  20 
 
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is the outcome of a joint collaboration with Jean-Charles Hourcade and Julie Rozenberg. 
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From its introduction on the diplomatic agenda in 1988, the climate change issue has been 
closely related to energy security concerns. The co-benefit of climate policies in terms of 
reduced dependency on fossil fuels’ importations (Schlessinger, 1989) has remained a major 
political justification for the adoption of ambitious post-2012 climate targets in oil-importing 
countries even during the periods of low oil prices.1 The corollary is the concern of the 5 
Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) about the resulting drop of their 
exportation revenues. This adverse impact of the climate policy has led oil exporters to claim 
for monetary compensations in the context of climate negotiations since the UNFCCC 
(Article 4.8) and the Kyoto protocol (article 3.14) (Barnett and Dessai, 2002). Although it 
conditions to a great extent the participation of Middle-East countries to a climate policy2, 10 
this question has remained a major unadressed political issue until now.3  
 Beyond purely geopolitical obstacles, the difficulty to reach an agreement on this 
question refers also to the controversial picture given by the economic literature on the socio-
economic consequences of climate policy in oil producing countries. On the one hand, hybrid 
energy-economy models concur in predicting significant losses for oil exporters at both short 15 
and long term4. These analyses are suited to capture the general equilibrium feedbacks 
causing adverse impacts, but they conventially do so with first-best assumptions minimizing 
the possibility of co-benefits with respect to the optimal baseline. On the other hand, dynamic 
partial equilibrium models obtain that ambitious climate targets may benefit to conventional 
                                                     
1 The Gleneagles Communiqué following the G8 summit in 2005 is a symptomatic example of this close 
interplay: “(a) Climate change is a serious and long-term challenge […] We know that increased need and use of 
energy from fossil fuels contribute in large part to increases in greenhouse gases associated with the warming of 
our Earth’s surface; (b) Global energy demands are expected to grow by 25% over the next 25 years. This has 
the potential to cause a significant increase in greenhouse gas emissions associated with climate change […]; (c) 
Secure, reliable and affordable energy sources are fundamental to economic stability and development. Rising 
energy demand poses a challenge to energy security given increased reliance on global energy markets.[…]”   
2 as illustrated by the statement of  Dr. Rilwanu Lukman, the Secretary General of OPEC at COP-4: ‘without a 
favourable disposition towards the compensation issue among the Parties to the Convention, how can fossil fuel 
producers be expected to give their wholehearted blessing to measures that could wreak havoc with their 
economies?’ 
3 The 2009 Copenhagen Accord only recognizes "the potential impacts of response measures on countries 
particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects" but does not provide concrete advancement on this question. 
4 The full implementation of the Kyoto Protocol over a 10 year period reduces oil exportation revenues by 9.8% 
to 13% in 2010 with a few percentage point losses in terms of economic activity and welfare (Barnett et al., 
2004). At a 2050 horizon, a 550ppm target would induce a 35% decrease of oil revenues in OPEC countries 
(Van Vuuren et al., 2003) and total abatement cost at approximately 2 percent of GDP in Middle East (WBGU, 
2003). 
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oil producers5. These results reflect the supply constraints imposed by different fractions of 
oil (conventional oil, tar sand, heavy crude oil, and oil shale), but the partial equilibrium 
nature of the exercise fails to consider the feedback effects of climate policies on oil demand 
through reduced economic activity, a major adverse impact on Middle-East economies.  
 This paper bridges the gap between these two branches of the literature by 5 
representing different categories of oil in a Computable General Equilibrim (CGE) energy-
economy model. But, we also extend these conventional approaches to represent the 
transitory departures from first best trajectories due to limited flexibility of economic 
adjustments. The basic intuition is indeed that, under imperfect expectations, adverse impacts 
and co-benefits of a climate policy depend crucially upon market imperfections (in particular, 10 
OPEC’s market power) and technical inertias on (i) the deployment of oil production 
capacities, (ii) the diffusion of alternatives to oil, (iii) the capital turnover in infrastructure 
sectors, and (iv) the pace and direction of end-use technical change.  
Section 1 sketches the rationale of Middle-East producers’ decisions in terms of oil pricing 
stategy and compliance to a climate agreement with and without compensations. Section 2 15 
describes and discusses the modeling assumptions behind the representation of market 
imperfections and technical inertias in a CGE framework. With this framework, Section 3 
estimates the socio-economic consequences of climate policy, including its adverse impacts 
on Middle-East countries and co-benefits for energy importers. This assessment serves in 
Section 4 as a basis for estimating the monetary compensations Middle-East producers may 20 
claim to oil importing countries, and for discussing their acceptability regarding the amount 
of associated transfers and the economic consequences for contributors. Section 5 considers 
finally the possibility that Middle-East exits the coalition and examines the additional burden 
it imposes on other regions.  
 25 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 by affecting more the cost of their potential substitutes (unconventional oil, coal) (Persson et al., 2007) and 
fostering an increase of conventional oil rents in OPEC if they can exert their market power (Johansson et al, 
2009) 
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I. OPEC’s decisions in a climate policy context 
Faced with a context of global agreement on climate policies, major oil producers can 
envisage three types of attitudes vis-à-vis the coalition: 
- participating to the global agreement without compensation (section III). This 
corresponds to an ideal case which may appear quite unrealistic after Copenhagen and 5 
Cancun, but constitutes a useful benchmark to evaluate the ultimate impacts of the 
climate policy. 
- participating to the climate coalition in exchange of a compensation for the adverse 
effects of the climate policy (section IV). In this case, OECD countries agree to 
compensate the adverse impacts of the climate policy for oil producers through 10 
monetary transfers.  
- remaining outside of the global agreement (section V). This option imposes an 
additional burden to remaining participants to the climate coalition if they want to 
achieve the same climate target. Its rationale for Middle-East countries is to avoid the 
slowing down of economic development induced by a local carbon constraint, but 15 
also to try and discourage the implementation of climate policies by undermining their 
political acceptability through enhanced costs in OECD countries. 
 
Although depending on a complex interplay of domestic and geopolitical determinants that 
are far beyond the scope of this paper, the political acceptability of either option driving the 20 
selection of one of these attitudes is largely dependent upon their ultimate economic 
consequences. These consequences in turn depend upon the way Middle-East countries will 
use the other strategic leeway at their disposal, which is the ability to influence world oil 
prices. 
The way Middle-East countries will exert their market power is conditional upon their ability 25 
to elaborate coordinated strategies during a temporary period. Although the climate policy 
may intensify intra-cartel tensions due to its lowering effect on oil revenues6, we admit that it 
will not affect the cartel discipline. This assumption is in line with (Berg et al, 1997a) who 
show that gains from cartelization are not that much impacted by global carbon taxes. 
                                                     
6This is particularly true since there are great discrepancies among Middle-East countries in terms of oil 
revenues per capita (more than 5000$ per capita in Saudi Arabia versus 800$ in Iran)  
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The response of this cartel to various profiles of carbon prices have been widely investigated 
(IPCC, 2001, section 8.3.2.3) and the conclusion is often that OPEC would adopt a limited 
deployment of oil production capacities to cut back production and maintain revenues (Berg 
and al., 1997b). However, given the experience of the mid-eighties, a market flooding 
strategy with low short-term oil prices cannot be a priori excluded. 7 This is why we will 5 
consider two polar options for short-term oil pricing strategies (note that in the IMACLIM-R 
model, before depletion starts Middle-East producers can control the time profile of oil prices 
through the utilization rate of production capacities): 
- The Limited Deployment scenario (LD): Middle-East producers refrain from investing 
in new capacities and maintain the medium term oil price around phigh=90$/bl 8.  10 
- The Market Flooding scenario (MF): the expansion of production capacities in 
Middle-East countries brings back oil price at its pre-2004 level, plow = 50$/bl.  
 
The Limited Deployment (LD) scenario permits to extract oil rents as soon as possible before 
the climate policy reduces significantly oil demand, contrary to the Market Flooding (MF) 15 
strategy in which short-term oil revenues remain moderate. This sacrifice may be made in 
view of two benefits. On the one hand, a low oil price makes a higher carbon price necessary 
to meet a given climate target. Since consumers and tax-payers are particularly sensitive to 
the carbon price level, this may undermine the political acceptability of climate policies in 
oil-importing countries and hence reduce the adverse impacts in Middle-East countries. On 20 
the other hand, under non-perfect expectations, low oil prices may lead oil importing 
countries towards oil intensive pathways.9 Taking into account inertias on the deployment of 
oil production capacities, oil substitutes and demand-side technical change in OECD 
countries, the demand for oil remains important even in the long run and high scarcity rents 
can then be formed. In this pricing trajectory, low short-term revenues may thus be 25 
compensated by long-term profits.  
                                                     
7 the recent ups and downs in oil prices down to 47$/barrel in November 2008 demonstrates the possibility of 
low prices for reasons other than an explicit market flooding strategy. However, the fall of prices after economic 
crisis simply demonstrates that OPEC did not cut back immediately production capacity. 
8 All price levels are expressed in $2001, the values of plow and phigh corresponding respectively to around 50$/bl 
and 100 $/bl in current currency. The price level estimated by the Short-Term Energy Outlook 2010 (available 
at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/steo/pub/contents.html) is 78$/bl, and falls in the middle of the range defined by 
plow and phigh. 
9 Such a strategy would replicate the drop of oil prices from 35$ to 8$/bbl between 1982 and 1985, followed by 
a stabilization at a rather moderate level, which weakened the discipline adopted in OECD countries in response 
to the oil shocks. 
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But, the time profile of oil revenues is only one indicator of costs and benefits of either 
strategy. Middle-East governments have indeed to consider broader objectives such as 
calming down social tensions or ensuring a sustainable long-run development beyond the ‘oil 
era’. This is why we have to capture the induced socioeconomic effects as measured by 
macroeconomic indicators of economic activity and welfare through a general equilibrium 5 
analysis. 
 
II The model 
We adopt the energy-economy model IMACLIM-R, which has been designed to endogenize the 
interplay between the long-term dynamics of oil markets, the strategies of major oil producers 10 
and general equilibrium effects under climate policy. This model of the world economy10 
covers the period 2001-2050 in yearly steps through the recursive succession of annual static 
equilibria and dynamic modules. The annual static equilibrium determines relative prices, 
wages, labour, value, physical flows, capacity utilization, profit rates and savings at date t as 
a result of short term equilibrium conditions between demand and supply on goods, capital 15 
and labor markets. The dynamic modules are sector-specific reduced forms of technology-
rich models, which take the static equilibria at t as an input, assess the reaction of technical 
systems to the economic signals, and send new input-output coefficients back to the static 
model to compute the equilibrium at t+1.  
The detailed rationale of the IMACLIM-R model as well as the full set of equations of the static 20 
equilibrium and the description of all dynamic modules are provided in Annex A; we limit 
here to summarize the crucial modeling features adopted for the representation of the core 
mechanisms in the present paper, namely (i) oil supply constraints, (ii) general equilibrium 
effects of oil price variations and (iii) monetary compensations in the form of international 
capital transfers. 25 
(i) The dynamic module describing oil supply determinants embarks three crucial 
specificities of oil supply (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed description). First, oil reserves 
are heterogeneous, which is captured by distinguishing different categories according to their 
                                                     
10 The IMACLIM-R model used in this paper divides the economy in 12 regions—USA, Canada, Europe, 
OECD Pacific, Former Soviet Union, China, India, Brazil, Middle East, Africa, Rest of Asia, Rest of Latin 
America—, and 12 productive sectors—Coal, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Refined products, Electricity, 
Construction, Agriculture and related industries, Energy-intensive Industries, Air Transport, Sea Transport, 
Other Transports, Other industries and Services. In addition IMACLIM-R includes transportation with personal 
vehicles and non-motorized transport. 
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nature (conventional vs non conventional) and their cost of exploration/exploitation; second, 
the geological nature of oil reserves imposes a limited adaptability of oil supply, which is 
captured by imposing a maximum annual rate of increase for production capacities of each oil 
category; third, a small group of suppliers (Middle-East countries) benefits from a market 
power, which allows them to influence world oil prices through their production decisions. 5 
(ii) The magnitude of oil-macroeconomy interactions are reproduced thanks to the five 
following features, which have been pointed by (Hamilton, 2008) as crucial determinants of 
the economic effects of oil price variations (see Chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion) 1) 
mark-up pricing to capture market imperfections (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996); 2) 
partial utilization rate of capital when the full utilization of installed production capacities 10 
cannot be secured due to limits in the substitution between capital and energy (Finn, 2000); 3) 
a putty-clay description of technologies to represent the inertias in the renewal of capital 
stock (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999); 4) frictions in the reallocation of capital across 
heterogeneous sectors causing differentiated levels of idle production capacities (Bresnahan 
and Ramey, 1993); 5) frictions in the reallocation of labor across heterogeneous sectors 15 
causing differentiated levels of unemployment (Davis and Haltiwanger, 2001).  
(iii) The general equilibrium effects of monetary transfers are captured through their impact 
on countries’ current account and thus their trade balance. More specifically, the overall 
regional capital balance is given by the sum of these monetary transfers and the rest of capital 
flows, these latter being assumed to decrease exponentially over time as a progressive 20 
correction of international capital imbalances by 2050. Under the standard assumption of 
equilibrated balance of payments, these capital accounts (including monetary transfers) must 
be exactly compensated by trade flows on international markets11. This compensation 
happens through adjustments of the set of relative prices defining regional competitiveness, 
and ultimately affects each region’s economy because it determines the terms of trade and 25 
hence the potentials for exports and the cost of imports. 
 
 
                                                     
11 All goods are internationally tradable; for non-energy goods, Armington specifications (Armington, 1969) 
capture the partial substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, while physical accounting for energy 
goods (in MToe) makes them fully substitutable. 
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III. Costs of Climate policy for oil producers 
In our modeling exercise, a climate policy is represented by a carbon tax associated to carbon 
emissions from the production and use of fossil energies (coal, oil and gas). It thus increases 
the cost of final goods and intermediate consumption according to the carbon content of the 
fuel used. At each date, the carbon price value is endogenously calculated to curve carbon 5 
emissions according to a prescribed objective. We consider a 450 ppm-CO2 stabilization 
target, which imposes a peak of world CO2 emissions between 2010 and 2020 and a decrease 
by 30% in 2050 with respect to 2000 levels (Barker et al., 2007, Table TS2) (Figure 2.1a). 
Associated revenues are collected by the government which then reallocates them to 
households and/or firms through transfers. An international permit market is modeled by 10 
introducing transfers according to the difference between real emissions and regional 
allocations, decided by a “Contraction and Convergence” principle (Figure 2.1b). 
Figure 2.1. (a) World CO2 emissions under climate policy (GtCO2) [left-hand panel]; (b) Regional quota 
allocation (GtCO2) [right-hand panel]. 
 15 
In this section, we consider the ‘ideal’ case of a world agreement on a Kyoto-type 
architecture with full participation. This assumption may seem unrealistic since it assumes 
that OPEC countries decide to accept carbon constraints without monetary compensations for 
their adverse impacts; it will however be used as a benchmark for sections IV and V. 
1- Carbon pricing and oil markets 20 
The carbon price follows a similar trajectory under the two oil pricing strategies, with three 
distinct periods (Figure 2.2a). During the first years of the climate policy (2010-2025), oil 
prices remain controlled by Middle-East producers and are then almost unaffected by the 
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climate policy (Figure 2b). In this case, high carbon prices are necessary to ensure a steady 
increase of the cost of oil for final users (Figure 2d) in turn triggering the decrease of oil 
consumption necessary to comply with the reduction of carbon emissions (Figure 2c). Under 
the MF scenario, the increase of carbon prices is sensibly steeper (89$/tCO2 in 2025 vs. 
70$/tCO2 under LD scenario), but total oil demand remains more important (105 5 
MBarrel/day at the maximum vs. 97 MBarrel/day in the LD scenario) because of lower total 
cost of a barrel. 
Figure 2.2. (a) Carbon price ($/tCO2) [upper-left panel]; (b) Oil price ($/Barrel) [upper-right panel]; (c) World 
Oil demand (MBarrel/day) [lower left panel]; (d) Total cost of a barrel of oil, including carbon costs ($/Barrel) 
[lower-left panel] 10 
 
 
Between 2025 and 2040, the carbon price stagnates and even declines in both 
scenarios (Figure 2.2a). They remain above 50$/tCO2 to sustain the continuous decrease of 
oil demand compatible with the climate policy, which proves sufficient to tap most mitigation 15 
potentials in power, residential and industrial sectors, which represent the core of emissions 
reductions at that medium-term stage of the climate policy (Barker et al., 2007, Figure TS27). 
Oil demand declines continuously (Figure 2.2c), because of the steady increase of end-use 
costs (Figure 2.2d) caused by the post Peak Oil rise of prices (Figure 2.2b). During this 
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period, carbon prices remain lower under the LD scenario because higher cost of fossil fuels 
in the previous period has accelerated carbon-free technical change.  
After 2040, a steep increase of carbon prices is experienced in both scenarios (from 
around 60 $/tCO2 in 2040 to 120$/tCO2 in 2050) to reach the high-cost mitigation potentials 
in the transportation sector, which become important above 100$/tCO2 (Barker et al., 2007, 5 
Figure TS27). Oil prices are lower than in the baseline scenario since carbon pricing 
accelerates fossil-free technical change and thus reduces the long-term oil dependency of the 
economy. This effect of carbon prices on oil prices is moderate in the LD scenario, while 
particularly important in the MF scenario (Figure 2.2b). In this latter case, the lowering of oil 
prices under the climate policy is even sufficient to make oil products less expensive than in 10 
the baseline, even with the carbon price (Figure 2.2d), and hence to foster slightly higher oil 
demand than in the baseline in the last period (Figure 2.2c).   
Logically, world oil demand under climate policy is always higher in the MF scenario 
than in the LD scenario over the whole period 2010-2050, with a significant cumulative 
difference amounting to 94 GBarrels (12.9 GToe). Table 2.1 shows a similar effect for gas as 15 
a result of the partial indexation of gas prices on low oil prices, with 19% higher cumulated 
gas consumption in the MF scenario over the 2010-2050 period. The compensation, to 
achieve identical climate objectives, will be made through lower coal-related emissions        
(-12%). This analysis demonstrates that maintaining low oil prices is an efficient way to 
protect the oil share in energy markets under a climate policy, by redirecting the mitigation 20 
efforts towards a more intense reduction of coal.  
Table 2.1. Cumulated production of fossil fuels under climate policy over the period 2010-2050 (GToe) 
 Oil Gas Coal 
LD scenario 182.3 97 162.6
MF scenario 195.2 115.1 142.9
 
2- The climate policy and Middle-East countries’ economy 
Unsurprisingly, the climate policy induces a significant drop of oil revenues in 25 
Middle-East countries due to the combination of lower prices and demand (Figure 2.3). 
Between 2010 and 2020, the OPEC maintains prices at their baseline levels and the reduction 
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of oil exportation revenues is due to the adverse impact on oil demand. Cumulative losses 
over this period are more important in the LD scenario in absolute terms (1032 Billion $ 
against 870 Billion $ in the MF scenario), and represent a similar reduction of total oil 
revenues over the period in the two scenarios (15.7% and 17.5% respectively). Over the 
whole period 2010-2050, the long run effects of climate policy on oil prices, especially in the 5 
MF scenario, enhance the losses, which reach 10 700 Billion$ losses, or 26% of cumulated 
oil revenues over. Indeed, the climate policy delays the Peak Oil and minors its consequences 
in terms of rising prices, hence strongly limiting the bubble of long-term profits Middle-East 
countries receive in the baseline case. This effect is also at play under the LD scenario but 
with a minored magnitude: cumulative losses are limited to 6 000 Billion$ losses over 2010-10 
2050, or 16% of total oil revenues over the period. 
Figure 2.3. Reduction of oil exportation revenues under climate policy (Billion $) 
 
Less intuitive is the somewhat different picture obtained by observing the economic 
trajectories in Middle-East countries, as measured by losses of domestic economic activity in 15 
GDP terms when they comply to the climate coalition (Figure 2.4a).  
Over the short-term (2010-2020), the contraction of economic activity is very significant in 
the two scenarios, reaching 12% GDP losses. This is due, as in the other countries, to the 
succession of sharply upward-oriented carbon prices which are necessary to foster low carbon 
trajectories in due time under imperfect foresight. The economic effects of this carbon price 20 
are magnified by inertias on the renewal of technologies and end-use equipments which 
inhibits the capacity of producers and consumers to escape the increase of their energy bill. 
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The carbon-intensity of production thus remains high, leading to an important increase of 
production costs and final prices, undermining competitiveness of non-energy sectors and 
consumers’ purchase power. Those effects combine to generate a drop in final demand, a 
contraction of production, a higher unemployment and an additional weakening of 
households’ purchase power. Although valid for any region complying to the climate 5 
coalition, these mechanisms are particularly important in Middle-East countries because of 
the high fossil-intensity of their production process driving high energy costs (especially 
when compared with labour costs), and of the high share of energy expenditures in 
households’ budget.  
Over the long run, the important drop of oil revenues in the long-run happens in 10 
parallel with a recovery phase of GDP with respect to its baseline level and macroeconomic 
costs in 2050 are moderate in the two scenarios (1% and 3%, respectively). This result can be 
analyzed as the end of the ‘natural resource curse’ (Sachs and Warner, 2001): high resources 
rents do not guarantee a sustained growth pattern if limits in the absorption capacity of the 
economy weakens the efficiency of re-investments in non-rent production sectors. Thus, a 15 
drop of oil revenues as experienced under a climate policy is not necessarily univocally 
penalizing for economic activity. For a given exogenous assumption about the current 
account balance12, lower oil exportation revenues imply a lower exchange rate of local 
currencies and foster local production at the expense of industrial goods importation. The 
climate policy then induces a faster industrialization in Middle-East countries, which better 20 
prepares their economies to the post oil era. As a result, long-run economic activity is less 
sensitive to oil revenues and those revenues fall into a more mature production structure apt 
to absorb them efficiently and to ensure a more sustained economic activity. This is critically 
illustrated by the MF scenario, in which the same GDP levels are reached in 2050 despite 
25% lower oil revenues at that time horizon.   25 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 As explained in Section II, the capital balance is exogenous and exponentially reduced to zero for all regions 
at the end of the simulation period. 
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Figure 2.4. Variations under climate policy of (a) GDP [left-hand panel] and (b) surplus [right-hand panel]  
 
 
To measure the socio-economic consequences of these economic losses, we go beyond the 
analysis of GDP, which, although a good measure of economic activity, is only a partial 5 
indicator of welfare. We consider in Figure 2.4b the variation of households’ surplus, which 
is commonly admitted as a better indicator in the context of important changes of the 
structure of prices (Bernard and Vielle, 2003) and which isolates the consequences of the 
climate policy on households.  
The general surplus trend is similar to GDP variations with important losses in the short-term 10 
and a long-term partial recovery. But, contrary to GDP trends, the magnitude of the effects is 
notably different according to the pricing scenario. This is particularly true in the short-term 
where welfare losses are amplified under MF scenario (up to 18%). In this case indeed, the 
introduction of a carbon price has an important relative effect on end-use prices compared to 
low baseline oil price and hence undermines households’ purchase power. This effect also 15 
happens under a LD scenario but with a lower relative magnitude since high short-term oil 
prices already affect households’ purchase power in the baseline, making the relative losses 
more moderate (around 10%).  
At a longer term horizon, the recovery of surplus levels proves to be less important than when 
considering GDP and welfare is still 5% lower than in the baseline in 2050. Indeed, it is more 20 
difficult to decrease the oil-intensity of final demand than for global activity because of 
inertias limiting the changes of consumption patterns. The more important of these inertias in 
terms of carbon emissions (and hence of costs of climate policy) is associated to constrained 
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mobility needs for daily travels (essentially, commuting and shopping), which force the 
consumption of fossil fuels13 without increasing welfare levels. Since these mobility needs 
are dependent on many other determinants than energy prices (e.g., prices of land and real 
estates, infrastructure availability, housing preferences), they are not notably changed by the 
introduction of the carbon price, even in the long term, and create an important burden on 5 
households’ budget in the final phase of carbon price increase, hence limiting the positive 
effect of structural change away from oil. 
 
IV. Climate policy and Monetary Compensations (MC) for oil producers 
1- Which monetary compensation for oil producers? 10 
The previous section has demonstrated that, even if the costs of the climate policy are 
reduced when considering economic activity instead of oil revenues, they remain high 
enough (especially in the transitory period) to cast doubt on the participation of Middle-East 
countries to a climate coalition. It rather suggests that this participation may be conditional 
upon the introduction of monetary transfers (mostly from OECD countries) to compensate the 15 
adverse impacts of the climate policy. The amount and time-profile of those transfers (Figure 
2.5) could aim at compensating the losses of oil exportation revenues (sectoral MC) or the 
drop of economic activity (macroeconomic MC).  
The first option compensates the drop of exportation revenues due to the climate 
policy (dotted lines in Figure 2.5). Although this approach may be considered as the more 20 
natural way to assess the adverse impacts of climate policies on oil exporters, two elements 
casts doubt on the actual implementation of such transfers. The first simple one is related to 
their political acceptability, as measured by the burden it imposes on OECD. To appreciate 
this dimension, it is sufficient to observe that the transfers would be close or even exceed the 
normative 0.7% of GDP that is set as the UN target for total North-South transfers for 25 
development (diamond points in Figure 2.5). The second issue relates to the sensibly different 
time-profile of the temporal distribution of monetary compensations and of macroeconomic 
losses due to the climate policy. Indeed, monetary compensations remain relatively moderate 
until 2020 at the period when Middle-East countries experience the more intense 
                                                     
13 in absence of large scale fossil-free options for transport 
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macroeconomic losses, whereas they are very important in the long-run despite the catch-up 
of baseline levels at that time horizon. This mismatch is likely to affect the efficiency of 
sectoral monetary transfers to limit the costs of the climate policy for oil exporters, especially 
during the short-term period.  
Figure 2.5. Monetary compensations for Middle-East countries (Billion $) 5 
 
 
For those two reasons, we will not consider more in-depth sectoral monetary transfers but 
consider instead that the transfers should be assessed to compensate economic activity losses, 
as measured by the reduction of Middle-East’s GDP due to the climate policy (solid lines in 10 
Figure 2.5). They still represent a relatively important amount (around 0.24% of OECD GDP 
on average over 2010-2050 in both scenarios), but they always remain below the 0.7% 
benchmark and leave room for other North-South transfers. Perhaps more importantly, their 
time-profile is very different from the transfers based on oil exportation revenues: they are 
important in the short-term but become very modest over the long-term.  15 
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2- General equilibrium effects of monetary transfers 
Macroeconomic monetary transfers then seem relevant to address the two limitations 
identified above in the case of sectoral transfers, as confirmed by their effect on 
macroeconomic costs in OECD and Middle-East countries (Figure 6). 
Figure 2.6. Relative GDP variations under climate policy (a) in OECD [left-hand panel]; (b) in Middle-East 5 
countries [right-hand panel] 
 
On the one hand, although the transfers unsurprisingly increase the costs of the climate policy 
in OECD, they do not induce excessive burdens in those oil importing countries. In the long-
term losses never exceed 2.5% of GDP (Figure 6a). On the other hand, the time-profile of 10 
monetary transfers has the advantage of supporting economic activity in Middle-East 
countries during the short-term period 2010-2030, when the most important losses are 
experienced. They will help reducing the transitory costs suffered in Middle-East countries 
down to 7.5% of GDP (in MF scenario) or 9.5% (in LD scenario) instead of 12.5% (Figure 
6b). 15 
Some might have expected the costs reductions permitted by monetary transfers to be higher 
and to cover the major part of climate policy-induced losses. However, the above results 
demonstrate that compensations mechanisms are not straightforward when accounting for 
general equilibrium effects. To investigate more in-depth the mechanisms at play, we 
decompose the economic consequences of monetary compensations on Middle-East countries 20 
according to the three components of GDP, namely consumption, investments and trade 
balance (exportations minus importations). For each of them, we consider an “efficiency 
index” defined by the ratio of variations due to monetary compensation over the amount of 
transfers: a value x means that 1$ in monetary compensation brings x$ of economic activity. 
 25 
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Table 2.2. “Efficiency index” of monetary transfers 
 Total Consumption Investments Trade
of which: 
Oil Industry 
LD scenario 0.21 0.76 0.15 -0.70 -0.02 -0.56 
MF scenario 0.63 0.62 0.06 -0.05 0.11 -0.17 
 
 Table 2.2 shows that the total net effect of monetary compensation remains positive, as 
captured by the positive value of the total efficiency index in both scenarios (0.21 and 0.63 in 
the LD and MF scenario, respectively). However, these values remain significantly lower 5 
than one, meaning that the net effect of monetary transfers on economic activity is limited by 
general equilibrium interactions. This result explains why Middle-East countries still 
experience relatively important macroeconomic losses despite the monetary transfers, 
especially in the LD scenario (Figure 6b). Let us now consider the three components of 
economic activity.  10 
Monetary transfers foster local activity as captured by the positive (and close to one) sum of 
consumption and investment index (0.91 in the LD scenario and 0.68 in the MF scenario). 
These results are confirmed by lower households’ surplus losses (see Figure 8a in Section V). 
Indeed, the additional capital available in Middle-East helps better preparing their economy 
to the post-oil era through additional early investments in industrial production capacities, 15 
and then contributes to support long-term consumption. This effect is particularly important 
in the LD scenario since the additional capital helps to offset the redirection of investments 
from industrial to oil sectors fostered by high early oil price. 
The positive effect on local economic activity happens at the expense of trade balance as 
captured by the negative value of the trade index in both scenarios (-0.70 in the LD scenario 20 
and -0.05 in the MF scenario). We distinguish the effects on the two main traded sectors, oil 
and industry. 
First, monetary compensations affect Middle-East’s oil exportations through two opposite 
effects on OECD’s oil demand: (i) lower OECD households’ disposable income, thus 
decreasing oil demand; (ii) lower capital availability for OECD investments, slowing down 25 
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cumulative technical change towards oil-free pathways and ensuring higher long-term oil 
demand. This latter effect is particularly important under the MF scenario, where low oil 
prices concur in giving poor incentive for oil-free technical change. This explains why the 
effect of monetary transfers on oil exportations is globally positive in this scenario, as 
captured by the positive value of the oil exportation index (+0.11). On the contrary, the 5 
former effect slightly dominates in the LD scenario, leading to a small negative effect of 
monetary transfers on oil exportations (-0.02). 
Also, monetary transfers affect the competitiveness of Middle-East’s industry on 
international markets. Indeed, under exogenous assumption about the current account 
balance14, the inflows of external capital due to monetary compensations force a degradation 10 
of the trade balance and a loss of competitiveness for Middle-East’s industrial exportations. 
This negative effect is particularly important in the LD scenario, where high short-run oil 
prices delay investments in industrial production capacity hence further undermining its 
competitiveness over the long term. 
 15 
V- What if Middle-East countries do not participate to the climate policy? 
The previous section has demonstrated that the introduction of monetary compensations 
raises concerns about both their efficiency in reducing the costs of the climate policy in 
Middle-East countries and the political acceptability of associated transfers in OECD 
countries. An alternative would be to consider that, in absence of monetary compensations, 20 
Middle-East countries exit the climate coalition with the rationale of avoiding the costs 
associated to a local carbon constraint.  
 
1- Is the withdrawal from the climate coalition efficient? Macroeconomic effects in 
Middle-East countries 25 
This withdrawal would force other countries to accept an additional burden of carbon 
abatements and to adopt higher carbon prices than those experienced when monetary 
compensations ensure the participation of Middle-East countries (Figure 2.7).  
                                                     
14 See Section II. 
89 
Figure 2.7. Carbon price under the no participation case ($/tCO2) 
 
 
Figure 2.8 depicts Middle-East surplus losses between the baseline and (a) a global climate 
agreement in which they receive monetary compensations for their GDP losses and (b) a 5 
global climate agreement from which they withdraw. It shows that in both cases, the benefits 
in terms of purchase power and industrial competitiveness reduce the surplus losses due to 
the climate policy (see Figure 4b for a comparison). Residual losses under the no 
participation case are essentially due to the reduction of oil exportation revenues because 
additional carbon reductions in oil-importing countries come with a decrease of oil demand. 10 
These losses follow very different time profiles according to the oil pricing scenario. Under a 
MF scenario (i.e. with low short-term oil price), the withdrawal from the climate policy helps 
softening the important short-term costs by avoiding the negative effects of carbon pricing on 
the local very oil-intensive domestic economy (surplus losses are reduced from 18% to 10% 
in 2020). This effect is not present in the LD scenario, since patterns of consumption are less 15 
oil-dependent due to high oil prices. In the middle to long-term, on the contrary, exiting the 
climate policy is more beneficial for Middle-East countries under the LD scenario (losses are 
reduced from 13% to 7% in 2030). Indeed, the sensibly higher carbon price (up to 100$/tCO2 
around 2030) favors oil against coal in the rest of the world, which contributes to compensate 
the decrease in oil demand triggered by a long period of high oil prices.  20 
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Figure 2.8. Surplus variations in Middle-East between baseline and climate policy scenarios, under                  
(a) participation and monetary compensation [left-hand panel]; and (b) no participation [right-hand panel]. 
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 8 shows that from a welfare point of view Middle-East countries would 5 
prefer to receive monetary compensations than to leave the climate coalition, whatever the oil 
pricing strategy. Indeed, monetary transfers significantly reduce the effect of the carbon tax 
on households’ consumption, while in the no participation case the reduction of oil 
exportations revenues strongly impacts local economies.  
 10 
2- Are the monetary compensations acceptable? Macroeconomic effects in OECD 
countries 
The next question is whether or not OECD countries might accept to give monetary 
compensations to Middle-East countries, rather than seeing them out of the climate coalition. 
In Section IV, Figure 6a showed that, from a macroeconomic point of view, monetary 15 
compensations might be acceptable by OECD countries. In a LD scenario, however, Figure 6 
shows that monetary compensations increase between 2040 and 2050, together with a steep 
rise of the carbon price. It is thus interesting to assess the acceptability of these transfers 
compared to a withdrawal of ME countries in terms of households’ welfare. To do so, we 
consider the additional OECD surplus variations due to the monetary compensations or the 20 
withdrawal of Middle-East countries) with respect to the benchmark case of section III (Table 
2.3). A significantly negative value means that losses are important compared to the case of 
an unconditional participation of Middle-East countries. 
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This is the case in the short- and medium-term as measured by around 1% losses of OECD 
households’ surplus; but these values are somewhat similar under all oil pricing scenario or 
the participation of Middle-East countries to the climate coalition. This means that the short 
to medium term welfare costs are not significantly different whether they are due to monetary 
compensations or to a withdrawal of ME countries. By considering this outcome, OECD 5 
countries should be indifferent between agreeing to give monetary compensations to Middle-
East producers and taking the risk of seeing them out of the climate coalition.  
 
Table 2.3. “Acceptability indicator” of monetary transfers vs risk of ME withdrawal (OECD additional surplus 
variation compared to the benchmark, i.e. the case of an unconditional participation of Middle-East countries). 10 
The last two lines indicate whether monetary compensations create losses (-) or gains (+) for the OECD 
compared to a withdrawal of ME countries. (0) is for differences lower than 0.1% and (--) for differences higher 
than 1%. 
    2010‐2020  2020‐2030  2030‐2040  2040‐2050 
Monetary compensations  LD scenario ‐1.3% ‐1.4% ‐0.5%  ‐1.6%
MF scenario ‐1.1% ‐1.4% ‐0.9%  ‐1.8%
No participation of ME 
countries 
LD scenario ‐0.9% ‐1.0% ‐0.6%  +0.3%
MF scenario ‐1.0% ‐1.5% ‐1.5%  ‐2.2%
Comparison 
Mon. comp. vs no particip 
LD scenario ‐ ‐ 0  ‐‐
MF scenario 0 0 +  +
 
 15 
However, the participation of Middle-East countries is critical for OECD economies at a 
longer term horizon (2050), with opposite effects according to the pricing scenario 
considered. If short-term oil prices are high (LD scenario), the withdrawal of Middle-East 
from the climate coalition has a long-term benefitial effect on OECD households’ surplus 
(+0.3%): it forces higher short-term carbon prices which act as an early incentive to 20 
accelerate carbon-free technical change with the twofold effect of limiting the surge of long-
term carbon prices and making the economy less vulnerable to energy shocks. On the 
contrary, the option with monetary transfers is very costly (-1.6%): the constraints they 
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impose on the availability of investments and the lower carbon prices contribute to slower oil 
and carbon-free technical change in OECD and hence make households more vulnerable to 
energy variations (including carbon price). These effects are also present with low short-term 
prices (MF scenario), but with different magnitudes. In particular, the increase of carbon 
prices is particularly steep if Middle-East does not participate (up to 250$/tCO2), which is 5 
too sudden to be absorbed by the economy and causes important surplus losses (-2.2%)   
 
This demonstrates a close interplay between geopolitical issues on oil pricing and climate 
negotiations. Indeed, if oil prices are maintained at a high level (LD scenario), OECD would 
not be incline to concede monetary compensations in exchange for the compliance of Middle-10 
East producers, and they would instead prefer Middle-East countries to exit the coalition 
since this notably lowers their long-term losses. On the contrary, a short-term fall of oil prices 
would lower Middle-East short-term profit but would put them in a better position to 
negotiate monetary compensations. Indeed, in that case the OECD would risk high long-term 
losses if Middle-East withdrew from the coalition. Furthermore, under a MF scenario short-15 
term welfare losses would be completely offset by monetary compensations in Middle-East 
countries. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 20 
This paper analyses the interactions between oil markets and the macroeconomy when a 
climate policy is implemented. Three main messages can be derived from the modeling 
exercise. 
First, the aggregate costs incurred in Middle-East countries under a global agreement on 
ambitious climate policy may remain limited, but the time profiles demonstrates the risk of 25 
one or two transitory decades with important slowing down of economic activity and 
households welfare. This analysis casts doubt upon the participation of Middle-East countries 
in absence of compensations designed to make this transition acceptable. 
This paper envisages two types of such architecture based on the compensation of either oil 
exportation revenues or macroeconomic losses by OECD countries. In the latter case, 30 
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transitory losses are reduced by 1/3 without inducing an excessive burden in OECD 
countries, but losses are not cancelled by the compensations. 
Finally, the cost of Middle-East exiting the climate coalition in absence of agreement on the 
monetary transfers remains moderate and essentially depends on oil pricing trajectories in the 
long-term. At this time horizon, the results demonstrate a close dependence between 5 
geopolitical dimensions of oil markets and climate negotiations. Indeed, high oil prices put 
Middle-East countries in an unfavorable position to obtain monetary compensations in 
climate negotiations, whereas low short-term oil price trigger such important long-term losses 
in OECD that these countries would be more encline to accept monetary compensations to 
gain the compliance of Middle-Ease countries to the climate coalition. 10 
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Chapter 3  
Infrastructures, Technical Inertia  
and the Costs of Low Carbon Futures 5 
under Imperfect Foresight  
 
Chapter 3* examines the global and long-term dimensions of the interplay between carbon 
prices, oil prices and the macroeconomy by analyzing the transition costs of moving towards 
a low carbon society. We emphasize the consequences on mitigation costs of considering the 10 
interplay between a) technical systems inertia, including slow infrastructure turnover in 
transportation and construction; and b) imperfect foresight influencing investment decisions. 
To this end, the hybrid general equilibrium modeling framework IMACLIM-R is employed as 
it allows for transitory partial adjustments of the economy and captures their impact on the 
dynamics of economic growth. The modeling exercise quantitatively emphasizes the i) 15 
specific risks that the interplay between inertia and imperfect foresight leads to high 
macroeconomic costs of carbon abatement measures; ii) opportunities of co-benefits from 
climate policies permitted by the correction of sub-optimalities in the reference scenarios. 
This chapter draws insights for the framing of future climate architectures by studying the 
role of measures that act complementarily to carbon pricing in the transport sector. In 20 
particular, reallocating public investment towards low-carbon transport infrastructure 
significantly reduces the overall macroeconomic costs of a given GHG stabilization target 
and even creates the room for long-term net economic benefits from climate policies.  
                                                     
* This chapter is the reproduction of  
Waisman H, Guivarch C, Grazi F and Hourcade JC (2011). The Imaclim-R Model:Infrastructures, Technical 
Inertia and the Costs of Low Carbon Futures under Imperfect Foresight, accepted in Climatic Change 
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Economic analysis of climate policy faces a paradox. The literature suggests that the 
macroeconomic cost of achieving stringent GHGs concentration targets would be moderate1, 
but most countries remain reluctant to adopt whereas ambitious climate policy. This may be 
because the few percentage points of GDP losses, translated in billion dollars, represent a 
prohibitive cost for decision makers; but part of the paradox may also lie in an often 
disregarded caveat of the IPCC report:  
“Most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and 
with universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no 
transaction cost, and thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures 
throughout the 21st century” (IPCC, 2007, Box SPM.3). 
This caveat actually points out the deficit of information about the transition to a low-carbon 
future in a second-best world. One can argue that imperfect foresight, incomplete markets and 
institutional failures will lead to higher costs that those reported so far, or, conversely, that 
non optimal baselines offer opportunities for relative gains under climate policy. This is the 
major finding of Barker and Scrieciu (2010) with the macroeconometric E3MG model. 
 
The IMACLIM-R model (Sassi et al., 2010) contributes to this debate by incorporating some 
features of second-best economies in a Computable General Equilibrium model, able to 
represent important structural and technical change over a century. Its main specificity is to 
endogenize transitory adjustments of an economy constrained by the interplay between 
choices under imperfect foresight and the inertia of technical systems. Imperfect foresight is a 
consequence of a) uncertainty about future relative prices, final demand and investments 
profitability, b) “noises” coming from signals other than energy prices (informal economy, 
prices of land and real estate) and c) non-economic determinants of public decisions in 
transportation and urban planning. Of little importance in a flexible world, imperfect foresight 
becomes crucial when non-optimal choices cannot be corrected frictionless because of inertias 
on capital stocks and behavioral routines. 
                                                     
1The IPCC (2007) reports costs between small GDP gains and lower-than-5.5% losses of global GDP in 2050 for 
stabilization targets between 445 and 535 ppm CO2-eq (Table SPM.6). The ADAM project (Edenhofer et al., 
2010b), extends the estimates to 2100 and finds aggregate costs below 2.5% of global GDP for 400 ppm CO2-eq 
targets. 
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 The objective of this paper is to show how this interplay between imperfect foresight 
and inertia explains the peculiar shape of the mitigation cost profiles found by IMACLIM-R 
compared to those in most models, including WITCH and REMIND in the RECIPE project 
(Edenhofer et al, 2010a; Luderer et al, 2010a).  Section 2 sums up the overall rationale of the 
IMACLIM-R model and insists on the specific role of infrastructures, a typical case of rigid 
capital stock. Section 3 shows out the major economic reasons for high short term climate 
policy costs, specifically in emerging economies, and for potential long run benefits. Section 
4 investigates how cost profiles change with a richer climate policy package including 
complementary measures to carbon pricing, specifically infrastructure policies that affect the 
transport sector. 
  
I. Rationale of the IMACLIM-R modeling Structure 
The IMACLIM-R model is a recursive, dynamic, multi-region and multi-sector2 Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy. It allows for describing growth 
patterns in second best worlds (market imperfections, partial uses of production factors and 
imperfect expectations) through a hybrid and recursive dynamic architecture. A detailed 
algebraic description of this model is given in Annex A and we herein outline only those of its 
features that matter for the purpose of this paper. 
1. A growth engine with gaps between natural and effective growth  
IMACLIM-R incorporates exogenous assumptions of regional labour productivity growth and 
active population growth (see Annex A), which determine the exogenous ‘natural’ growth 
rate.3 Effective growth rates are endogenously driven by labour allocation across regions and 
sectors at each point in time, given relative productivities and short-term rigidities (capital 
stock inertia, frictions in reallocating labour and wage rigidity). Aggregate capital 
accumulation is controlled by exogenous saving rates like in Solow (1956), but IMACLIM-R 
represents investment decisions under imperfect foresight. At a given date, agents have 
limited information about the future and shape their expectations on the basis of past and 
current trends (adaptive expectations). Under such semi-myopic foresight, installed capital 
                                                     
2 see Annex A for regional and sectoral disaggregations. 
3 A large strand of literature has emerged after Solow (1956) that traditionally represents growth trajectories on 
the basis of this “natural” growth rate, which boils down to representing the global economy as characterized by 
a unique composite production sector operating at full employment.  
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resulting from past investment decisions may not be adapted to future economic settings. 
However, it cannot be renewed overnight due to inertias and acts as a constraint on the 
adaptability to variations of economic conditions (activity levels and prices). 
2. A recursive and modular architecture to endogenize technical change 
 The IMACLIM-R model endogenizes the rate and direction of technical change through 
describing the impact of investment decisions on the deployment of technical systems. The 
consistency of the top-down/bottom-up conversation is guaranteed by a hybrid structure 
representing the economy in money values and physical quantities (Hourcade et al, 2006). 
This dual accounting follows the Arrow-Debreu axiomatic. It ensures that the projected 
economy is supported by a realistic technical background (in the engineering sense) and, 
conversely, that projected technical systems correspond to realistic economic flows and 
consistent sets of relative prices. In climate policy analysis, this approach has for long been 
claimed as crucial for the energy goods to represent explicitly their carbon-to-energy ratio 
(Malcolm and Truong, 1999; Sands et al., 2005). IMACLIM-R extends it to transportation as 
another key sector of climate analysis. 
A recursive structure then organizes a systematic exchange of information between a 
top-down annual static equilibrium providing a snapshot of the economy at each yearly time 
step, and bottom-up dynamic modules informing on the evolution of technical parameters 
between two equilibria (Figure 3.1).  
 
Figure 3.1: The recursive and modular structure of the IMACLIM-R model   
 
 
Updated parameters 
(technical coefficients, 
population, productivity)
Economic signals 
(prices, quantities,
Investments)
Static Equilibrium  (t)
under constraints
A
g
ri
co
ltu
re
E
n
er
g
y
Tr
an
sp
or
t
Bottom‐up sub‐models 
(reduced forms
Static Equilibrium  (t+1)
under updated   constraints
E
le
ct
ric
ity
O
il...
In
d
u
st
ry
Tr
an
sp
or
t
TIME PATH
102 
 
The annual static equilibrium determines relative prices, wages, labour, value, physical 
flows, capacity utilization, profit rates and savings at date t as a result of short term 
equilibrium conditions between demand and supply on all markets, including energy. Utility-
maximizing households base their consumption choices on both income and time constraints; 
the former is the sum of wages, capital returns and transfers whereas the latter controls the 
total time spent in transportation. Firms adapt their short term production considering fixed 
input-output coefficients (the average of techniques embodied in their capital stock) and 
decreasing static returns when capacity approaches saturation4. They determine their prices 
with a margin rate over production costs (mark-up) to capture the effect of imperfect 
competition.5  
Total demand for each good (the sum of households’ consumption, public and private 
investments and intermediate uses) is satisfied by a mix of domestic production and imports.6 
All intermediate and final goods are internationally tradable. Domestic as well as international 
markets for all goods are cleared (i.e. no stock is allowed) by a unique set of relative prices 
and this determines the utilization rate of production capacities.7 The equilibrium values of all 
variables are sent to the dynamic modules to serve as a signal for agents’ decisions affecting 
technical coefficients at t+1. 
 
The dynamics of the economy is governed by endogenous descriptions of capital 
accumulation and technical change, given the exogenous ‘natural’ growth assumptions. At 
each year, regional capital accumulation is given by firms’ investment, households’ savings, 
and international capital flows8. On that basis, the across-sector distribution of investments is 
governed by expectations on sector profitability and technical conditions as described in 
                                                     
4 Following (Corrado and Mattey, 1997), decreasing returns reflect the higher labor costs associated to extra-
hour operations, costly night work and increasing maintenance works when capacity approaches saturation. 
5 The mark-ups are exogenous except in energy sector where they are endogenous to reflect (a) the market power 
of fossil fuel producers (b) specific pricing principles in the power sector (e.g., mean cost pricing), and (c) the 
different margins over the three inputs for liquid fuels production (oil, biomass, coal). 
6 For non-energy goods, we adopt Armington specifications (Armington, 1969) to capture the partial 
substitutability between domestic and foreign goods, while physical accounting for energy goods (in MToe) 
makes them fully substitutable. 
7 The partial utilization rate of production capacities allows representing operational flexibility through early 
retirement of those capacities which, although installed, are not used for actual production because not 
competitive in current economic conditions. 
8 In absence of explicit interest rate, we assume a gradual correction of current imbalances, as a standard proxy 
for the complex determinants of international capital flows in energy forecasting exercises (Edmonds et al, 2004; 
Paltsev et al., 2005). 
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sector-specific reduced forms of technology-rich models (referred to as Nexus modules and 
extensively described in Annex A).  
The Nexus modules represent the evolution of technical coefficients resulting from agents’ 
microeconomic decisions on technological choices, given the limits imposed by the 
innovation possibility frontier (Ahmad, 1966). They embed a) sector-based information of 
economies of scale, learning-by-doing mechanisms and saturation in efficiency progress, and 
b) expert views about the asymptotes on ultimate technical potentials, the impact of incentive 
systems, and the role of market or institutional imperfections. The new investment choices 
and technical coefficients are then sent back to the static module in the form of updated 
production capacities and input-output coefficients to calculate the t+1 equilibrium. 
This structure comes to adopt a standard putty-clay representation with fixed technical content 
of installed capital, which allows distinguishing between short-term rigidities and long-term 
flexibilities (Johansen, 1959). 
3- A specific treatment of the transport sector 
The potentials of the IMACLIM-R structure have been exploited to explicit the specifics 
of the transport sector and its impact on energy demand. This sector, vital for economic and 
human development, is characterized by a strong path dependency of options, by the influence 
of non-energy determinants in the collective and individual behaviors (for example the spatial 
setting via location choices of both firms and households) and by the dependence upon long-
lived infrastructure investments.  
Transport demand is indeed affected by i)  the attractiveness of alternative modes and 
influencing the modal choice of individuals, ii) households’ mobility needs and their average 
(travel and commuting) distances, and iii)  the spatial organization of production and its 
associated freight transport needs. IMACLIM-R incorporates these features in three ways: 
i. The relation between transportation infrastructure, mobility demand and modal 
choices is captured in the maximization of households’ utility  where saturation of 
infrastructures cause speed decreases when normal load conditions are exceeded. Then, 
investments in transport infrastructures determine the efficiency of the different transport 
modes and, hence, the allocation of travel time budget across modes of different efficiencies.  
ii. The utility demand for mobility includes households’ constrained mobility (for 
commuting and shopping). It does so through a “basic need’ level which depends essentially 
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on location and infrastructure constraints (residential areas, work centers, transport 
infrastructures). Non directly sensitive to fuel prices variations, they capture location and 
infrastructures choices, including urban policies aimed at limiting urban sprawl. 
iii. The freight transport content of production processes is represented by explicit input-
output coefficients. The absence of decoupling between production and transport (constant 
input-output coefficient) corresponds to pursuing current trends of transport-intensive 
production; in alternative scenarios we also consider a progressive decrease of the freight 
content of production in a way to represent changes in producers’ choices on the supply 
chains, relocation of production infrastructures (more vertically integrated, and spatially 
closer to markets) and a moderation of “just-in-time” processes. 
II. Time Profiles of Climate Policy Costs 
We herein analyze the specifics of cost profiles of a global climate policy in IMACLIM-R. In 
section 1, we test their robustness to parameter uncertainty. In section 2, we use a simple 
analytical demonstration to clarify the short-term economic determinants of costs and their 
evolution over time. In section 3, we demonstrate why the long distance race between 
technical change and inertia is the major cause of important short-term losses and allows for 
long-term catch-up of baseline levels (and even some benefits).  
To conduct these analyses, our numerical experiments will encompass (see Appendix) 
A. three assumptions on Oil and Gas supply : (A-1) assumes moderate limitations on 
medium-term oil supply in line with conservative estimates on the amount and distribution of 
oil reserves, whereas (A-2) considers lower oil reserves. We add a third variant, an even more 
pessimistic case, where not only are resources low, but also geological constraints on capacity 
deployment forces to an accelerated decline of global production (A-3).  
B. two assumptions on the Substitutes to oil: (B-2) corresponds to a faster and deeper 
market diffusion of substitutes to oil (biofuels and Coal-To-Liquid) than (B-1). 
C. two assumptions on Demand side technological change : (C-2) refers to a faster 
diffusion of decarbonization and energy efficiency technologies than in (C-1). 
 
Using the same assumptions on regional natural growth, we obtain very similar mean 
GDP growth under all combinations of parameter assumptions defining the 3 × 22 = 12 ‘BAU’ 
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scenarios for the 2010-2100 period9. These scenarios feature a wide dispersion of CO2 
emissions from 30 to 69 GtCO2 in 2100 (see Table 1), which lie in the middle of the 15-135 
GtCO2 range of the SRES and post-SRES scenarios, in 2100 (Barker et al., 2007, Figure 
TS7).  
Table 3.1: Mean annual real GDP growth in BAU scenarios, for the world and a selection of regions (average 
values in bold, full range of variations across scenarios into brackets). 
 World USA Europe China India 
mean annual growth (2010-2050) 2.1 [2.0;2.2] 1.7 [1.6;1.8] 1.6 [1.4;1.7] 4.0 [3.8;4.1] 4.3 [3.8;4.5] 
mean annual growth (2010-2100) 1.7 [1.6;1.7] 1.8 [1.7;1.8] 1.4 [1.3;1.4] 2.4 [2.3;2.5] 2.9 [2.7;3.0] 
 
Since the objective is to analyze the mechanisms of cost formation, we worked under 
an identical CO2 emission trajectory for all stabilization scenarios over the period. We thus set 
aside the question of the intertemporal flexibility for allocating emission reductions for the 
same carbon budget that could affect near-term mitigation costs by postponing emission 
reductions (“when flexibility”). The trajectory is chosen in category III of IPCC scenarios 
corresponding to a stabilization target of 440-485 ppm CO2: global CO2 emissions peak in 
2017 and are decreased by 20% and 60% with respect of 2000 level in 2050 and 2100, 
respectively (Barker et al., 2007, Table TS2). For the purpose of this exercise, we also 
exclude international redistribution of tax revenues10 and the model endogenously calculates 
the world carbon tax to be imposed to meet the emissions constraint at each point in time.  
 
1- ‘Carbon price-only’ policy: a time profile robust to uncertainty 
Figure 3.2(a) displays global GDP variations in stabilization scenario targets compared to the 
Business As Usual (BAU) situation, for all of the 12 ‘future worlds’, the bold black line 
giving the average costs of these scenarios11. Figure 3.2(b) compares the average growth rates 
in BAU and stabilization scenarios.  
                                                     
9 Note that the reference scenario from the RECIPE model comparison exercise (Luderer et al, 2010a) is not 
included within these BAU scenarios. Indeed, specific exogenous forcing of the model were introduced in the 
model comparison exercise in order to make the reference scenarios comparable across models. For example, an 
exogenous oil price trajectory was used, but is not used in the BAU scenarios from this article. 
10 The RECIPE project investigates the consequences of regional differences in carbon tax  (Jakob et al, 2010) 
and the effects of alternative rules for quota allocation among regions (Luderer et al, 2010b) 
11 This average value attributes equal importance to each ‘future world’ and should not be intended as a best-
guess estimate. It is displayed to identify the general trends of the variables under consideration, independently 
of their variability across scenarios. 
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Figure 3.2: Global GDP variations between stabilization and BAU scenarios, over the 2010-2100 period  [left-
hand panel]; Average GDP growth rate across all BAU (solid line) and stabilization (dotted line) scenarios 
[right-hand panel] 
 
 
 With a 3% discount rate, discounted mitigation costs over the period 2010-2100 range 
from 1% to 4.6% across scenarios, but this aggregated value masks critical issues revealed by 
the time profile of costs. Actually, despite differences in the magnitude of GDP variations 
across scenarios, four phases of GDP losses (Figure 3.2(a)) and carbon price (Figure 3.3) can 
be identified for all of them: 
(i) substantial transitory costs during the first two decades of stabilization with lower 
growth rates than in reference scenarios (but never an absolute decrease of GDP in any 
region).12 These costs are associated with a sharp initial increase of the carbon price.  
(ii)  a medium-term (about fifteen years) GDP catch-up with higher growth rates under a 
climate policy than in the reference scenario; this phase is associated with a decline in the 
carbon price ending around 2045, 
(iii)  a second phase of significant GDP loss in the stabilization scenario from 2045 to 
2070 associated with a second phase of steep carbon price increase, 
(iv)  a long-term regime in which, on average, the continuous increase of average carbon 
prices do not trigger significant GDP loss, as if the economy were adapted to a regime with 
ever increasing carbon prices. In fact, this average stabilization of GDP losses hides a 
divergence across scenarios, between optimistic scenarios with a slow economic catch-up 
towards baseline levels and pessimistic ones with continuing departures from these levels. 
 
 
 
                                                     
12IPCC reports global GDP losses between 0.2% and 2.5% in 2030 (IPCC, 2007, Table SPM.4), whereas we 
obtain a range between 1% and 9.5%, with the average value around 4% (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 3.3: Average carbon tax ($/tCO2) 
 
 
The magnitude of the above mechanisms features some significant regional difference, since 
the costs remain moderate in developed countries, but are extremely high in the rest of the 
world (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.2).  This is particularly true in the short-term, in which 
developing countries face, on average, as high as 10% transitory losses around 2030 (against 
only 1% at the same time horizon in developed countries).  
 
Figure 3.4: Average GDP variations between stabilization and BAU scenarios in developed countries, 
developing countries and the world, over the period 2010-2100  
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Table 3.2: GDP losses (a negative value represents an actual gain) between stabilization and BAU scenarios for 
a selection of major countries and regions, in 2030, 2050 and 2100 (average values in bold, full range of 
variations across scenarios into brackets). 
 2030 2050 2100 
USA 1.2 [0.1; 2.4] 1.4 [-0.1; 2.4] 2.3 [0.2; 5.3] 
Europe 0.8 [-0.4; 2.4] 0.7 [-0.8; 1.8] 1.6 [-0.7; 4.5] 
China 16.8 [5.3; 33.9] 6.9 [4.5; 12.1] 10.5 [-3.9; 21.4] 
India 13.5 [3.6; 21.6] 7.5 [4.0; 15.0] 10.9 [0.8; 21.1] 
 
 
2. Drivers of mitigation costs: an analytical detour 
The economic drivers of these non conventional time profiles can be derived from a  stylized 
model which incorporates the core specificities of the static equilibrium of the IMACLIM-R 
model. Let us assume an economy producing a composite good Q with energy and labour as 
input factors, a mark-up price equation to represent imperfect competition and a wage-curve 
to capture labour market imperfections. A simple analytic derivation (see Annex A) gives an 
explicit expression for mitigation costs when a tax on energy Eτ  (taken as a proxy for a 
carbon tax) is levied, as measured by production variations QΔ : 
1
0
0 0 0
.. 1 1
1
E
E
z p eQ
Q z w l
ατ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞Δ ⎢ ⎥= − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                     
 (1) 
 
In equation (1), e and l are the unitary energy and labour requirements for production, pE the 
price of energy, w0 and z0 the wage rate and unemployment level in the absence of taxation 
andα  is the elasticity of the wage curve (the higher α , the more flexible the labor markets).  
The remarkable lesson of equation (1) is that the energy parameters are not the only drivers of 
the costs induced by a given level of carbon taxation. Part of the magnitude of the costs is 
driven by the macroeconomic effects on labour markets controlled by the elasticity of the 
labor market α and the unemployment rate 0z 13. Another part is driven by the energy costs / 
                                                     
13 These effects are analyzed more in-depth in (Guivarch et al.,2010)  
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labor costs ratio 
0
.Ep e
w l
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
: the countries the more adversely affected by higher energy prices 
are those in which the energy share in production costs is high and the salaries share is low. 
The dynamic effect of the carbon tax then depends on the interplay between the pace of a) 
changes in labour markets driving wage adjustments, b) technical change favouring lower 
labour and energy inputs for production, c) energy price and carbon tax increases.  
Over the short-term, the decline of the energy costs / labor costs ratio is constrained by 
inertias on the evolution of the ratio e/l and on the absolute increase of wages. This justifies 
high magnitude of the costs.  
Over the long term, induced technical change accelerates the decline of the energy content of 
production and slows down the increase of energy costs; labour costs increases thanks to 
wage adjustments (in particular in developing countries during their catch-up period); and the 
decline of energy demand due to carbon taxation triggers a significant drop of energy prices 
with respect to the baseline. Therefore, long-term costs are moderated14. 
3. A long distance race: technical change versus inertia 
Let us now analyze in more detail how the above mechanisms work during the four phases of 
our time profiles. 
 (i) During the 2010-2030 period, the particularly high GDP losses of climate policy 
found with IMACLIM-R are due to the sharp increase of carbon prices Eτ  (Figure 3) and 
inertias in the decrease of e/l. Under adaptive expectations indeed, investment choices can be 
redirected only with high carbon prices whereas, under perfect foresight long-term prices are 
internalized in short term decisions which makes high short-term prices unnecessary. These 
carbon prices trigger increases of production costs, final prices and households’ energy bills 
because the decrease of the carbon-intensity of the economy is limited by inertias on installed 
capital and on the renewal of households’ end-use equipment (residential appliances, 
vehicles). These effects combine to undermine households’ purchasing power, generate a drop 
in total final demand, a contraction of production, higher unemployment (under imperfect 
                                                     
14 To demonstrate why those long-term costs can even be negative, it is necessary to represent the imperfect 
allocation of investments under baseline, which brings about considering a multisectoral model at the expense of 
analytical solvability. 
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labour markets) and an additional weakening of households’ purchasing power through lower 
wages.  
These mechanisms are more pronounced in emerging and developing countries because their 
industrial catch-up is based on a high share of energy-intensive basic industries with a high 
ratio e/l
 
and low wages w. The GDP losses caused by these structural characteristics are 
enhanced by the negative effect of a unique carbon price on the international competitiveness 
of these carbon-intensive economies (Figure 3.4 and Table 3.2). 
 
Figure 3.5: Average GDP variations between stabilization and BAU scenarios with slow (black) and fast 
technical change (grey). Note: Vertical bars give the range of values across scenarios at some dates. 
  
 
Unsurprisingly, more optimistic assumptions on technological change limits short-term 
losses, since fast technical change partly counterbalances the inertia on the renewal of 
installed capital and makes decarbonisation easier: the energy intensity of production 
decreases, the carbon price necessary to trigger decarbonisation is lower, and those two 
effects combine to reduce GDP losses (Case C-2 in Figure 3.5). In addition, transitory costs 
are much lower where low oil reserves impose high short-term oil prices further accelerating 
technical change (Case A-3 in Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.6. Average GDP variations between stabilization and BAU scenarios with the three assumptions on oil 
and gas supply. Note: Vertical bars give the range of values across scenarios at some dates. 
 
 
 (ii) Between 2030 and 2045, the economic catch-up observed in Figure 2 is due to two 
major positive effects of early carbon prices, which lowers the weight of energy in the 
production process, pE.e. First, moderation of oil demand in stabilization scenarios delays 
Peak Oil and the associated oil price increase (reduction of energy prices pE). Second, the 
accumulation of learning-by-doing favours the diffusion of carbon-free technologies over this 
time horizon, with the co-benefit of enhanced energy efficiency (lower e). The mitigation 
costs are further moderated at this time horizon by the decrease of carbon price Eτ between 
2030 and 2045, permitted by the abundance of mitigation potentials below 50$/tC02 in the 
residential, industrial and power sectors (see (Barker et al., 2007, Figure TS27)). Those 
effects can be interpreted as a partial correction, via carbon pricing, of sub-optimal investment 
decisions in the BAU scenarios. A steady increase of fossil energy costs (carbon price 
included) partly compensates for the imperfect anticipation of increases in oil prices in the 
BAU scenario. It forces short-sighted decision-makers to progressively internalize constraints 
in fossil fuel availability, and accelerate the learning-by-doing in carbon-saving techniques. 
This yields a virtuous macroeconomic impact through a lower burden of imports in oil 
importing economies and reduced volatility of oil prices. In this sense, a carbon price is a 
hedging tool against the uncertainty on oil markets (Rozenberg et al., 2010).  
 
This virtuous effect is stronger in the case of slow technical change leading to high oil 
dependency (scenario C-1 in Figure 3.5). In this case indeed, economies are more vulnerable 
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to Peak Oil in the BAU scenario. The GDP catch-up is also more important in the case of high 
reserves. In the Scenario A-1 (Figure 3.6) indeed, oil-free technical change is for long 
discouraged by low oil prices and the high economic burden imposed by Peak Oil period is 
significantly reduced by early carbon pricing. 
 
 (iii) Around 2050, a new phase of increasing mitigation costs starts as a consequence 
of a sharp increase of carbon prices Eτ from around 100$/tCO2 in 2045 to around 300$/tCO2 
in 2070. Indeed, at this time horizon, most of the low cost mitigation potentials in the 
residential, industrial and power sectors have been exhausted, and the essential of emission 
reductions has to come from the transportation sector. A fast increase of carbon prices is then 
necessary to ensure emission reductions despite the weak sensitivity of the transportation 
sector to carbon prices and the trend of increasing carbon-intensive road-based mobility. This 
context is generated by the concomitance of four effects: a) the massive access to motorized 
mobility in developing countries, b) the absence of targeted policies to control urban sprawl, 
which tends to increase the dependence on constrained mobility c) the abundance of 
investments in road infrastructure, which decrease road congestion and favor the 
attractiveness of private cars at the expense of other transportation modes, d) the rebound 
effect on mobility demand consecutive to energy efficiency gains, which offsets 
approximately 25% of the emissions reductions that would have resulted from technical 
energy efficiency improvement.15 
In addition the diffusion of Coal-To-Liquid (CTL) as a mature substitute to oil after 2050 
makes passenger mobility particularly carbon intensive. During this post-Peak Oil period, the 
assumptions about the degree of maturation of CTL are one key determinant of overall costs. 
Mitigation costs are high with a rapid deployment of CTL in the BAU scenario, making very 
high carbon prices necessary to limit its penetration (Case B-2 in Figure 3.7) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 This order of magnitude of the rebound effect is in the range of empirical measures reported in the literature 
(Greening et al., 2000). 
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Figure 3.7. Average GDP variations between stabilization and BAU scenarios with slow (black) and fast (grey) 
deployment of oil substitutes; Note: Vertical bars give the range of values across scenarios at some dates. 
 
 
 (iv) After 2070, an increase of carbon price is still necessary to control emissions in 
the transportation sector since most other mitigation potentials have already been exploited 
(up to 600$/tCO2 in 2100). However, contrary to the first period, high carbon prices do not 
necessarily induce significant GDP losses. Indeed, they apply to a low-carbon economy and, 
at that time horizon, the share of labor costs has increased drastically in currently developing 
regions, making the critical energy-to-labor cost ratio 
0
.Ep e
w l
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
far lower. 
 The race between increasing mobility needs and technical change in the transport 
sector is thus critical to explain discrepancies across scenarios over the century. In this race, 
the diffusion of Electric Vehicles is a key parameter (given almost carbon-free power 
generation). Optimistic assumptions for the market potential of electric vehicles accelerate its 
diffusion, decrease the energy cost .Ep e  and allows for a final phase of GDP catch-up (C-2 in 
Figure 3.5). Conversely, if the diffusion of electric vehicles is limited, the transportation 
sector remains fossil fuel intensive and further emission reductions come at as slightly 
increasing cost (C-1 in Figure 3.5). 
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III. Beyond carbon pricing: the role of investments in long-lived 
infrastructure  
 
The time profile of mitigation costs obtained with a worldwide carbon price in Section 3 
highlights two major concerns. First, the necessity of high short-term carbon prices is 
detrimental to most economies and triggers high transitory losses (especially in developing 
countries). The sensitivity of short-term mitigation costs to technological change parameters, 
as discussed in Section 3.3(i), suggests that support schemes to low-carbon technologies may 
be an appropriate complementary measure to foster early investments and endogenous 
improvements of low-carbon technologies (Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007) and to lower 
carbon prices (see Bosetti et al., 2009).16 
Second, these high short-term carbon prices may be insufficient to limit long-term losses, 
notably because of the very specific dynamics of the transportation sector (Jaccard, 1997) 
where energy prices are swamped by other determinants (e.g., real estate markets, political 
bargaining behind infrastructure policies and just-in-time processes in the industry). In this 
section, we test a design of climate policy where carbon pricing is complemented by measures 
aimed at controlling the long-term dynamics of transport-related emissions. In this 
exploratory exercise, we represent spatial planning-related policies and changes in investment 
decisions for long-lived infrastructure in a synthetic way through three main sets on 
assumptions17.  
(i) a shift in the modal structure of investment in transportation infrastructure favoring 
public modes against private cars. Instead of assuming that the allocation of investments 
follows modal mobility demand, we consider public policies for reallocating part of them 
from road to low-carbon transportation infrastructure (rail and water for freight transport, rail 
and non-motorized modes for passenger transport).  
                                                     
16 These schemes are not investigated explicitly in this paper, but are implicitly captured by the assumption on 
technological change. 
17 Given the absence of reliable and comprehensive data on the cost of implementation of these measures, we 
assume a redirection of investments at constant total amount and neglect side costs and benefits.  
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(ii) a progressive relocation of buildings infrastructure that allows for a reduction of 
households’ constrained mobility (essentially commuting) from the 50% of total mobility as 
previously considered to 40% . 
(iii) changes in the production/distribution processes allowing to reduce transport 
needs (we considered a 1% decrease of the input-output coefficient between transport and 
industry to be compared with  a constant coefficient in the previous case). 
Replicating the numerical experiments for the 12 above BAU scenarios, we find that the 
reduction of mobility needs and the shift towards low-carbon modes allows meeting the same 
climate objective without a steep rise of carbon prices over the long run (Figure 3.8) and with 
far more moderate GDP losses (Figure 3.9).  
Figure 3.8: Average carbon price for a ‘carbon price-only’ policy (black) or with complementary infrastructure 
policies (grey). 
 
 
Another important finding is that these positive effects become especially important only after 
2050, which is the logical outcome of the inertias in deploying new infrastructures. However, 
the complementary measures do not change drastically carbon prices before 2050, their 
impact on GDP losses is already visible between 2025 and 2050 in the form of an acceleration 
of the GDP catch-up with its BAU level and negligible losses around 2050 (Figure 9). The 
alternative infrastructures are not fully deployed but they begin to have an influence on the 
demand for gasoline (constraining the rebound effect) at the very moment when other sources 
of decarbonization start to become exhausted. This reduction of gasoline demand has a 
significant impact on the dynamics of the oil market and yields a deeper ‘peak oil avoidance. 
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Figure 3.9: Average GDP variations between stabilisation and BAU scenarios for a ‘carbon price only’ policy 
(black) or with accompanying infrastructure policies (grey).  Note: Vertical bars give the range of values across 
scenarios at some dates; squares represent GDP variations between the stabilisation and the BAU scenario in 
the RECIPE project. 
 
 
In the short run, the effects of complementary policies is less important, but non negligible; as 
GDP losses being reduced by 20% in 2025 with respect to the carbon-price only policy. But, 
because of the inertia of transportation infrastructures, the bulk of the transition problem has 
to be addressed through other policies (fiscal policies, differentiated tariffs, subsidies for 
energy efficiency in the residential sector, etc.) targeted to avoid a full transmission of the 
carbon price to householders’ energy bill, especially in developing countries. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of a world carbon price with the IMACLIM-R 
model. The profiles of GDP costs differ significantly from those found in a first best 
economy, because the model captures key features of second- best economies (non fully 
flexible labor markets, imperfect competition, adaptive foresight) and represents the inertia of 
technical systems. We demonstrate the role of infrastructure dynamics in the formation of 
these costs profiles and investigate a richer climate architecture, where carbon pricing is 
complemented by measures designed to control transport-related emissions. 
Over the short term (2020-2030), the absence of perfect foresight makes high carbon prices 
necessary and causes high GDP losses, especially in developing countries. Technical inertia 
limits the pace of decarbonization and the high carbon prices increase production costs; these 
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costs are transmitted to the selling prices and combine with higher household’s energy bill to 
undermine consumers’ purchasing power. This is more important in emerging economies 
because of their higher labor-to-energy costs ratio. 
 In the medium term (2030-2050) the reduced vulnerability to Peak Oil and the acceleration of 
learning-by-doing in fossil-free techniques allow the policy trajectories to catch-up the BAU 
GDPs. Over the long-term (2050-2100), there is the recurrence of significant costs. Indeed, 
the high short-term carbon prices prove to be insufficient to shift the patterns of urban and 
transportation infrastructures and prevent an explosion of road based mobility. In the absence 
of very optimistic assumptions on biofuels and electrical cars, high carbon prices are 
necessary to outweigh these trends in the long-term period where transport represents the core 
of emissions reductions. 
This lock-in can be avoided by specific measures triggering an early redirection of 
investments in favor of modal shifts towards public modes, moderation of urban sprawl, and 
curtailment of the transport intensity of production. The adoption of such measures proves to 
significantly reduce the policy costs in the short and medium term and to create room for low 
and even negative long-term costs. This analysis highlights the importance of measures 
designed to shift investments in long-lived infrastructures as complementary policies to 
carbon pricing. More detailed insights could be obtained by disaggregating these measures in 
a set of agglomeration-specific policy measures, and complementary initiatives at alternative 
spatial scales, that may shed light on different behavioral responses, in terms of relocation of 
production and consumption activities. 
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Appendix: Numerical assumptions and variants of scenarios  
A. Numerical assumption on oil and gas supply 
The three crucial determinants of the ‘oil supply’ Nexus are the amount of ultimate resources 
(and their regional distribution), the inertia on capacity deployment and the decision of 
Middle-East producers acting as “swing producers”.  
Most estimates of proved oil reserves converge around 2.2 Tbbl (BP, 2011) including past 
production. To reflect controversies about the amount of reserves to be discovered, we adopt 
two assumptions for ultimate resources Q∞: 3.3 Tbbl and 3.8 Tbbl. The lower bound reflects a 
conservative assumption on resource additions, in line with estimates from the Association for 
the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO). The higher bound considers higher resource potentials, 
corresponding to median estimates by (USGS, 2000; Greene et al., 2006; Rogner, 1997). 
The intensity of constraints on production growth due to geological constraints is captured by 
the slope parameter b18. For conventional oil, we adopt the econometric estimate from Rehrl 
and Friedrich (2006): bC=0.061/year. Given uncertainty on large scale production of non-
conventional oil, we consider either the same value than conventional oil, bNC=0.061/year, or 
more pessimistic assumption of a slower deployment with bNC=0.04/year. For Middle-East 
producers, we impose in addition a cap on the annual increase of production capacity, 
ΔCapME. 
The deployment of production capacities in Middle-East countries is decided by the price 
objective pobj. A benchmark for oil price setting is a continuous increase towards a medium-
term stabilization around 80$/bbl, reflecting the progressive loss of influence of Middle-East 
producers. Given uncertainties, especially in the geopolitical context, we also consider the 
possibility that Middle-East producers are able to expand their production capacities to bring 
oil price at their pre-2004 level, 40$/bbl. This market flooding option is possible only for the 
more optimistic assumption on reserves. This exercise of the market power ends up when the 
finiteness of the resource forces a decline of production. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that it happens once a share shD of their reserves remains underground, and consider two 
values (50% or 25%) to reflect the uncertainties on the stock of resource in Middle-East 
countries. 
                                                     
18 a small (high) b means a flat (sloping) production profile to represent slow (fast) deployment of production 
capacities.  
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Finally, the ‘gas supply’ NEXUS represents indexation of gas markets on oil markets with a 
0.68 elasticity of gas to oil price, as calibrated on the World Energy Model (IEA, 2007). But, 
in order to represent the possibility that gas scarcity triggers faster price increases, we 
consider an alternative where this indexation disappears when oil prices exceed a threshold 
level poil/gas (chosen at 80$/bbl). In this latter case, gas prices are driven by the increased 
margins for gas producers. 
These numerical assumptions are grouped in three variants summarized in Table 3.3 
Table 3.3: Numerical assumptions for the three variants on oil and gas supply 
 Unit A-1 A-2 A-3 
Q∞ Tb 3.8 3.3 3.3 
pobj $/bl 40 80 80 
bNC Year-1 0.061 0.04 0.04 
ΔCap Mbl/y 0.8 0.7 0.7 
shD % 25 25 50 
poil/gas $/bl 80 ∞ ∞ 
 
B. Numerical assumption on substitutes to oil 
The ‘alternatives to oil’ Nexus considers two large-scale substitutes to oil for liquid fuels 
production: biofuels and Coal-To-Liquid.  
The supply curves, Sbio(t,p) give biofuels production, given competition with oil, and are 
taken from IEA (2006). They assume maximum biofuels production at 14 EJ/year in 2030 
and, thanks to technical progress, at 42 EJ/year in 2050. These assumptions are quite 
conservative with respect to recent estimates about biofuels potential (Chum et al, 2011, 
Figure 2.23(b)) and we introduce an alternative, more optimistic, assumption allowing 20 
EJ/year in 2030 and 60EJ/year in 2050.  The diffusion of biofuels is in addition submitted to 
the constraint of a time delay, Δtbio, which captures inertia on the deployment of raw products 
(biomass) and of refining capacity. 
Coal-To-Liquid is treated as a backstop technology, which enters the market as soon as liquid 
fuel selling price exceeds its total cost, pCTL, including production processes and risk 
premium. This backstop technology is submitted to capacity constraints in the form of a delay 
ΔtCTL between investments and production. Given uncertainty on large-scale CTL production, 
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we consider two possibilities, depending whether CTL is a mature technology (low threshold 
oil price at 120$/bbl and no inertia in the deployment) or it is submitted to constraints slowing 
down its deployment (high threshold oil price at 200$/bbl and significant time-lag in the 
deployment). 
These numerical assumptions are grouped in two variants summarized in Table 3.4 
Table 3.4: Numerical assumptions for the two variants on oil substitutes 
 Unit B-1 B-2 
Sbio(t,p) Mtoe/y Sbio(t,p)(*), 1.5* Sbio (t,p) 
Δtbio Years 6 4 
pCTL $/bl 200 120 
ΔtCTL Years 8 0 
(*)exogenous trend from (IEA, 2006) 
C. Numerical assumptions on demand-side technical change 
The ‘Power generation’ Nexus represents investment choices in new power generation 
technologies according to a minimization of mean production costs. Technical change is then 
dependent upon the decrease of capital costs, along with the learning process controlled by 
technology-specific learning rates γ (it measures the percentage decrease of capital costs for 
each doubling of experience). Learning does not affect standard technologies due to saturation 
of experience, but potentially contributes to important costs decreases in more recent or 
prospective technologies, including wind energy and Carbon Capture and Storage. Due to 
uncertainties on the technical potentials of these technologies, we represent either fast 
learning through high learning rates (7% for wind vs 13% for CCS) or constrained learning 
with low learning rates (3% for wind vs 7% for CCS). Note that we consider lower learning 
rates for wind units than for CCS to represent that the former is a more mature technology, 
with less remaining progress potential.  
In addition, the ‘Power generation’ Nexus represents the constraints that may affect the 
diffusion of carbon-free power plants by an exogenous maximum market share, with different 
dynamics for already existing and new technologies. In the former group, we explicitly 
represent Nuclear and Wind Energy and assume their maximum shares ShNuke and ShW as 
constant-over-time. We adopt rather conservative assumptions on the long-term potential of 
Nuclear and consider a maximum market share at 40% to capture limitations for social 
acceptability reason (20% in a more constrained vision). For wind energy, we consider a 
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benchmark case where it is limited to 15% of production to capture implicitly constraints 
imposed by intermittent production and additional integration costs at higher shares. This 
assumption is in line with the median estimate of the 164 global scenarios reviewed by the 
IPCC (Wiser et al, 2011, Figure 7.25). But, a growing body of work has evaluated higher 
levels of deployment, around 20% or more, provided that cost and policy factors are 
favourable. To treat this case, we also consider a higher limit on wind’s market share, at 25%. 
In the latter group, we consider Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), and the maximum share 
ShCCS increases over time to represent its progressive deployment, ranging from zero at the 
starting year (t0,CCS) up to its long-term market potential Shmax,CCS. During the early years, 
inertia limits the deployment of this new technology as captured by a slow increase of the 
maximum share during a ‘bottleneck period’ of length ΔtCCS, followed by an accelerated 
increase once the technology is mature.  
In the ‘Industry and services’ Nexus, energy prices affect the selection of new production 
capacities but do not influence existing ones. This putty-clay assumption implies that changes 
in final energy use are dependent on their lifetime Δtind. This is an important variable, since it 
conditions both the turnover of productive capital (and hence the speed of technical change) 
and investments needs. We take 20 years as a benchmark case, whereas 30 years reflects a 
more constrained context on investment imposing delayed retirement of production capacities.  
In the ‘Housing and Buildings’ Nexus, the baseline trends of energy consumption per square 
meter, αres(t) are taken from outcomes of the POLES model. They feature a relative decrease 
of unitary energy demand in developed regions thanks to energy efficiency, while strong 
increases in developing countries are due to the access to energy services along with wealth 
increase. In addition, the energy mix is orientated towards electricity and gas at the expense of 
coal and oil. We consider also more energy-intensive pathways with proportionally higher 
unitary energy consumption due to lower efficiency gains (for technical constraints or lack of 
investments) and/or a more prominent access to energy services in developing countries.  
In the ‘Freight transportation’ Nexus, the energy intensity of vehicles is driven by an 
exogenous trend μf (t) and a short-term fuel price elasticity εf to capture autonomous and 
endogenous energy efficiency gains as well as short-term modal shifts, respectively. The 
long-term price response of the fleet then results from the sequence of those short-term 
adjustments.  
The ‘Passenger Transportation’ Nexus represents the crucial determinant of energy efficiency 
and modal choices. Energy efficiency in private transportation is mainly dependent on the 
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constraints on the diffusion of Electric Vehicles (EV). They are captured by an exogenous 
maximum Sh on their market share, which ranges from zero in the first year (t0,EV) to Shmax,EV 
as it achieves its long-term market potential. During the early years, inertia limits the 
deployment of this new technology, as captured by a slow increase in the maximum share 
during a ‘bottleneck period’ of length ΔtEV, followed by an accelerated increase once the 
technology has matured. 
Modal allocation of mobility demand is affected by investments in infrastructure, which 
determine the relative efficiency of the different modes. Instead of the default assumption that 
investment is allocated proportionally to modal mobility demand, alternative decisions may 
trigger a re-allocation from road to low-carbon transportation infrastructure (public and rail 
transport for passengers and rail and water transport for freight).  
These numerical assumptions are grouped in two variants summarized in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5: Numerical assumptions for the three variants on delmand-side technical change 
  Unit C-1 C-2 
Nuclear ShNuke % 20 40 
Wind 
 energy 
ShW % 15 25 
γW % 3 7 
Carbon 
Capture 
and 
Storage 
t0,CCS Date 2015 2010 
ΔtCCS Years 10 7 
Shmax,CCS % 70 100 
γCCS % 7 13 
Electric 
Vehicles 
t0,EV Date 2020 2010 
ΔtEV Years 8 3 
Shmax,EV % 50 80 
γEV % 10 20 
Freight 
transport 
µf(t) - 1 µf(t)(**) 
εf - -0.35 -0.4 
Buildings αres(t) Toe/m2 1.2* αres(t) αres(t) (**) 
Industry Δtind Years 30 20 
 (**)exogenous trend from the POLES energy sectoral model(LEPII-EPE ,2006) 
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Part B 
Urban land and the spatial dimension of 
climate policies 
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This introductory section builds upon the general theory of rents (see General introduction) to 
identify the crucial determinants of urban land markets. 
 
I- Spatial differentiation and differential production rents  
   
The role of the spatial dimension of economic activities has received much less attention than 
the temporal dimension in the standard theory of rent. Such approaches ignoring the spatial 
dimensions consider implicitly that the economic mechanisms driving the emergence of rents 
are independent of land-use patterns. This assumption is questionable when introducing an 
immobile factor, since location becomes then a discriminating factor likely to give a 
comparative to those producers benefiting from the more interesting locations. This 
dimension has been introduced by Von Thünen (1836), who studies equally fertile lands used 
for agricultural production in the case where the goods can be sold in a single, immobile point 
of space. The selling price will be identical independently from the location where it is 
produced, but the production costs depend on the distance between production and market 
locations, as a result of transport costs. In this case, producers located in the central location 
will benefit from a surplus with respect to further locations, which gives rise to differential 
rents in the similar manner than in the standard Ricardian theory. 
 This idea that location can be an important determinant of rents is extended to non-
agricultural production by Chamberlin (1933), who considers retail sales in urban areas where 
consumers’ moving are constrained. This immobility factor introduces a spatial differentiation 
via the size of the market at producers’ disposal, which results in imperfect competition, 
differentiated prices and ultimately different rent levels in function of the location. the excess 
of production obtained by firms on the better locations is a form of a differential rent, 
resulting from better access to the market.  
 
II- From production rents to land rents 
 
The share of production rents that is transferred to the landowner depends on the natire of 
land competition :  
« The differential remaining, which is due to the superiority of the profit making 
opportunities afforded by one site as compared to another, is rent, and is put into the 
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hands of landlords by the competition of entrepreneurs for the best opportunities» 
(Chamberlin, 1933) 
 
The nature of land rents perceived by landowners in this situation is subjected to theoretical 
debates (Evans, 1991; Foldvary, 1993; Evans, 1993). In the extreme case where a unique agent 
owns all land, he can freely differentiate them according to production surpluses permitted by 
each location characteristics, and can then capture the whole production rents in the form of 
land revenues paid by producers. In this case, even if the landowner can capture the rent 
thanks to his monopoly power on land markets, land rents are differential in nature since they 
pay the advantages of the location for production. In more realistic cases where several 
landowners are active, land competition prevents them from deciding the price of their plot of 
land independently from others, and the landowner only captures a share of total production 
rents perceived by producers. Land price at a given location is then determined by the 
competition between different uses of a given plot and the share of land rent perceived by 
landowners then depends on its scarcity, given its intrinsic characteristics, 
III- The specific case of residential uses 
  
In this thesis, we focus more specifically on land use in urban environment for households’ 
housing purposes, which enters in the more general framework described above when 
considering housing services as the good produced from land use. Housing prices then 
basically obey to differential principles, the share of which that is captured by landowners 
being dependent on the scarcity of the site under consideration. The first consistent depiction 
of these mechanisms is provided by Alonso (1964), who generalizes Von Thünen’s model to 
non-agricultural urban agents. He investigates location choices of three categories of agents 
(farmers, industrial and households) with respect to the Central Business District (CBD) 
where all economic activities are concentrated on the basis of a tradeoff between transport 
costs and housing costs. In this approach, the analysis of urban rents is based on the bid-rent 
function, which measures what agents are ready to pay to ensure the possession of a given 
location. The equilibrium spatial distribution of economic activities then results from 
competition between the different categories of agents, the more profitable activities 
occupying the better locations (i.e. the closest to the CBD) because they can afford higher 
land prices. Muth (1969) extends Alonso’s approach to make it suitable for the question of 
residential locations by introducing core determinants of the desirability of a given location 
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within a city beyond the distance from the CBD, namely construction constraints and broader 
dimensions of the urban environment affecting households’ utility. In this framework, housing 
rents are continuously increasing when getting closer from CBD, since transport costs weight 
less on households’ budgets and allows them to pay higher land rents. Housing rents then 
appear as the difference between this bid-rent price, decided according to competition for 
better residential location, and construction costs.  
IV- Land rent and monopoly power 
 
A monopoly rent can emerge over the above described sources of rent in the case where 
landowners can act as monopolist by reducing the supply of housing services provided on 
their plot of land through limited construction. In this case, enhanced competition fosters a 
rise of prices and then of rents.  
 
V- Specifications for the representation of urban land price 
 
The analysis of mechanisms driving the appearance and amount of land rents in a urban 
environment gives us the fundamentals of the formation of prices for residential uses: 
 
• Land prices in urban environment are driven by the competition between residential 
and other production uses, and the price paid by households results from the share of 
production rents that can be captured by landowners. In a simplified vision where 
housing builders (who invest capital on land to provide housing services) are 
landowners, this rent transfer is total and land price effectively represents the price 
paid by households for residential services. This assumption is not a strong limitation 
for this thesis, which is interested in the economic effects of land prices on 
households’ budgets.1 
• Land price results from the superposition of differential rents reflecting the 
specificities of the locations in terms of accessibility and amenities, and monopoly 
rents allowed by a localized market power, which play an important role fro 
residential uses in reason of the constraints on construction. 
                                                     
1 If we wanted to consider the effects of land taxation in the spirit of Henry George (1879), it would be necessary 
to distinguish explicitly landowners and housing services builders, and to describe the mechanisms driving the 
distribution of rents among those two categories of agents 
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Chapter 4 and 5 describe the theoretical foundations and the modeling assumptions adopted to 
capture these mechanisms of urban land markets. Chapter 6 finally enables a coupled version 
of IMACLIM, including the description of urban areas to provide a consistent vision of the 
interplay between energy, mobility and urban dimensions. 
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Chapter 4  
The economic geography  
of environmental sustainability  
 
Chapter 4* proposes a theoretical analysis of location decisions when long-term 
negative environmental externalities are accounted for. To this aim, we develop a 
theory of “spatial sustainability” by combining industrial location decisions, production- 
and trade-related environmental externalities, and the dynamics of migration and 
pollution. This study generalizes earlier modeling efforts to address agglomeration and 
environmental externalities in a location-trade framework. The model is innovative in 
that it: i) formalizes heterogeneous patterns of land development in multiple regions; ii) 
includes an endogenous agglomeration effect, which influences environmental pollution 
through two opposite mechanisms; iii) allows for continuous and asymmetric 
distributions of population and economic activities within the region; and iv) 
distinguishes between environmental externalities and sustainability.  
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is the reproduction of : Grazi F, Waisman H, van den Bergh JCJM (2011). The economic 
geography of environmental sustainability, submitted to Journal of Environmental Economics and Management  
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Translating the notion of global sustainable development into concrete principles and actions 
at local, regional, and national levels has turned out to be difficult [OECD (2007; 2010)]. One 
reason is that there is no agreed framework for studying the spatial dimension of sustainable 
development. The relation between international trade and environment has received 
considerable attention, but most of the literature ignores dynamic issues related to 
sustainability (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). 
 This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of spatial 
structure of the economy on its long-run sustainability. We introduce the notion of “spatial 
sustainability” to denote that spatial configurations and economic dynamics are consistent 
with environmental constraints, as defined by the assimilative capacity of the environment 
(Pezzey and Toman, 2005). One may think here of global environmental issues, notably the 
emission of greenhouse gasses (GHG) due to energy use, which gives rise to climate change 
(IPCC, 2007). 
We develop a general equilibrium model motivated by the new economic geography 
(NEG) (Krugman, 1991). It integrates three important economic mechanisms which influence 
the (un)sustainability of the economy: namely, agglomeration externalities; the advantages of 
international or interregional trade; and the dynamics of migration and pollution. 
Agglomeration externalities, such as shorter travel distances and technological spillovers and 
knowledge sharing, affect the emission of pollution by manufacturing firms through their 
impact on the efficiency of transport-related energy inputs in production. To address the direct 
and indirect energy-use effects of spatial economic organization, the model includes an 
intermediate intra-regional transport sector. The model is used to study the long-run 
performance of the economy in terms of sustainability, and the emergence of alternative 
spatial configurations of the global economy under different parameter values. 
 The model extends the standard NEG framework in four main ways. First, it explicitly 
accounts for spatial structure through the design of various spatial configurations of the 
economy (urbanized versus undeveloped) and transition between these. Second, it includes a 
distance-related endogenous agglomeration effect, which allows to simultaneously model 
increasing returns to scale at the firm level and external economies at the industry level. 
Third, it can handle continuous and asymmetric distributions of population and economic 
activities within the region which is consistent with infinite set of trade costs. This in turn 
allows for realistic application of the model findings to environmental policy analysis. Fourth, 
the model includes the interplay of dynamic mechanisms of pollution and agglomeration to 
formalize the notion of spatial sustainability of the economy in relation to standard pollution 
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dynamics and “nature’s regenerative capacity” (Copeland and Taylor, 2004), or its ‘pollution 
assimilation potential’. This ultimately allows distinguish between environmental externalities 
associated with domestic production and international trade at each point in ‘time’, and 
unsustainability due to cumulative pollution effects.  
Following Krugman’s seminal work (1991), a considerable literature on the NEG has 
developed that addresses the mechanisms through which economies develop in space. It 
combines location choice, transport cost, trade barriers, and imperfect market competition in a 
mathematically tractable framework. Studies in this vein have addressed a variety of issues, 
including trade taxes, regulation of transport, and lobbying on factor mobility.1 
 Yet few studies that employ the NEG framework have covered environmental issues, 
and none has explicitly addressed its connection with spatial structure and sustainability. An 
early study, Brakman, Garretsen, Gigengack, van Marrewijk and Wagenvoort (1996), 
examined congestion as a dampening agglomerative force, but did not offer analytical 
solutions. Eppink and Withagen (2009) study biodiversity conservation in the context of 
regional economic specialization and development with an analytically solvable NEG model, 
but treat the environmental externality (i.e. biodiversity loss) as purely local. Rauscher (2003) 
develops a NEG model with pollution and obtains analytical solutions at the cost of assuming 
quasi-linear preferences, which gives a partial-equilibrium flavor to this approach. Zeng and 
Zhao (2006) investigate the “pollution haven” hypothesis2 by embedding pollution into the 
standard “footloose capital” model, a variant of Krugman’s (1991) model that describes the 
migration of capital when labor is immobile (Martin and Rogers, 1995; Baldwin et al, 2003). 
However, the analytical tractability of this model is realized by ignoring the negative impacts 
of pollution on household utility.  
 In this paper we use an analytically solvable variant of Krugman’s (1991) model, the 
“footloose entrepreneur (FE)” model developed by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). This model 
has become quite popular because it yields closed-form solutions. A disadvantage of it is that 
it may give rise to spatial equilibria that are more extreme than what one tends to find in 
reality (what is called the ‘catastrophic agglomeration’ result). As a consequence, applications 
of such a framework to the policy domain have been hampered by the unrealism of model 
outcomes (Ottaviano, 2003). By formalizing a smooth transition from economic 
                                                     
1 For an overview of the NEG literature, see Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), Fujita and Thisse (2002), and 
Ottaviano and Thisse (2004). 
2 This hypothesis states that pollution-intensive industries will tend to move to countries with relatively lax 
environmental regulations. Many studies have performed an empirical test. For a survey and meta-analysis see 
Jeppesen, Folmer and List (2002). 
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agglomeration to dispersion and continuously variable degrees of heterogeneity of land 
development within each region, we overcome this limitation of the framework. This results 
in an approach that is applicable to policy questions. 
 A few other contributions have employed the Forslid and Ottaviano framework to 
incorporate pollution and analyze how this relates to agglomeration. Van Marrewijk (2005) 
and Grazi, van den Bergh and Rietveld (2007) focus on quasi-static and static short-run 
equilibria, respectively. Lange and Quaas (2007) provide a dynamic analysis of pollution and 
agglomeration, but do not consider the positive effects of agglomeration on pollution and 
sustainability through technological and knowledge-sharing spillovers. The result is a partial 
description of reality, resulting in environmental externalities that dominate the final 
equilibrium outcome in certain cases. In contrast, our model accounts for two effects of 
agglomeration on environmental pollution which work in opposite directions, as explained 
below. 
 Agglomeration spillover effects have received attention in the economic literature on 
trade theory and urban economics since Marshall and Chamberlin. Nevertheless, their formal 
representation has turned out to be difficult and controversial (Ciccone, 2002). Moreover, to 
the best of our knowledge, to date no study has achieved a simultaneous modeling of 
increasing returns to scale at the firm level à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), as is standard in 
NEG models, and agglomeration externalities at the industry level à la Scitovsky (1954). Our 
work tries to accomplish this, and for this purpose adds to the increasing returns to scale 
operating at the firm level an endogenous agglomeration effect variable defined at the 
industry level. In particular, the intensity of the agglomeration spillover effect is defined as a 
function of regional ‘market density’, captured by the number of firms that are active in the 
industry, and a regional ‘market form’ which is captured by the capacity of the infrastructure 
endowment. 
 Our approach also has a number of minor innovative features. First, since the focus of 
this paper is on spatial sustainability, we provide a detailed analysis of the effect of the 
parameters that relate to the spatial and environmental dimensions of the model, notably the 
degree of economic concentration and the intensity of the environmental externality for 
different spatial configurations. Second and related to this, the spatial dimension of the 
economy is strengthened through the introduction of an explicit domestic transportation 
sector, which contributes to intra-industry agglomeration externalities. Third, agglomeration 
affects environmental pollution through two mechanisms, which, ex ante make the net effect 
non-obvious. One effect is that agglomeration increases the scale of production activity by 
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lowering the costs of production and hence leads to more energy use and associated 
emissions. The other is that agglomeration reduces the energy requirements for production 
through a lower intra-regional transport intensity of production (shorter distances) and 
technological (R&D and learning) spillovers. This in turn leads to an improvement in the 
energy-efficiency of technologies used by economic production activities and associated 
lower pollutive emissions. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a basic model. 
Section III derives the conditions under which qualitatively different, stable equilibria (with 
partial and full agglomeration) arise when agglomeration effects and pollution externalities 
are present. Section IV extends the model with the dynamics of pollution to derive long-run 
spatial equilibria that satisfy environmental sustainability and takes the next step of evaluating 
the sustainability performance of three different spatial configurations of the economy, 
resulting in a ranking of sustainable configurations. Section V concludes. Proofs of the main 
results are given in the Appendices.  
I- Economy and Space 
1. The Short-Run Model 
 The model describes a global economy consisting of two regions (labeled { }1,2j∈ ) 
and three production sectors. One produces an intermediate good ‘transport service’ ξ for the 
industrial sectors by employing a fixed amount of immobile unskilled work force L. A second 
sector is manufacturing, denoted by the symbol M, which produces a continuum of i varieties 
of a horizontally-differentiated final good through mobile human capital H and transport ξ as 
input factors. A third sector is an aggregated sector, denoted by the symbol Q, which produces 
a homogeneous traditional final good using only immobile unskilled labor L. M is 
characterized by increasing returns and monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). Because of consumer preferences for variety and increasing returns to scale, each firm 
specializes in producing a distinct variety of the manufactured good. Hence, the total number 
of active firms in the two-region economy, 1 2N n n= +  equals the number of varieties 
available in the market. The traditional and the transportation sectors produce under 
Walrasian conditions (constant returns to scale and perfect competition). The traditional good 
is chosen as the numéraire (i.e. its price is set at unity). 
For the purpose of assessing environmental sustainability as related to the use of space, 
we explicitly model a pollutive transportation sector as a variable input of production. This 
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comes down to assuming that, unlike the literature following Krugman (1991), the domestic 
trade of the manufacturing good is costly. In line with a Krugman-like modeling setting, 
international trade of the composite manufacturing good occurs at a certain cost, whereas 
trade costs are zero for both inter- and intra-regional shipment of the traditional good. 
1 2L L L= +  and 1 2H H H= + denote the total of unskilled and skilled laborers, respectively. In 
the initial spatial setting, skilled workers are unevenly distributed across the two regions; the 
share of skilled workers living in region 1 is denoted by h, with 1h H H= . Unskilled 
workers, on the other hand, are assumed to be evenly spread across regions, so that 2jL L= . 
Each unskilled worker supplies one unit of labor. 
1.1 Households 
 Workers maximize utility by consuming the two goods and suffer from negative effects on 
utility because of external environmental effects associated with economic activity. Aggregate 
utility is a Cobb-Douglas function of consumption of the traditional commodity Q and 
consumption of the aggregate manufactured good M. The latter is modeled as a CES function 
of consumption levels ( )jjc i  and ( )kjc i  of a particular variety i of the manufactured good that 
is sold in region j and produced in regions j and k.3  
The negative effect of the environmental externality on utility is captured by a 
multiplicative term ( )LjEΘ . Many earlier studies employed an additive functional form to 
achieve analytical results [e.g. Rauscher (2003); Lange and Quaas (2007); Elbers and 
Withagen (2004)]. This comes down to assuming constant marginal disutility associated with 
the environmental externality. Unlike these studies we treat the environmental externality as 
part of a multiplicative utility function, which ensures a more realistic relationship between 
pollution and utility, while still allowing for analytical solutions of the model. This modeling 
choice is moreover in line with a theoretical study of appropriate functional forms to describe 
environmental externalities [Ebert and Welsch (2004)]. 
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3 For ease of notation, we drop the index i for varieties in the remainder of the paper. 
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Here, 0 1δ< <  is the share of income jϒ  spent on manufactures; 1ε >  is the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties; and ( )LjEΘ  is the damage function associated with local flows 
of pollution LjE  which alters individuals’ utility in j. 
Domestic consumption of traded goods kjc  results from standard utility maximization: 
 1
( )
, , 1,2; .kjkj j
j
p
c j k j k
I
ε
ε δ
−
−= ϒ = ≠
                                            (2) 
 
Here kjp  is the price of a good produced in k and consumed in j, and 
1 1 1/(1 )[ ]j j j k kjI n p n p
ε ε ε− − −= +  is Dixit-Stiglitz’s (1977) price index of the manufactured good in j. 
1.2 Firms 
 Manufacturing firms produce using both skilled labor H and domestic transport ξ as inputs. 
Skilled workers are hired at a domestic wage rate jw , while domestic transport services are 
paid a price pξ  independent of the region j considered. The cost structure of a typical j-firm 
which produces a quantity jx  of the manufactured good entails fixed costs in human capital, 
jwα , and variable costs in terms of transport requirements per unit of output, jpξξ : 
 .j j j jw p x
ξχ α ξ= +                                                              (3) 
  
Trade also occurs between the two regions. To avoid modeling a separate interregional 
transportation sector, we use the ‘iceberg’ form of transport costs associated with the 
interregional trade of manufactured goods (Samuelson, 1952). This means that if a variety of 
the manufactured good produced in location j is sold in the same region at price jjp  then it 
will be charged a price jkp  in consumption location k that satisfies jk jj jkp p T= . Here 1jkT > is 
the iceberg unitary trade cost of the manufactured good, which represents the number of 
goods sent per unit received. We assume that interregional trade costs are the same in each 
direction, jk kjT T T= = . 
 Next we formalize an agglomeration effect and consider the impact of spatial 
clustering of economic activities on the transport intensity of production in the manufacturing 
sector. This effect occurs through a two mechanisms. The first one is based on the regional 
endowment of infrastructure, which represents the spatial form (or structure) of the market; 
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and the second mechanism is related to the number of firms in the spatial form, which 
determines the density of economic activity. The region specific transport requirement results 
from the endogenous agglomeration effect, as captured by variable jξ : 
 ( ).j j jnξ β ψ=                                                               (4) 
 
Here the parameter 0jβ >  captures the impact of regional spatial form, related to and 
captured by the regional infrastructure endowment, on the transport intensity of regional 
production in manufacturing. In addition, ( )0 1jnψ≤ ≤  is the equivalent impact of market 
density, which is a function of the number of firms that are active in the regional market when 
its spatial extension is determined. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to jβ  as the 
‘market-form’ effect and to ( )jnψ  as the ‘market-density’ effect. 
Parameter jβ  represents the transport requirement per unit of output in production. We 
can think of this as capturing (being inversely related to) the degree of ‘urbanization’ of a 
given spatial economy, or the spatial concentration of domestic transportation and 
telecommunications infrastructure networks. Since infrastructure is characterized by slow 
dynamics or inertia, jβ  is treated as an exogenous parameter. Two possible spatial forms (or 
structures) for each region are considered: namely, a spatially-developed organization of 
manufacturing activities, with a high intensity of infrastructure development (urbanized 
space), and a less intense use of space by these activities on (undeveloped) land. We consider 
a two-region system, which then gives rise to three possible spatial configurations of the 
global economy (urban + undeveloped; urban + urban; and undeveloped + undeveloped).4 
The multiplicative term ( )jnψ  captures the impact of the market density on intra-
industry transaction (communication and transport) costs and the technological spillovers.5 In 
line with empirical evidence on the effect of density of the economic activity on the structure 
of production (Ciccone and Hall, 1996; Keller, 2002; Duranton and Puga, 2004), we posit 
( )0 1ψ =  to indicate no positive effect of agglomeration on production costs in the absence of 
                                                     
4 Actually, with the two possible regional structures described, 22 4=  spatial configurations for the two-region 
economy are possible. However, two of these are spatial mirror images of each other. 
5 The ‘market-density’ external effect that we model acts so as to reduce the average cost of production at the 
industry level, thus overriding the firm scale. As such it can be identified with external economies in the sense of 
Scitovsky (1954). 
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firms; and ( ) 0jnψ ′ <  to mean that the higher the number of firms, the stronger the reduction 
in production costs. 
Given eq. (3), profit-maximization leads to mark-up pricing for the manufactured good: 
 .
1j j
p pξε ξε= −                                                                   (5) 
 
The traditional good and the transport service commodity are produced using unskilled 
labor as a linear input.6 
Production in the traditional sector is assumed to have a one-to-one relationship with 
unskilled labor and final product, whereas in transport service supply the labor requirement 
per unit of output is captured by parameter γ. We take the wage of unskilled workers as the 
numéraire.7 Marginal cost pricing in the domestic transportation sector then implies: 
 .pξ γ=                                                                     (6) 
 
The domestic supply of the traditional good is: 
/ 2 ,j j j jQ L n xγξ= −                                                             (7) 
 
where the second term on the right-hand side of (7) represents the effect of unskilled workers 
being employed in the transport sector [see eq.(3)]. 
1.3 Market Equilibrium 
 For a given regional distribution of the skilled labor factor jH , the short-run model is 
determined by a set of four equations (for details, see Grazi et al, 2007). 
 / 2.j j jw H Lϒ = +                                                                (8) 
 
Here, jϒ  is the income generated in each region by jw , the wage rate of skilled workers, jH , 
and the numéraire wage of jL  unskilled workers. 
 
                                                     
6 The assumption of linearity in the traditional/agricultural constant returns sector is very standard (Krugman, 
1991). We extend it to the transport service sector in order to keep the analysis simple. 
7 This is a consequence of assuming free trade for the numéraire traditional good Q, which in turn comes down 
to its price being equal to 1 across regions: 1Q Q Qj kp p p= = = , with { }, 1, 2j k = . Marginal cost pricing implies 
the interregional equalization of the wages of unskilled labor input L used in the traditional sector: 1Q Lp w= = . 
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 ,jj
H
n α=                                                                      (9) 
where a fixed input requirement α indicates that the total number of firms operating in region 
j, jn , is proportional to locally available skilled laborers. 
As a consequence of the profit maximization behavior in a monopolistically competitive 
market, in both regions firms will enter and exit the manufacturing sector until the point at 
which profits are zero. Therefore, by substituting (5) into the profit function j j j jp xπ χ= −  
and setting 0jπ = , the wage rate jw  at the equilibrium is: 
 .
( 1)
j j
j
x
w
γξ
α ε= −                                                                    (10)
 
 
The market-clearing size of a typical firm in equilibrium is j jj jkx c Tc= + . Substituting 
(2), (5) and (6) in (10) gives equilibrium solutions for jx  and jI : 
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Here 1T εφ −=  is a measure of the openness to interregional trade, with 0φ =  representing 
maximal barriers to interregional trade (or autarky), and 1φ =  free trade across regions.8 
Given eq. (9) and recalling that the share of the regional population equals 1h H H= , 
the ‘market density’ effect ( )jnψ  in (4) can be re-written as a function of h: ( )hψ  in region 1 
and ( )1 hψ −  in region 2. Moreover, substituting equations (8), (9) and (11) into (10), and 
using the definition of the regional share of population h, the model can be analytically solved 
in the regional wage levels 1w  and 2w : 
                                                     
8 In the NEG approach, transport costs allow one to study the extent to which space affects economic decisions 
by individual agents (consumers and producers), and how these decisions in turn drive the spatial distribution of 
economic activities. 
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1.4 Local Pollution Externalities 
 The small literature that exists on NEG with agglomeration and environmental externalities 
considers the local effect of pollution (flow), meaning the (immediate) negative impact on the 
utility of individuals living in the respective region [Rauscher (2003); van Marrewijk (2005); 
Lange and Quaas (2007)]. Like these studies, we initially assume that the environmental 
externality (pollution) is local and only generated by manufacturing.9 Yet, unlike these 
studies, we reject the standard assumption of proportionality of pollution to the output jx  and 
instead consider pollution as a function of transport-related energy use by the j-manufacturing 
sector j jxξ . By so doing, we are able to address the relationship between energy use, energy 
intensity and production structure. 
Local pollution emissions by manufacturing production in region j which affect utility 
in j are then generated in the following manner: 
 ( ).L Lj j j jE a n xξ=                                                         (13) 
 
                                                     
9 Later, in Section IV, we relax this assumption to consider global environmental externalities that arise from 
interregional trade/transport as well, and which is functional to the aim of addressing sustainability. Since global 
environmental externalities do not introduce heterogeneity across regions, they have no influence on the 
dynamics of migration. Hence, they can be omitted in this first-step analysis, which aims to determine the 
patterns and stability of the spatial long-run equilibria. 
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Here, La  represents the intensity of externalities generated by the transport input jξ .10 The 
pollution term in utility, ( )LjEΘ  [see eq. (1)] captures the effect of pollution externalities on 
utility. We posit ( )0 1Θ =  to indicate no negative effect of pollution on utility in the absence 
of any flow of pollution; and ( ) 0LjE′Θ <  to mean that the higher the pollution level, the 
stronger is its negative effect on utility. 
2. The Long-Run Model and the Dynamics of Migration 
Next, we study the long-term impact of different spatial configurations on production 
allocation when agglomeration- and local pollution-related effects matter. As in the “footloose 
entrepreneur” framework [Forslid and Ottaviano (2003)] the model dynamics is driven by 
international migration of individuals belonging to the skilled population. The resulting 
spatial equilibria are defined over the share h of skilled workers living in region 1, where 
1h H H= . Then the study of dynamic behavior of the core model variables is carried out for 
different values of trade barrier, φ . Consequently, all the variables in the dynamics analysis 
(wage, price index, pollution externality, etc.), can be expressed as functions of variables h 
and φ  ( ( , )jw h φ , ( , )jI h φ , ( , )LjE h φ , etc.). 
The dynamics of migration and resulting spatial equilibria follow from individuals 
comparing wages at different locations, as captured by the indirect utility differential between 
region 1 and 2 as 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )h V h V hφ φ φΩ = − , where the indirect utility jV  associated with (1) 
is specified as: 
 { }( , )( , ) ( , ), 1,2 .
( , )
j
j
j
w h
V h h j
I h δ
φφ φφ= Γ Θ =                                   (14)
 
 
Here, 1(1 )δ δδ δ −Γ = −  is a constant that depends on the share of income devoted to 
manufacturing good purchases, δ . 
Substituting (14) in the indirect utility differential ( , )h φΩ  gives the following derived 
relationship, which represents the incentive to move from region 2 to region 1: 
                                                     
10 An alternative way to model local pollution would be to relate this to the marginal input factor unskilled labor, 
as in Copeland and Taylor (2004). Our formulation, although simple, has the advantage of specifying explicitly 
the impact mechanism via the transport-related energy use, and addressing the impact of agglomeration on 
emission intensity. 
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 1 2
1 2
( , ) ( , )( , ) ( , ) (1 , ) .
( , ) ( , )
w h w hh h h
I h I hδ δ
φ φφ φ φφ φ
⎡ ⎤Ω = Γ Θ − Θ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                              (15)
 
 
Given [ ]0;1h∈ , the equation describing the dynamics of factor mobility can be 
expressed as follows:11 
 
( , ), if 0 1
max(0, ( , )),    if 0 .
min(0, ( , )), if 1
h h
dh h h
dt
h h
φ
φ
φ
Ω < <⎧⎪= Ω =⎨⎪ Ω =⎩                                                (16) 
 
Clearly, a long-run spatial equilibrium is defined by condition: 
 0.dh
dt
=
                                                                     (17) 
 
Substituting (15) and (16) into (17) gives the implicit relationship between the 
distribution of population h and the trade barrier φ  in the long run. Such an equilibrium is 
stable only if ( , ) 0h
h
φ∂Ω <∂ . For a given spatial configuration, a certain pattern of population 
distribution associated with a trade barrier level φ  defines a stable long-run equilibrium if one 
of the three following conditions holds: 
 
0 1 1 0
) ;  ) ;  ) .
( , ) 0 ( , ) 0( , ) 0, ( , ) 0
h h h
a b c
h hh h
h
φ φφ φ
< <⎧ = =⎧ ⎧⎪ ∂Ω⎨ ⎨ ⎨Ω ≥ Ω ≤Ω = < ⎩ ⎩⎪ ∂⎩                  (18)
 
 
II. Equilibrium with Agglomeration and Pollution Effects 
 
This section analytically investigates the stability of long-run spatial equilibria once 
agglomeration and pollution flow effects are accounted for, as in condition (18). By 
                                                     
11 Note that dynamics are implicit-in-time in this type of modeling framework [Krugman (1991)]. This allows us 
to omit the index for time dependence from the variables of the long-run model. 
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substituting (12), (12bis), and (11) into (15), the latter can be rewritten as:
1
2(1 ) 1
2 2(1 ) 2 22 2
1 1
( , )
( , ) .
( ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
h
h
h h h h h h h h
δ
ε ε
ε
ω φβφ
β βδ δφ ψ ψ φ ψ ψβ ε ε β
− −
−
′Γ
Ω = ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − − + − + + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ (19)
 
Here 
1
1/ ( 1)
1 / 2
L
δ
εδ ε ε α
δ ε γε
−⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥′Γ = Γ ⎢ ⎥− ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 is a positive parameter and ω  is a function that depends 
on variables φ  and h in the following way: 
 
1
1 1 2 12
1
1 1
1 12
1
1 1
1 12 2
1 1
( ) 2 ( ) 1 1 (1 ) (1 )
( , ) ( , )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) 1
h h h h h
h h
h h h h
h h h
ε
ε ε ε
δ
ε ε
ε ε
ε ε
ε ε
β δ δψ φψ φ ψβ ε εω φ φ
βψ φ ψβ
β β δψ φ ψ φβ β ε
−
− − −
− −
− −
− −
− −
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞+ − + + − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭= Θ +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− − − + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠−
2 1
1 1
1 12
1
1 ( )
(1 , ).
( ) (1 ) (1 )
h h
h
h h h h
ε
δ
ε ε
ε ε
δ ψε φ
βφψ ψβ
−
− −
− −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞+⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭Θ −
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦           (20)
 
 
Note that the formulation in (19) generalizes the result obtained by Forslid and Ottaviano 
(2003) in three ways: i) it allows for a variable positive spatial spillover effect associated with 
the size of market (i.e. ( ) 1hψ ≤ ); ii) it includes an environmental externality that negatively 
affects the utility of individuals (i.e. ( , ) 1h φΘ ≤ ); and iii) it enables to represent ex-ante 
differences in the regional spatial setting (i.e. 1β  and 2β  may take different values). On the 
other hand, setting ( ) 1hψ = , ( , ) 1h φΘ =  and 1 2β β=  in equation (19) produces the same 
results as Forslid and Ottaviano (2003).  
 To be maximally consistent with the original framework by Forslid and Ottaviano 
(2003), we start this section’s analysis by considering the case of ex-ante identical regions      
( 1 2β β= ), and derive for each the conditions that drive the nature of the long-run equilibria 
(sub-section II.1). The study of equilibria is then extended to consider different spatial settings 
for the regions ( 1 2β β≠ ) (sub-section II.2). Finally, the results are analyzed and discussed in 
the light of the interplay between agglomeration and environmental drivers (sub-section II.3). 
152 
 
Adapting the expressions in (19) and (20) to the range of possible spatial settings of the 
economy (as defined by the combinations [ ]1 2;β β ), we successively investigate the stability 
conditions of the core-periphery ( 1h = ) and symmetric spreading ( 0.5h = ) equilibria, as is 
standard in the NEG literature. The key innovation that moves this section beyond the 
previous NEG literature is that it analytically derives the general stability conditions of the 
partial agglomeration equilibria ( 0.5 1h< < ).12 
1. Equilibrium of Symmetric Spatial Configurations 
Here we study the long-run equilibria associated with (18) in symmetric spatial 
configurations of the two-region economy (i.e. j kβ β β= = ). We limit the analysis to the case 
0.5 1h≤ ≤ , since the findings are symmetrical around 0.5h = . For these conditions, the 
indirect utility in (19) and the function in (20) can be rewritten as follows: 
2 2(1 ) 2 2(1 ) 2 1 1
( , )( , ) ,
( ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
hh
h h h h h h h h
δ
ε ε ε ε
ω φφ β δ δφ ψ ψ φ ψ ψε ε
− − − −
′ΓΩ = ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤+ − − + − + + − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ (21)
 
 
and 
 
1 1 2 1
1 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 1
( ) 2 ( ) 1 1 (1 ) (1 )
( , ) ( , )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 ( )
( ) (1 ) (1 )
h h h h h
h h
h h h h
h h h h h
h h h h
ε ε ε
δ
ε ε ε
ε ε ε
δ
ε ε
δ δψ φψ φ ψε εω φ φ
ψ φ ψ
δ δψ φ ψ φ ψε ε
φψ ψ
− − −
− − −
− − −
− −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ − + + − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭= Θ +
⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− − − + − + +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭−
⎡ ⎤+ − −⎣ ⎦1
(1 , ).h
ε
φ
−
Θ −
(22) 
 Next we derive the analytical equilibrium conditions:  
 
1.1 Core-Periphery Pattern in Symmetric Configurations 
 Rewriting equation (20) for the case of a Core-Periphery (CP) pattern ( 1h = ) gives:13 
                                                     
12 Lange and Quaas (2007) also obtain partial equilibria, but only for a restricted set of the trade parameter 
values. Such a limitation excludes any realistic application of their model findings to environmental policy 
analyses. 
13 Deriving (1)LjE  from (10), (12), (12bis) and (13) shows that the pollution flow function is independent from φ  for 1h = . Hence the index φ  in (1)Θ  can be omitted. 
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2 1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1 (0) (0)
(1)(1, ) 2 (1) (1) .
(1)
ε
ε
ε
δ δ
ε ε ε
δ δφ ψε εψω φ φ ψ
ψ φ
−
−
−
− − −
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− + + Θ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦= Θ −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
By assumption, because regional economic activity is absent, (0) 1Θ =  and (0) 1ψ = , 
that is, these variables take their maximum values. Combining this with the condition 
(1, ) 0ω φ >  (18-b), which assures that the core-periphery pattern ( 1h = ) is a stable 
equilibrium for any φ  value, we obtain 1 CP(1) (1) ( )εψ σ φ−Θ ≥ , where: 
   
( )
2
CP
1
1
1 1
( ) .
2
δ
ε
δ δφε εσ φ
φ + −
⎛ ⎞− + +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠=
                                                    
(23) 
 
This a concave function that defines the stability condition of the core-periphery equilibrium 
pattern in the case of symmetric configurations, as summarized by the following condition: 
CONDITION 1: Given CP ( )σ φ  in (23), the core-periphery pattern ( 1h = ) is a stable equilibrium 
for a trade barrier φ  ( 0 1φ≤ ≤ ) if and only if: 1 CP(1) (1) ( )εψ σ φ−Θ ≥ .14 
The possible stable equilibrium outcomes are summarized by the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1: Given (1)Θ , (1)ψ , and 
1 11 1
2 1 2 1min
CP
1 1
1
δ δ
ε εε ε δ ε δσ ε ε δ ε δ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− − − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , three 
cases must be distinguished according to the position of 1(1) (1) εψ −Θ with respect to minCPσ
and 1: 
CP–i: If 1 minCP(1) (1)
εψ σ−Θ ≤ , the full agglomeration is never an equilibrium, whatever the 
trade freeness; 
CP–ii: If min 1CP (1) (1) 1
εσ ψ −< Θ < , the full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium for 
intermediate trade freeness ;S Sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , while it is unstable for [ ]0;1 \ ;S Sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦
;
 
 
                                                     
14 Stability of long-run equilibrium in a NEG model requires that the additional so-called “no black hole” 
condition is satisfied, which imposes that the full agglomeration is never a stable equilibrium in case of autarky 
0φ =  [Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999)]. According to Condition 1, this means ensuring that function 
CP ( )σ φ  tends to infinity when 0φ = , which, from (23), is in turn equivalent to 1 / (1 ) 0δ ε+ − > . This analytical 
form for the “no black hole” condition is similar to the one obtained in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), and is 
supposed to hold in the reminder of the paper. 
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CP–iii: If 1(1) (1) 1εψ −Θ ≥ , the full agglomeration is a stable equilibrium for a sufficiently 
high value of trade freeness [ ];1Sφ φ∈ , while it is unstable for [ ]0; Sφ φ∈ ;  
The threshold point Sφ  (with Sφ  and Sφ  indicating its upper and lower value in 
case of existence of multiple points) is the “sustain point” in the sense of Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (1999). It is implicitly given by any φ  value that satisfies 
condition 1 CP(1) (1) ( )
εψ σ φ−Θ = .  
(See Appendix B.1 for a proof). 
We can compare our results with those obtained by Lange and Quaas (2007). Even 
though their model differs from ours in the specification of the negative externalities in the 
utility function (additive vs. multiplicative), the results of Proposition 1 are comparable with 
theirs in the absence of the endogenous agglomeration-driving ‘market-density’ effect. In our 
analysis this translates into (1) 1ψ = . Only two out of the above three possible outcomes then 
emerge:15 i) if minCP(1) σΘ ≤ , the core-periphery structure is unstable independently of freeness 
of trade (case CP–i); and ii) if minCP(1) σΘ > , two “sustain points” Sφ  and Sφ  exist and the full 
agglomeration is a stable equilibrium only for intermediate trade freeness ;S Sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  (case 
CP–ii).  
1.2 Symmetric-Spreading Pattern in Symmetric Configurations 
 Let us now turn to consider the stability range of the core-periphery equilibrium 0.5h = . 
Rewriting (20) for this specific case shows that (0.5, ) 0ω φ =  for any φ , so that the symmetric 
outcome is always an equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is stable if and only if (0.5, ) 0
h
φ∂Ω ≤∂ . 
We introduce (0.5) (0.5)2
(0.5)
dψ
ψ
ψ
′= −
 
and (0.5)
(0.5)
2
(0.5)
EdΘ
∂Θ
∂= − Θ  
as a measure of the intensity 
of the agglomeration and the environmental effects at 0.5h = , respectively.16 Using (21) and 
(22) we can derive: 
                                                     
15 Note that case CP–iii in Proposition 1 never emerges in the absence of the market density effect because 
condition (1) 1Θ >  then does not hold. 
16 Deriving (0.5)LjE  from (10), (12), (12bis) and (13) shows that the pollution flow function is independent of φ  
for 0.5h = . Hence, the index φ  in (0.5)Θ  and in (0.5)dΘ  can be omitted. Moreover, since ψ and Θ are both 
decreasing in h, their derivatives are negative. Consequently, (0.5)dψ and 
(0.5)dΘ  are positive terms. 
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 11 1
SS
1 (0.5, )2 (1 ) (0.5)
1
0.5, ( ),
1 1 1
L
h
δ δ δ
εε εεγ φ δ β φ ψα εφ σ φε δ φ δ φ ε φ
− − −− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ Θ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠∂Ω ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦=∂ − + − + +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦           
(24) 
 
where SS ( )σ φ  can be decomposed into three components: 
  
  (FE) (0.5) ( ) (0.5) ( )SS SS SS SS( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),d d
ψ
ψσ φ σ φ σ φ σ φΘΘ= + −                            (25) 
 
with 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )
(FE)
SS
( ) 2 2
SS
( ) (0.5)
SS
1( ) 2 1 ;
1 1
1( ) 4 1 2 ;
2
1 1( ) 2 .
2
fa L
d
ψ
ψ
δ ε δ ε δσ φ φ ε δ δ ε φε ε δ ε δ
σ φ δφ ε δ φ ε ε δ δ ε δ
δε ε εσ φ φγ ε δ
Θ
− − −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + + −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= − + + − + + −⎣ ⎦
− −⎛ ⎞= +⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠               
(26) 
Since all other terms on the right-hand side of equation (24) are positive, ( )0.5,
h
φ∂Ω∂  
has the same sign as SS ( )σ φ . The stability condition of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium 
in symmetric configurations can then be expressed as follows: 
CONDITION 2: A symmetric distribution of skilled workers ( 0.5h = ) is always an equilibrium. 
Given (24), such an equilibrium is stable if and only if SS( ) 0σ φ < . 
The conditions for determining the sign of SS ( )σ φ  are analytically obtained from (25) 
and (26). Given Condition 2, this allows to explicitly investigate the stability conditions of the 
symmetric spreading equilibrium, as summarized in the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2: Let the following functions be defined: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
,0
(0.5)
(0.5)
2(0.5)
(0.5) (0.5)
2 (0.5)
2
222 2 (0.5) 2 2 2 (0.5)
4 1
;
( 1)
4
;
4 1
2 4 1 4 1
.
1 4 1
. .
4 4 1 1 4 1 4 1
f
f
d
d
a L d
d
d d
a L d
d d
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ ψ
ε δ
δ ε
γ ε δ ε δζ δ ε
γ ε δ ε ε εζ ζ ε ε δ ε
δ
δ ε ε δ ε ε δ ε δ ε
Δ
− −= −
− −= + −
⎡ ⎤− − + + −⎣ ⎦= + ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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Then stability of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium depends on these functions, 
where five cases can be distinguished: 
SS–i: If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < , the symmetric-spreading is never a stable 
equilibrium; 
SS–ii: If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < , a value bφ  exists so that the symmetric-
spreading is a stable equilibrium for all [ ]0; bφ φ∈ ; 
SS–iii: If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > , a threshold value bφ  exists so that the 
symmetric spreading is a stable equilibrium for all [ ];1bφ φ∈ ; 
SS–iv: If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( ) ( )(0.5) (0.5) (0.5)d d dψ ψζ ζΘ Δ< < , two threshold values exist, bφ  
and bφ , such that the symmetric equilibrium is stable for all 0; ;1b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∈ ∪ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
and unstable for all ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  
SS–v: If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ Δ> , the symmetric-spreading equilibrium is 
always stable. 
The threshold point bφ  (whose lower and upper values are represented by bφ  and 
bφ , respectively) appearing in cases SS–ii, SS–iii and SS–iv is the “break point” in the 
sense of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). It is implicitly given by condition 
SS ( ) 0σ φ = . 
(See Appendix B.1 for a proof). 
  
Also here we can compare the results with those obtained by Lange and Quaas (2007), 
when the endogenous agglomeration effect is absent. In our analysis, this comes down to 
posing (0.5) 0dψ = . Three possible outcomes out of the five above presented then arise:17 i) if 
( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ Δ> , the symmetric spreading equilibrium is stable independent of trade freeness 
(case SS–v); ii) if ( ) ( )(0.5) (0.5) (0.5)d d dψ ψζ ζΘ Δ< < , two “break points” emerge bφ  and bφ , and the 
symmetric spreading is a stable equilibrium only for [ ]0;1 \ ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  (case SS–iv). These 
two cases correspond to the two possible outcomes mentioned in Proposition 2 in Lange and 
                                                     
17 Note that cases SS–i and SS–iii never occur in case of absent market-density effect, since condition 
(0.5)
,0d dψ ψ>  never holds. 
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Quaas (2007), but with other specific analytical conditions due to the difference in the 
specification of negative externalities in utility. Adopting a multiplicative formulation as we 
do generates an additional possible outcome that does not emerge in the analysis by Lange 
and Quaas (2007), namely: iii) if
 ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < , a unique “break point” bφ  exists and 
symmetric spreading is a stable equilibrium only for [ ]0; bφ φ∈  (case SS–ii). 
1.3 Partial Agglomeration in Symmetric Spatial Configurations 
The existence and stability properties of partial agglomeration (PA) of production ( 0.5 1h< <
) can be derived from those of the core-periphery and symmetric-spreading configurations, as 
summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3: Let us consider a φ -value such that 0 1φ≤ ≤ : 
PA–i: If the core-periphery ( 1h = ) and symmetric spreading ( 0.5h = ) are both stable 
equilibria for trade barrier φ , then a partial agglomeration equilibrium exists 
which is unstable. 
PA–ii: If the core-periphery ( 1h = ) and symmetric spreading ( 0.5h = ) are both 
unstable equilibria for trade barrier φ , then a partial agglomeration equilibrium 
exists which is stable. 
(See Appendix B.2 for a proof). 
  
The emergence and nature (stability vs. instability) of partial agglomeration then 
depends on the values of 1(1) (1) εψ −Θ , (0.5)dψ and (0.5)dΘ , which determine the stability ranges of 
the core-periphery (cases CP–i to CP–iii) and the symmetric-spreading equilibria (SS–i to SS–
v), as well as the relative values of “sustain points” and “break points”, whenever these exist. 
We draw attention to the case in which CP–i and SS–i are simultaneously satisfied. This 
results in the instability of both core-periphery and symmetric-spreading equilibria for all 
trade barriers. According to Proposition 3, this is associated with the stability of partial 
agglomeration equilibria for all trade barriers φ , which represents a continuous asymmetric 
distributions of the manufacturing sector across regions. Lange and Quaas (2007) already 
presented an extension of the basic model by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003) that allows for the 
existence of some stable partial agglomeration equilibria. However, contrary to previous 
studies in which the existence of such equilibria is always bound to limited ranges of trade 
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barriers, our framework enables stable partial agglomeration equilibria to emerge for all trade 
barriers. So our model is capable of explaining a wider range of realistic spatial distributions 
of population and economic activities. What is more, this property makes our framework 
valuable for policy analysis and overcomes the shortcomings of previous NEG studies, which 
have seen very little application to policy. 
 
2- Equilibrium of Non-Symmetric Spatial Configurations.  
 In this sub-section, we extend the analysis of long term equilibria of the two-region 
economy to the case of non symmetric configurations characterized by ex-ante differences in 
terms of spatial structure modeled by assuming distinct β-values in the production function: 
1 2β β≠  (see eq. (4)). We introduce 
1
2
1
εβν β
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 and, without loss of generality, assume that 
condition 1ν <  (corresponding to 1 2β β< ) holds.18 We then investigate the stability 
conditions of core-periphery ( 0h = ; 1h = ) and partial agglomeration ( 0 1h< < ).19 
2.1 Core-Periphery pattern in non-symmetric configurations 
 Similar to the analysis carried out in section 1, we first investigate the conditions under which 
a full agglomeration of production is a stable equilibrium.  
According to (18-b), the full agglomerations 1h =  is stable equilibrium under the 
condition (1, ) 0φΩ ≥ . Using (19) and (20) shows that this condition is equivalent to 
( ) 1CP 1 (1) (1) εσ φ ψν −< Θ . 
CONDITION 3: The core-periphery pattern 1h =  is a stable equilibrium for trade barrier 
[ ]0;1φ∈  if: ( )1 CP1 (1) (1) εψ σ φν −Θ > . 
We can derive the stability conditions of the core-periphery pattern 1h =  through a 
formal analogy with condition 1 by substituting 1(1) (1) εψ −Θ  with 1
1 (1) (1) εψν
−Θ . Similarly to 
                                                     
18 Since we consider regions with different spatial structures, the indirect utility differential ( , )h φΩ takes the 
general form as given in (19). This holds throughout the subsection. 
19 The symmetric-spreading distribution 0.5h =  is not discussed in the context of asymmetric configurations (
1 2β β≠ ). The reason is that 1 2β β≠  gives (0.5, ) 0φΩ ≠  (eq. (20)) and this case is not an equilibrium. 
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Proposition 1, we obtain three possible outcomes for the core-periphery pattern 1h =  
conditional on the position of 11 (1) (1) εψν
−Θ  with respect to minCPσ and 1: i) 1h =  is never an 
equilibrium if 1 minCP
1 (1) (1) εψ σν
−Θ < ; ii) 1h =  is an equilibrium for intermediate trade freeness 
* *;S Sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ ; iii) 1h =  is an equilibrium for low trade barrier *;1Sφ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  if 
min 1
CP
1 (1) (1) εσ ψν
−< Θ .20 
Similarly we derive the stability condition for the full agglomeration 0h = . According 
to (18-c), the case 0h =  is a stable equilibrium as long as condition (0, ) 0φΩ ≤  holds. Using 
(19) and (20) shows that this condition is equivalent to ( ) 1CP (1) (1) εσ φ ν ψ −< Θ . 
CONDITION 3BIS: The core-periphery pattern 0h =  is a stable equilibrium for trade barrier 
[ ]0;1φ∈  if: ( )1 CP(1) (1) εν ψ σ φ−Θ > . 
 
Similarly to Proposition 1, we obtain three possible outcomes for the core-periphery 
pattern 0h =  conditional on the position of 1(1) (1) εν ψ −Θ  with respect to minCPσ  and 1: i) 0h =  
is never an equilibrium if 1 minCP(1) (1)
ε σν ψ −Θ < ; ii) 0h =  is an equilibrium for intermediate 
trade freeness * *** ; SSφ φφ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  if 1minCP (1) (1) 1εν ψσ −< Θ < ; iii) 0h =  is an equilibrium for low 
trade barrier **;1Sφ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  if 1(1) (1) 1εν ψ −Θ > .21 
 Two characteristics of the full-agglomeration equilibria are worth noting. First, 
whatever the ν -value, a full agglomeration is never an equilibrium for 0φ =  (“no black hole” 
condition). Second, by assuming 1ν < , condition ( )1 CP(1) (1) εψ ν φσ−Θ >  is less stringent than 
condition ( )1 CP1(1) (1) εψ σ φν−Θ > , so that the stability range of 1h =  (indicating full 
agglomeration in region 1) is wider than the stability range of 0h =  (indicating full 
                                                     
20 The threshold point *Sφ  (with *Sφ  and *Sφ  indicating its upper and lower value in case of existence of multiple 
points) is the “sustain point” in the case of full agglomeration 1h =  in non-symmetric configurations (see 
Proposition 1). It is implicitly given by condition 1 *CP
1 (1) (1) ( )S
εψ σ φν
−Θ = . 
21 The threshold point **Sφ  (with **Sφ  and 
**
Sφ  indicating its upper and lower value in case of existence of 
multiple points) is the “sustain point” in the case of full agglomeration 1h =  in non-symmetric configurations 
(see Proposition 1). It is implicitly given by condition 1 **CP(1) (1) ( )S
εν ψ σ φ−Θ = . 
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agglomeration in region 2). This makes sense since positing 1ν <  means that region 1 is 
characterized by a stronger agglomeration effect (as captured by 1 2β β< ), which fosters 
agglomeration of production. 
2.2 Partial Agglomeration in the Non-symmetric Spatial Configuration.  
The equilibrium properties of partial agglomeration (PA) of production ( 0 1h< < ) can be 
derived from those of the core-periphery configurations ( 0h =  and 1h = ) as summarized in 
the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4: Let us consider a φ -value with 0 1φ≤ ≤ : 
PA’–i: If 0h = and 1h =  are both stable equilibria for trade barrier φ , then an unstable 
partial agglomeration equilibrium exists. 
PA’–ii: If 0h =  and 1h =  are both unstable equilibria for trade barrier φ , then a stable 
partial agglomeration equilibrium exists. 
(See Appendix B.3 for a proof). 
According to Proposition 4, if both 1h =  and 0h =  are never stable equilibria, a stable 
partial agglomeration equilibrium arises for all trade barrier values. This situation occurs 
when 1 minCP(1) (1)
εψ νσ−Θ ≤ .  
3- Analysis of the Interplay between Agglomeration and Environmental Effects  
The analytical equilibrium conditions derived in the two previous sections complete the 
earlier NEG literature. To the standard analysis of agglomeration versus dispersion drivers of 
the equilibrium in the long run22 we add a new force of agglomeration that stems from an 
explicit representation of the spatial dimension of the market (which we call ‘market density’) 
and take the next step to study it in interaction with an associated environmental externality 
effect. In our model the ‘market density’ effect acts as a centripetal force fostering 
agglomeration of production through the decrease of unitary intra-industry transport costs. We 
henceforth refer to it as the more general ‘agglomeration effect’, but we actually mean the 
specific effect of the size of the market in a given space on the structure of production (see the 
discussion of equation (4)). On the other hand, the environmental effect acts as a centrifugal 
force fostering dispersion of activities in response to the negative impact of pollution on 
                                                     
22 Agglomeration forces, as traditionally approached by the NEG literature are: “market-size” and “cost-of-
living” effects, whereas the dispersion force is represented by the “market-crowding” effect [see Forslid and 
Ottaviano (2003) for a thorough discussion]. 
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domestic utility. The impact of those two effects on long-term equilibria depends on their 
relative intensities, as defined by functions ψ and Θ, respectively.23  
Let us start with the stability range of the core-periphery pattern, which can be derived 
as the φ -values for which Condition 1 is satisfied. Everything else being equal, a stronger 
‘market density’ effect, as captured by a lower (1)ψ , favors agglomeration by widening the 
range of trade freeness compatible with stability of the core-periphery,24 whereas a stronger 
environmental effect as captured by a lower Θ(1) fosters dispersion by narrowing this range. 
The three cases discussed in Proposition 1 differ in terms of the number of emerging “sustain 
points” resulting from the interplay between the agglomeration and environmental effects. In 
the case of CP–i, there is no “sustain point”: the centrifugal environmental effect is so strong 
that it always renders full agglomeration unstable. In case CP–ii, two “sustain points” Sφ  and 
Sφ  exist. This corresponds to an intermediate situation in which centrifugal and centripetal 
forces associated with market density and environmental effects, respectively, are of the same 
order of magnitude and offset each other. The boundary case 1(1) (1) 1εψ −Θ =  corresponds to a 
situation in which the centrifugal environmental and the centripetal market density forces 
fully offset each other, and lead to an identical result as in the traditional “footloose 
entrepreneur” model where they are absent: the “sustain point” Sφ  is unique and is defined by 
condition ( )CP 1σ φ = , which is identical to condition (25) in Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). 
Finally, case CP–iii is associated with a unique “sustain point”: the centripetal impact of the 
agglomeration effect dominates, making core-periphery a stable equilibrium in the case of 
free trade 1φ = , so that the range of stability is given by [ ];1Sφ φ∈ .  
The stability of the symmetric spreading equilibrium is obtained for those φ -values for 
which Condition 2 is satisfied. As formalized in the decomposition of SS ( )σ φ  in (25), in 
determining the stability of the equilibria, our model accounts for the relative importance of 
agglomeration and environmental effects, as well as for their dependence on the long-run 
trade costs. Given the relevance and the novelty of this analysis we take the next step of 
analytically deriving the conditions under which both the interplaying and the trade-
dependence mechanisms occur. Due to limited space, we summarize here the main insights 
from this analysis; mathematical details are given in Appendix B.4. 
                                                     
23 For the sake of clarity of interpretation of the results, we abstract from considering ex-ante differences among 
regions as in non-symmetric configurations, which, although affecting the results, do not modify the qualitative 
effects at play. 
24 We recall that 1 0ε− < , so that a lower (1)ψ  means a higher 1(1) εψ − . 
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The first term on the right-hand side of (25), (FE) SS ( )σ φ , captures the forces at play in 
the traditional footloose-entrepreneur model, as developed by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003), in 
the absence of any agglomeration and environmental effects ( (0.5) (0.5) 0d dψ Θ= = ). In this case, 
the stability range of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium is determined by condition 
(FE)
SS ( ) 0σ φ < . With (26), this means ( )( )( )( )
1
1
ε δ ε δφ ε δ ε δ
− − −< + − + , an identical expression to 
condition (26) obtained by Forslid and Ottaviano (2003). 
The last two terms on the right-hand side of (25) describe how agglomeration and 
environmental effects influence the stability of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium. The 
second (third) term is positive (negative) [see eq. (26)], so that the agglomeration 
(environmental) effect unequivocally contributes to the instability (stability) of the 
symmetric-spreading configuration. A more intense agglomeration (environmental) effect, as 
captured by a higher (0.5)dψ (
(0.5)dΘ ), results in a narrowing (widening) of the stability range of 
the symmetric-spreading equilibrium.  
Proposition 2 provides explicit conditions for the intensity of the agglomeration and 
environmental effects (0.5)dψ and 
(0.5)dΘ , which can be interpreted in terms of the strength of 
these effects. The high value of (0.5)dψ in condition 
(0.5)
,0d dψ ψ> can be viewed as a ‘strong 
agglomeration effect’. Next, ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ >  means a strong centrifugal force, which we will 
refer to as a ‘strong environmental effect’. Moreover, since ( ) ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψ ψζ ζ Δ< , condition 
( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ Δ>  is more restrictive than ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > on the value of (0.5)dΘ . Therefore, we 
interpret the first condition, ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ Δ> , as representing a ‘very strong environmental 
effect’. 
To better understand how the interplay between the agglomeration and environmental 
effects influences the existence and nature of equilibria, let us give an economic interpretation 
of the five conditions in Proposition 2.  
We first consider the situation where both agglomeration and environmental effects are 
weak, as captured by (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < . This corresponds to case SS–ii in 
Proposition 2. This type of stability condition is similar to the one obtained in the traditional 
footloose-entrepreneur model (Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003). This similarity makes sense, 
163 
 
since the addition of small agglomeration and environmental effects only marginally modifies 
the stability conditions that hold without these effects. 
We then turn to the case of a strong environmental and a weak agglomeration effect, as 
captured by conditions (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > . Two sub-cases must be 
distinguished: 
• If condition ( ) ( )(0.5) (0.5) (0.5)d d dψ ψζ ζΘ Δ< <  holds, the environmental effect is strong but 
not ‘very strong’, and a range of high φ -values (close to 1) appears, for which the 
centrifugal environmental effect is strong enough to favor stability of the symmetric 
spreading, contrary to the outcome of the traditional footloose-entrepreneur model. As 
a result, the symmetric-spreading pattern is stable for high and low trade barriers, 
while it remains unstable for intermediate trade barriers. This corresponds to case SS–
iv in Proposition 2; 
• If condition ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ Δ>  holds, i.e. the environmental effect is ‘very strong’, the 
associated centrifugal force dominates and uniformly favors the stability of the 
symmetric-spreading equilibrium. This corresponds to case SS–v in Proposition 2 with 
the symmetric-spreading equilibrium being stable for all values of the trade barrier. 
All cases in which condition (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  holds correspond to a strong agglomeration 
effect which fosters the instability of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium. The magnitude of 
the environmental effect, which tends to counterbalance agglomeration, determines the 
resulting net equilibrium. If a weak environmental effect is assumed ( ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < ), the 
agglomeration effect dominates the location decisions of economic agents and leads to the 
instability of the symmetric spreading under all values of the trade barrier (case SS–i in 
Proposition 2). If, on the contrary, a strong environmental effect is considered (
( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > ), the trade-off between agglomeration and environmental effect dominates 
the stability conditions of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium. It is found that the positive 
agglomeration (negative environmental) effect dominates at low (high) φ -values, leading to 
the instability (stability) of the symmetric-spreading equilibrium (see Appendix A.4 for a 
proof). This corresponds to case SS–iii in Proposition 2. 
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4- Spatial Equilibria 
 Combining the conditions that define the nature of the long-run equilibria presented in 
previous sub-sections gives rise to several alternative types of bifurcation diagrams. For the 
sake of realistically representing the spatial organization of the world economy, we exclude in 
the remainder of the paper the extreme equilibria that one would not expect to find in practice. 
In particular, we limit the analysis to equilibria other than full agglomeration, and instead 
focus on those equilibria that allow for a (stable) partial agglomeration to arise. To achieve 
this, we adopt adequate numerical values of model parameters and exogenous variables, as 
well as the functional specifications, whose rationale is discussed in Appendices A.5 and A.6, 
respectively.  
We start by considering stable (continuous curves) and unstable (broken curves) 
equilibria in the symmetric configurations A and B, as defined by condition (18) in the case 
1 2β β=  (see Figure 4.1). This is the typical ‘spatial equilibrium’ picture that arises in 
“footloose entrepreneur”-like models, given the absence of an explicit spatial dimension here.  
 
Figure 4.1: Long-run Equilibria for Symmetric Spatial Configurations. 
  
 
Figure 4.2 displays long-run stable (continuous curve) and unstable (broken curve) 
equilibria for the asymmetric configuration C, as defined by condition (18) in the case 
1 2β β≠ . Again, partial agglomeration equilibria emerge for any trade barrier. However, 
unlike in the previous case, the partial agglomeration equilibria are not symmetric around 
0.5h = , as a consequence of ex-ante differences between the two regions in the spatial 
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setting. More precisely, a partial agglomeration in the (urbanized) region 1 ( 0.5 1h< < ) can 
be a long-run equilibrium for any trade barrier, while a partial agglomeration in the 
(undeveloped) region 2 ( 0 0.5h< < ) can be a long-run equilibrium only for sufficiently high 
trade barriers. Firms may indeed agglomerate in the undeveloped region only if high trade 
costs ensure a strong incentive for a relocation of production close to consumption places.  
 
Figure 4.2: Long-run Equilibria for the Asymmetric Spatial Configuration. 
 
 
Our analysis extends the traditional NEG approach, in that it allows for the emergence 
of a stable partial agglomeration for any trade barrier. To the best of our knowledge, this 
constitutes a major novelty in the NEG literature, where partial agglomeration is traditionally 
either unstable – as in the seminal paper by Krugman (1991) and in Forslid and Ottaviano 
(2003) when symmetric unskilled labor endowment is assumed – or stable, but only for a 
limited range of trade barriers (see Forslid and Ottaviano (2003); and Lange and Quaas 
(2007)). 
III. Extension to Spatial Sustainability 
In this section we provide the second main extension to the standard NEG modeling 
framework and address the long-term interplay between trade, pollution and spatial location 
of economic activities, and its counterpart transport in terms of environmental sustainability. 
In so doing we touch on the literature that goes under the name of ‘trade and environment’, 
and which focuses on the role of trade costs on pollution [Copeland and Taylor (1994; 1995)]. 
We hence discuss our results in the light of the findings of this mainstream literature. 
166 
 
1. Global Pollution and Trade 
 In the strand of literature that followed Copeland and Taylor (1994; 1995), the relation 
between spatial concentration and environmental externalities is mainly driven by the 
negative effect of pollution on utility and productivity (Copeland and Taylor, 1999); 
Benarroch and Thille, 2001; Unteroberdoerster, 2001). We engage with these analyses by 
considering i) the role of the spatial dimension of the economy on pollution through the 
impact of the type of spatial structure (urbanized versus undeveloped land use) on intra-
regional transport requirements, as captured by parameter β in eq. (4); ii) the positive impact 
of agglomeration on productivity through a decrease of unitary energy requirements for 
production in more agglomerated production patterns as captured by variable ( )jnψ  in (4). 
For the purpose of analyzing environmental sustainability in the context of the climate 
change debate (and other environmental issues like depletion of the ozone layer or 
biodiversity), we consider global pollution affecting equally both regions, regardless of its 
source. Hence, we generalize the definition of environmental externalities in (13) to include 
transboundary pollution as generated by international trade.25 We assume trade-associated 
pollution to be proportional to the volume of trade that is necessary to satisfy the domestic 
demand for imported goods. Quantities jkTc  and kjTc  represent such volume for each of the 
good variety that is produced in region j and k respectively, with j k≠ . Introducing Ga and 
Gb  as the intensity of global pollution generated by manufacturing production and 
interregional trade/transport respectively, global pollution flow GE  is given by:26 
 ( ) ( ).G G Gj j j k k k jk j kj kE a n x n x b Tc n Tc nξ ξ= + + +                               (27) 
 
The amount of long-term global emissions in (27) depends on trade freeness through the 
interplay between three effects. First, the iceberg structure for transport costs implies that 
lower trade barrier brings about a decrease of emissions per unit of good shipped. Second, for 
a given spatial distribution of the economic activities, a trade barrier affects the quantity of 
good actually shipped from one region to another, since freer trade fosters a higher demand 
for imported good in both regions. This ultimately acts in the direction of increasing trade-
                                                     
25 Extending the analysis in Sections I and II to consider trade-related global pollution emissions does alter 
neither the nature nor the quality of the equilibrium findings, as these emissions play no role in individuals’ 
migration decisions (and are hence ignored in the analysis of long-run equilibria).  
26 Note that regardless of the source of emission, pollution has both a local and global component of impact. In 
the case of manufacturing production, we can imagine pollution resembling particulate matter (local impact) and 
carbon emission (global impact). 
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related emissions. Third, trade freeness affects the long-term location of economic activities 
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2), which ultimately determines both the intensity of trade as a 
consequence of the uneven distribution of production and consumption locations27, and the 
level of global economic activity because of the effects of agglomeration on regional and 
aggregate production. 
2. Pollution Dynamics and Assimilation Potential 
For the sake of comparability with the literature on trade and the environment following 
Copeland and Taylor (1999), we consider the level of environmental capital stock K as 
deprived or enhanced over time, depending on the flow of pollution GE  and the “nature’s 
regenerative capacity” ( )F K , as described in the standard dynamic equation:  
 ( ) .GdK F K E
dt
= −
                                                           
(28) 
 
In the literature following Copeland and Taylor (1999), the function ( )F K  is 
traditionally taken as a linear function of the difference with a “natural level” K  at a 
“recovery rate” g: ( )( )F K g K K= −  (see for example, eq. (1) in Copeland and Taylor 
(1999)). With this specification, environmental capital gravitates towards the “natural level” 
K  in case of absent environmental pollution, and dK
dt  
is still positive at 0K = , which means 
that no minimum viable level of environment’s capital stock occurs. This result is possible 
due to the underlying assumption that substitutability occurs between environmental and man-
made capital, which is evidently an oversimplification of the description of pollution 
dynamics.  
Unlike Copeland and Taylor (1999) we consider that such a minimum exists as a 
consequence of negative nonlinear mechanisms limiting the “nature’s regenerative capacity” 
at low levels of environmental capital.28 We represent the existence of these mechanisms by a 
drop in the “nature’s regenerative capacity” ( )F K  at low levels of environmental capital 
stock. To keep the analysis simple we distinguish between two regimes of “nature’s 
regenerative capacity” and assume that: i) at medium and high levels of environmental stock, 
                                                     
27 For example, full agglomeration in one region creates the need to export manufacturing goods for unskilled 
workers in the other region. 
28 This is particularly true when one considers the case of climate change. Here non-linear events include ocean 
acidification at high CO2 atmospheric concentrations, which may cause a drastic drop of biological carbon 
sequestration in oceans and affect significantly the “regenerative capacity” of the climate. 
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the “nature’s regenerative capacity” is a constant process A (Gradus and Smulders, 1993); 
Keeler et al, 1971; van der Ploeg and Withagen, 1991], which we call the ‘pollution 
assimilation potential’.29 This represents thus the maximum of the natural recovery rate of the 
environment, like the (natural) biological and ocean carbon sequestration in the case of 
climate change, or the rate of reproduction of (rare) biological species; ii) at a low level of the 
environmental stock, this “nature’s regenerative capacity” drops to zero. This leads to: 
 ( ) .
0
A if K K
F K
if K K
⎧ ⎫≥⎪ ⎪= ⎨ ⎬<⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭                                                     
(29) 
 
Here, K  is a threshold below which the regenerative capacity drops to zero. The functional 
specification for the “nature’s regenerative capacity” ensures that 0dK
dt
<
 
at 0K = , or that 
falling below a certain level of environmental quality may turn out irreversible. This leads us 
to adopt a more restrictive approach to sustainability than in the traditional approach assuming 
substitutability between natural and man-made capital. Instead, we acknowledge the 
specificity or unique character of the environment by imposing to maintain its stock because 
the functions it performs cannot be duplicated by manufactured capital. This assumption 
seems particularly relevant for the large-scale environmental issues which motivate this 
analysis (climate, ozone layer, biodiversity) and means positing 0dK
dt
≥  in the long-run 
equilibrium, which according to (28) and (29) leads to: 
 ( ), .GE h Aφ <                                                                (30) 
 
3. Formalizing Spatial Sustainability  
 Here, we address the spatial or geographical nature of sustainability, in the sense 
defined in the previous subsection. This means investigating the conditions under which the 
long-run equilibrium conditions of the two-region economy analyzed in Section II are 
compatible with condition (30). A sustainable long-run equilibrium exists if one of the three 
following sets of conditions is satisfied:  
                                                     
29 Our (simplified) specification of the dynamics of pollution for high levels of the environmental capital stock is 
motivated by environmental issues like climate change, which involves irreversibility and catastrophic 
mechanisms that compromise the “nature’s regenerative capacity” at low levels of the environmental stock.  
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If condition a) in (31) holds, the distribution of population with a share h of workers in 
region 1 (and a share (1 )h−  in region 2) is a sustainable long-run equilibrium for the spatial 
configuration considered. If condition b) (condition c)) holds, a full agglomeration of skilled 
workers in region 1 (region 2) is the sustainable long-run equilibrium. Finally, if none of the 
three conditions is satisfied, the spatial configuration is always unsustainable, that is, for all 
possible trade barriers and spatial distributions of the population. 
For a given configuration λ , we define ,minGEλ  and ,maxGEλ  to denote the minimum and 
maximum long-run levels of polluting emissions over all ranges of trade barrier. Three cases 
can occur: 
CASE 1: For high configurations in terms of emission characterized by the condition 
,minGE Aλ > , the level of long-run pollution is always larger than the pollution 
assimilation potential A, whatever the trade barrier φ . This means that the spatial 
configuration considered is always unsustainable. 
 
For any other type of configuration, there exists a range of φ -values that satisfies (30). 
We define * ( )Aλφ  as the highest of these values (lowest trade barrier), meaning the minimum 
constraint on the economy in terms of barriers to trade to ensure a sustainable development of 
a spatial configuration λ .30 Setting a constraint on long-run emissions, as imposed by spatial 
sustainability in (30) results from the interplay between minimum trade barriers, * ( )Aλφ , the 
λ -specific pollution stock, and the pollution assimilation potential under normal conditions, 
A, as follows: 
 ( ) ( )* ,max, ( ) min , .s sE h A A Eλ λ λφ =                                              (32) 
 
CASE 2: For intermediate configurations in terms of emission characterized by the condition 
,min ,maxG GE A Eλ λ< < , the relation in (32) becomes ( )*, ( )GE h A Aλ λφ = . The corresponding 
                                                     
30 Intuitively, condition * ( ) 0Aλφ =  expresses the unsustainability of the above Case 1. 
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solution in * ( )Aλφ  is such that: *0 ( ) 1Aλφ< < . In this case, the configuration considered 
satisfies (does not satisfy) the sustainability conditions on emissions if trade barriers are 
high (low) enough: * ( )Aλφ φ<  ( * ( )Aλφ φ> ). 
CASE 3: For low configurations in terms of emission characterized by the condition 
,maxGE Aλ < , the configuration considered satisfies the sustainability conditions on 
emissions whatever the value of trade barrier. In particular, the configuration remains 
sustainable even if free trade is assumed as expressed by * ( ) 1Aλφ = . 
 
We are now able to assess the sustainability characteristics of any spatial configuration 
λ  by considering the minimum value of the trade barrier * ( )Aλφ  that ensures that the stock of 
environmental capital increases in the long term. 
4- Numerical Application 
By substituting (2) and (11) into (27), and considering baseline values for the model 
parameters and exogenous variables (see Appendix A.5), we compute the threshold values for 
stock pollution ,minsEλ  and 
,maxsEλ  for each of the three configurations { }A,B,Cλ∈  (Table 
4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Threshold values for emissions in the three spatial configurations 
Spatial Configuration Emission threshold values 
,minsEλ  
,maxsEλ  
A (both regions with undeveloped land) 1.54 1.67 
B (both regions with urbanized land) 1.54 1.72 
C (one region urbanized, other undeveloped) 1.54 1.70 
 
We then compare the performance of the three spatial configurations in terms of 
sustainability of the final long-run spatial equilibrium by investigating the variation of the 
minimum trade barrier for sustainability * ( )Aλφ  across the configurations for a given level of 
the pollution assimilation potential A.  
 We limit the analysis to the range of A-values that are not associated with trivial 
outcomes, that is, we exclude those for which the three spatial configurations under 
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consideration are either never or always sustainable. For this purpose, we define minA  and 
maxA  as the minimum and maximum values of ,minGEλ and 
,maxGEλ  across all spatial 
configurations, respectively. In other words, { }
min ,min
, ,
min s
A B C
A Eλλ∈=  and { }
max ,max
, ,
max s
A B C
A Eλλ∈= . 
For the numerical data summarized in Table I, min 1.54A =  and max 1.72A = . In order to 
perform a non-trivial analysis of the sustainability of the configurations, we do not consider 
the cases where minA A< with the three configurations in Case 1, nor maxA A> with all 
configurations in Case 3. In other words, we only consider values of A satisfying 
min maxA A A≤ ≤  and are interested in the numerical values of the lowest trade barrier that 
satisfies the sustainability condition in (30) for all the three spatial configurations 
{ }A,B,Cλ∈ . Figure 4.3 summarizes graphically the results.  
 
FIGURE 4.3: Minimum Trade Barriers Assuring Sustainability of the Three Spatial Configurations 
 
 
 
For each configuration { }A,B,Cλ∈ , the stringency of the barriers to trade that are 
necessary to achieve sustainability is captured by the value of * ( )Aλφ : the higher * ( )Aλφ , the 
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wider the range of trade barrier values that is compatible with sustainability for a given 
pollution assimilation potential A and configuration λ .31  
Figure 4.3 shows that conditional to the spatial configuration considered, free trade 
(defined by 1φ = ) can be incompatible with environmental sustainability. The reason for this 
is that global emissions of pollutants reach their maximum ,maxsEλ  for completely lax trade 
restrictions. When the emission level ,maxsEλ  is higher than the pollution assimilation potential 
A, a more stringent trade barrier is required to meet the sustainability condition in (30), as 
captured by * ( ) 1Aλφ < . 
 For a given value of the pollution assimilation potential A, the differences in values of 
* ( )Aλφ  across configurations illustrate that the stringency of the trade restrictions depends 
critically on the spatial configuration considered. In particular, it appears that * ( )Aλφ  is always 
higher for configuration A than for the two others, implying that any trade barrier that ensures 
sustainability of either configuration B or C also assures configuration A is sustainable. 
A more detailed analysis requires a study of different A-range values over the interval 
min max;A A⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , as summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2: Sustainability of spatial configurations for different pollution assimilation potentials 
Spatial configuration  Value range of the pollution assimilation potential A 
min 1.54;1.67A⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦ [ ]1.67;1.70  max1.70;1.72 A⎡ ⎤=⎣ ⎦  
A φ∃  φ∀  φ∀  
B φ∃  φ∃  φ∃  
C φ∃  φ∃  φ∀  
Legend: The symbol ‘ φ∃ ’denotes that the condition for sustainability is satisfied only for certain values of the 
trade barrier parameter (namely, * ( )Aλφ φ< , with * ( ) 1Aλφ <  associated with the case ,min ,maxs sE A Eλ λ< < ). The 
symbol ‘ φ∀ ’ denotes that the condition for sustainability is always satisfied, for any value of the trade barrier 
parameter (since * ( ) 1Aλφ = , associated with the case ,maxsA Eλ> ).  
 
In the non-trivial case minA A≥ , several spatial configurations potentially meet the 
spatial sustainability requirements summarized by condition * ( )Aλφ φ< . The associated 
constraint on trade barriers depends on the spatial configuration considered. For example, for 
1.67 1.70A≤ ≤ , three sustainable equilibria are possible: either production chooses a 
                                                     
31 We recall that configuration λ  is sustainable as long as the trade barrier φ  satisfies * ( )Aλφ φ< . 
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configuration A-like pattern (both regions feature undeveloped land use) and no constraint on 
trade barriers is necessary for sustainability purposes (condition φ∀  in Table 4.2); or the 
system moves to a B- or C-like spatial configuration, in which case trade barriers must be set 
high enough to satisfy condition * ( ) 1Aλφ φ< < . The policy relevance of this result is that it 
shows the sustainability offsetting effect between a policy imposing barrier to the volume of 
inter-regional or international trade and a policy inducing a reorganization of the spatial 
structure of regional economies. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has developed a theoretical approach to study the impact of spatial 
configurations of the world economy in the presence of local and global environmental 
externalities and a sustainability condition. The starting point was the notion of spatial 
sustainability, denoting a spatial configuration that is consistent with long-term pollution 
being within the pollution assimilation potential. Our framework accounts for three drivers of 
economic activity and (un)sustainability, namely, agglomeration spillovers, advantages of 
trade, and environmental externalities. It extends the “footloose entrepreneur” model of the 
new economic geography by introducing four major innovations. First, it formalizes 
heterogeneous patterns of land development of the economy in multiple regions (which we call 
‘spatial configurations’). Second, agglomeration spillover effects emerge endogenously from 
the analytical setting. In particular, we allow for simultaneous modeling of increasing returns 
to scale at the firm level and external economies at the industry level. Third, the model 
generates continuous and asymmetric distributions of population and economic activity in 
space, hence allowing for non-extreme, realistic spatio-economic configurations associated 
with a full range of trade barriers (i.e. inherent costs, possibly partly due to trade policies). 
Fourth, it includes the dynamics of pollution, and distinguishes between environmental 
externalities and environmental sustainability, which represents an innovation over the 
existing literatures on geography, trade and environment as well as on the economic analysis 
of sustainability. A number of additional, minor novelties were introduced that render the 
application of our framework of potential interest to analysts of environmental policy and 
sustainable trade. This ultimately contributes to overcoming the limitations of the NEG 
approach which has traditionally seen little application to policy questions and environmental 
issues. 
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The starting point of our analysis was a spatial-economic structure which includes 
manufacturing and traditional production sectors. Regions are characterized by alternative 
degrees of land development resulting in potentially different levels of agglomeration 
spillovers. By formalizing an endogenous agglomeration effect, we capture the intensity of 
the spatial spillover associated with the regional ‘market density’, reflected by the number of 
firms that are active in a given space, and the regional ‘market form’, reflected by the capacity 
of infrastructure endowment. Agglomeration affects environmental pollution through two 
mechanisms. First, agglomeration increases the scale of production activity leading to more 
energy use and associated pollutive emissions. Second, agglomeration reduces transport 
requirements for production through a lower intraregional transport intensity of production 
(shorter distances) and learning and R&D spillovers leading to improved energy technologies 
(i.e. lower emissions). Because of these opposite mechanisms, the interplay between trade and 
agglomeration in determining a stable spatial distribution of economic activity and sustainable 
levels of pollution is not trivial, that is, the net general equilibrium outcome is not obvious ex-
ante. 
The model extends previous NEG studies by presenting analytical solutions that have an 
intuitive interpretation of the relative intensity of (a comprehensive set of) equilibrium 
offsetting agglomeration and dispersion forces over the whole range of trade barriers. This in 
turn allows for continuous and asymmetric distributions of population and economic activities 
across space. The sustainability characteristics of the long-run equilibrium have been studied 
here over the whole range of the ‘pollution assimilation potential’, which is taken as a 
measure of the “nature’s regenerative capacity”, by allowing for variations in the trade barrier 
and the regional spatial form of the three alternative configurations. A main result of the 
analysis is that regional concentration of economic activities is not necessarily the most 
sustainable spatial structure. This is only true for a very lax environmental sustainability 
constraint which is due to a very high pollution assimilation potential. A counter-intuitive 
finding is that a dispersion of economic activities may perform best in terms of sustainability 
for very low values of the pollution assimilation potential because of less stringent trade 
barriers resulting from the sustainability condition.  
The results illustrate the relevance of sustainability-offsetting spatial structure and trade 
effects in environmental regulation. This insight can help to formulate an effective and 
efficient mix of policies focusing directly on emissions reduction, redirection of trade or 
spatial reorganization. More specifically, the approach provides a theoretical basis for further 
investigation of the interaction and complementarity of such diverse instruments as pollution 
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taxes, technological standards, land taxation, road pricing and parking tariffs. Moreover, since 
the approach makes a clear distinction between environmental externalities and environmental 
sustainability, it adds a dynamic element to the existing literature on trade and environment 
which makes it very suitable for addressing the spatial economic and welfare dimension of 
long-term environmental problems such as climate change. 
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Chapter 5  
City dynamics  
under macroeconomic constraints 
 
Chapter 5* extends the theoretical approach of agglomeration and environmental 
externalities developed in the previous chapter to improve its robustness with 
respect to empirical evidence. The model provides an improved representation of 
the spatial dimension of the economy in which multiple cities potentially emerge 
and interactions occur among them and between cities and the surrounding rural 
area. The breakdown of the OECD economy in a mass of urban areas is enabled 
through calibration of the 74 largest agglomerations according to the OECD 
metropolitan dataset. The dynamics is driven by changes in the macroeconomic 
conditions and firms’ migration decisions towards the most attractive locations; it 
is tested against historical data, and proves to reproduce well past trends. We 
further analyze its characteristics as a forecasting tool by investigating the 
mechanisms and the major determinants of the dynamic process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* This chapter is the result of a joint work with Fabio Grazi. 
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The patterns along which an economy locates and the determinants driving its distribution 
across the space are the core subject of the new economic geography (NEG) developed after 
Krugman (1991). Comprehension of the spatial determinants of regional economic 
development is set at the core issue of NEG’s investigation, which particularly looks at how 
firms and households agglomerate or sprawl. The NEG approach makes use of a set of 
assumptions that combine (a) general equilibrium modeling, (b) increasing returns related to 
indivisibilities at the firms’ level and monopolistic competition à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
(c) transport/trade costs (traditionally modeled in the ‘iceberg’ form à la Samuelson (1952), 
which make location matter, and (d) the movement of production factors and agents.  
Yet, NEG frameworks traditionally fall short of rendering a picture of the spatial organization 
and distribution of activities that can be observed in the real world. This lack of realism is at 
the origins of the lack of implications by NEG that are meaningful to policy makers. In order 
for NEG approaches to achieve a certain degree of empirical validity that may translate in 
sharp policy conclusions, some important extensions need to be addressed, as Fujita and Mori 
(2005) already pointed out in their ‘way forward’ for second-generation NEG models. First, 
unifying Urban economics and the New Economic Geography is necessary to investigate 
consistently the development of cities (having spatial extent) and industrial locations in the 
same continuous space, the former providing insights on the intra-city structure while the 
latter informs on the spatial distribution among cities. Second, the objective of explicit 
empirical validity imposes to go beyond analytical approaches valid in two-region-two-sector 
models to adopt numerically computable results in the context of multiple available (urban) 
locations. Bahrens and Nicoud have pushed this critique forward in their article prepared for 
the 10th anniversary issue of the Journal of Economic Geography and called for NEG 
necessarily opening up to calibration excercises and quantified models. To date, none of these 
extensions are available. 
 Against this backdrop, we address the two above identified extensions of standard 
NEG models by designing a computable general equilibrium framework that allows for a) 
multiple cities in mutual interaction, whose number and size is endogenously determined; and 
b) dynamic recursive representation of them under the constraint of global macroeconomic 
trends. To the best of our knowledge, the spatial breakdown of the firms’ location preferences 
over multiple endogenous agglomerations and simulations of their dynamic properties over 
the long term are simply not available in the NEG framework.  
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In order to render a realistic picture of spatial distribution patterns of an economy across a set 
of available urban agglomerations, we represent intra-urban benefits and costs that are both 
function of how close to the city-center the households’ location preference falls, in line with 
standard approaches in Urban Economics. This provides a description of intra-regional spatial 
structure. We assume that all firms have identical fixed production costs structures but face 
different costs according to the specificity of their location among a number of 
agglomerations. Our approach distinguishes agglomeration-specific benefits in the form of 
economies of scale that arise from economic agents being located close together (e.g., 
facilitation of interchange among firms, job flexibility, ability to support social and cultural 
events). On the other hand, we also consider agglomeration-specific costs due to 
diseconomies that arise from congestion, like increased land costs and higher commuting 
costs for workers. 
Dynamics of the urban system is enabled through three levels of interaction at the local, 
regional and national scales between intra-urban land-use patterns, migration decisions of 
firms (whose location preferences go towards those agglomeration markets that offer the best 
investment opportunities) and the underlying constraint of macroeconomic trends at the 
national level, respectively.   
Section I presents the static model and section II extends it to dynamics. The model is 
calibrated on empirical data for 74 OECD agglomerations in Section III, and its validity to 
reproduce past trends is verified in Section IV. Section V investigates the long-run 
equilibrium and extends the standard ‘bifurcation diagram’ to a multiplicity of ‘regions’. 
Finally, Section VI analyses the determinants of the dynamics through a long-term forecasting 
exercise for urban population at 2050 horizon. 
I- The static space economy 
 
A (group of) country(ies) is envisaged as a mass of NA+1 regions, with NA urban 
agglomerations and a “rural area”.1 In the former, land is conceived as a heterogenous space 
for households and firms produce a number of varieties i of a differentiated (manufacturing) 
good M under increasing return to scale. In the rural area, land is conceived as a homogenous 
                                                     
1 The term “rural” is used for the sake of conveniency by opposition to the agglomerations. But, this does not 
mean that is an agricultural-type of production. Instead, it recovers all economic activity that is not realized in 
the NA agglomerations, including industrial production and some manufacturing and service activities.  
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space, the AL  households are strictly identical and production is made of a homogenous good 
f under constant returns to scale. 
 
1. The urban economies 
 
In each agglomeration [ ]1; Aj N∈ , three types of agents are operating: nj firms2, Lj households 
and a local government.  
1.1 Firms 
 
Manufacturing production uses capital and labor as its two spatially mobile input factors. 
Production costs differ across agglomerations as a result of heterogeneous labor productivity (
{ } [ ], , 1j k Al l j k N≠ ∀ ∈ ), they are identical for all firms of a given agglomeration j.3 
 
Labor is the variable factor of production and is subject to external economies of scale so that 
unitary labor costs jLC are reduced in a larger market, as follows: 
j j
j
j
l w
LC
n α
=                                                                          (1) 
0α > is the elasticity of labor costs to market size, measured by the number of active firms in 
region j. It captures the improvement of effective productivity permitted by the agglomeration 
of production through facilitated technology spillover. 
Capital is the fixed factor of production, and, with fixed input requirement χ , the amount jX
of productive capital in agglomeration j is proportional to the number of domestic firms, jn : 
j jX nχ=                                                                          (2) 
 
Letting jr be the unitary return of capital jX , the total cost jTC of producing jq for a firm 
settled in agglomeration j is expressed as: 
                                                     
2 Increasing returns foster the concentration of production of each variety in a single firm so that the number of 
firms nj that are active in agglomeration j represents the number of varieties produced there. 
3 This means that all varieties produced here are identical in terms of prices and quantities and allows us to drop 
the notation i for the variety in the remainder of the analysis.  
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j j
j j j
j
l w
TC r q
n α
χ= +                                                                          (3) 
Given its monopoly power, each firm acts to maximize profit:  
( ) ( )j j j j j jq p q TC qπ = −                                             (4) 
 
1.2 Households 
 
Households derive utility from the consumption of goods and the services offered by land 
occupation (housing and amenities). These two decisions are different in nature, since, 
although consumption patterns can be adapted rapidly under changing economic conditions, 
location decisions are constrained by long-lived infrastructure and hence submitted to stronger 
inertias. To capture these specificities, we consider housing services and the consumption of 
goods as separable in the utility function, which allows us to treat them separately. We note  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )L Cj j jU x U x U x= +                                                           (5) 
 
a) Land Demand and urban costs 
 
As traditionally approached by urban and regional economics since von Thünen (1966), land 
in agglomeration j is conceived as a monocentric, axisymmetric city spread along one-
dimensional space j jd x d− ≤ ≤ , where jd is the overall city size. The central business district 
(CBD), situated at the origin 0x = , is the location where firms choose to distribute once they 
enter the agglomeration. All economic activities take place in the j-CBD, whereas the urban 
population is distributed within circular peripheral areas surrounding it.  
The land use component of the utility function, ( )LjU , captures the tradeoff between the 
welfare gained from land consumption, assumed to be proportional to the space occupied
( )j xλ , and the amenities related to this location A(x). These amenities measure the 
accessibility to urban services and hence decrease at higher distance x from the CBD. For the 
sake of simplicity, we adopt an inverse relationship, and capture substituability between land-
use and amenities by a Cobb-Douglas formulation:  
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2
1( ) 1( ) ( )Lj jU x x x
ν
νλ ⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                           (6) 
Households distribute in space according to an equalization of utility levels at each point x of 
the j-agglomeration. By introducing 2
1
νξ ν= , this means:
 4 
( ) , 0 1j jx x
ξλ λ ξ= ≤ ≤                                                                   (7) 
Here jλ is a constant. The number of households jL is then given by: 
1
0
2
( ) (1 )
j
j
j
j jx d
ddxL
x
ξ
λ λ ξ
−
≤ ≤
= = −∫                                                                          (8) 
 
Total urban costs experienced by households at a distance x from the j-CBD are made of land 
costs ( ) ( ). ( )j j jLC x x R xλ=  and commuting costs ( )jCC x . Commuting costs are due to the 
daily trip to and from the CBD. As in Murata and Thisse (2005), we introduce unitary 
commuting costs jθ in the ‘iceberg form’ à la Samuelson (1952), and the effective labor 
supply ( )js x of a worker living in the urban area at a distance x from the CBD is
5: 
( ) 1 2 , ;j j j js x x x d dθ ⎡ ⎤= − ∈ −⎣ ⎦                                                (9) 
The commuting costs ( )jCC x can then be expressed as the losses of revenues due to 
commuting: ( ) 2j j jCC x x wθ= . The total urban costs incurred by households for living at 
location x are then given by 
 
( ) 2 ( ) ( )j j j j jUC x x w x R xθ λ= +                                           (10) 
 
b) Consumption of goods 
 
Households derive utility from the consumption of the differentiated good M and the 
homogenous good f.  Utility of a household living in agglomeration j at a distance x from the 
CBD is given by: 
                                                     
4 Condition 0ξ ≥ ensures that ( )j xλ is an increasing function, so that the empirical evidence of higher 
population density in the centre of the city is captured, and condition 1ξ ≤  is necessary to have population 
convergence in (2).  
 
5 Condition: 10
2j jd
θ< ≤ ensures positive labor supply. 
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1(0)( ) ( ) ( )j jCj j j jU x U M x f x
δ δ−=                                           (11) 
 
Here, jδ  is the share of the manufacturing good in households’ expenditures6 , ( )jf x  is the 
consumption of the homogenous good and ( )jM x is the aggregated consumption of the 
differentiated good, with an elasticity of substitution 1ε > among the varieties. By noting 
( )kjc x the demand at a distance x from the j-CBD for a variety produced in agglomeration k, 
we have: 
1
1
1
( ) ( )
AN
j k kj
k
M x n c x
ε
εε
ε
−−
=
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑                                                (12) 
 
The constant (0)jU  captures all the elements driving households’ utility which are not directly 
related to consumption; it encompasses all amenities associated to residing in agglomeration j. 
In the ramining of the paper, we refer to this parameter as the “amenity for households” 
parameter. 
By introducing the disposable income ( )jy x of a household living at distance x from the j-
CBD, the consumer has to satisfy the following budget constraint: 
1
( ) ( ) ( )
AN
j k kj kj F j
k
y x n p c x p f x
=
= +∑                                                     (13) 
 
Maximization of utility in (11) under budget constraint (13) leads to the conditions 
( ) ( )1( )) ( ) 1 ; ) ( ) ( ) .kjjj j kj j j
F j
py x
i f x ii c x y x
p I
ε
εδ δ
−
− ⎡ ⎤= − = ⎣ ⎦                            (14) 
 
Here we have introduced the price index of the differentiated good in agglomeration j 
( )
1
11
1
AN
j k kj
i
I n p
εε −−
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ .                                                      (15) 
 
 
                                                     
6 We assume that this share is agglomeration-specific, so that they may differ from one agglomeration to another 
but are identical for all households living in a given agglomeration. 
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c) Income 
 
Households have three sources of income: wages paid to workers, dividends from capital 
investments and transfers from the government.  
In agglomeration j, wages are paid on effective labor, so that a household living at a distance x 
from the CBD receives a labor-related income ( ) ( )ljy x given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )lj j jy x s x w=                                                                          (16) 
 
In agglomeration j, total revenues from capital ( )Kjϒ are given by: ( )Kj j jr Xϒ = . For the sake of 
simplicity, we assume that productive capital is equally possessed by local households, so that 
the dividends are uniformly re-distributed among them. Each of the jL  households living in 
the j-agglomeration receives a capital–related income ( )Kjy  given by:    
( ) j jK
j
j
r X
y
L
=                                                                               (17) 
 
By introducing Rj(x) the land rent at distance x from the j-CBD, the total of land revenues 
perceived by governments is
0
( )
j
j
x d
R x dx
≤ ≤
∫  . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
local governments redistribute this revenue in a lump-sum manner. A household living at 
distance x from the j-CBD pay ( ) ( )j jx R xλ and then benefits from a transfer (either positive or 
negative):  
0( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )j
j
x dT
j j j
j
R x dx
y x x R x
L
λ≤ ≤= −
∫
                                              (18) 
 
Total income in agglomeration j is given by  
( ) ( ) ( )l K T
j j j jϒ = ϒ + ϒ + ϒ                                                           (19) 
The total disposable income ( )jy x of a household living at a distance x from the CBD is given 
by 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )l K Tj j j jy x y x y x y x= + +                                           (20) 
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1.3 Local government 
Government owns the available land, and decides of the rent ( )jR x to be paid by households 
for land use, and the amount of investments in urban infrastructure.   
 
a) Urban Land Rent 
 
The local government sets land rent ( )jR x to ensure that people living inside each peripheral 
rings face identical urban costs, as in (10).7 This means imposing  
; , 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )j j j j j j j j j j j j jx d d x w R x x d w R d dθ λ θ λ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ − + = +⎣ ⎦                   (21) 
 
By normalizing the rent value at zero for land located at the edges of the city ( ( ) 0j jR d = ), 
the equilibrium land rent in agglomeration j is derived from equation () as: 
( )2
( )
( )
j j j
j
j
w d x
R x
x
θ
λ
−=                                                   (22) 
 
b) Housing investments and city size 
Local governments decides the amount of capital invested to construct buildings at each 
location x according to a minimization of total costs jTC given by infrastructure costs jIC and 
congestion costs. The latter is given by aggregate commuting costs CCj: 
0
( ) 12
( ) 2
j
j
j j j j j
jx d
CC x
CC dx d w L
x
ξ θλ ξ≤ ≤
−= = −∫                                          (23)                        
 
Infrastructure costs jIC are submitted to increasing marginal investment requirement at higher 
density in an attempt to capture higher marginal construction costs in the building sector and 
the need for more developed transport infrastructure. This means that the amount of annual 
public investment per capita I increases with density ρ : 
                                                     
7 This price setting assumption ignores the monopolistic behavior of housing investors at the origin of higher rent 
levels. Although essential for financial flows, this dimension is less crucial for representing location patterns, 
which is the focus of the paper. Further extensions of the model will include this dimension through an explicit 
representation of housing investors.  
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1
0( )I I
γρ ρ −=
                                                                   
(24)                        
Here, 1γ > measures the non-linearity of the annual capital investments, and 0I normalizes the 
units of measurment. Under condition 1γξ < , the total amount of annual investments in urban 
infrastructures in the j-agglomeration, jIC , is given by: 
( )1 1 1
0 0
0
11 12 2
1
jd
j j j
j j
IC I dx I L d
x x
γ γ
γ γ γ
ξ ξ
ξ
λ λ γξ
−
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫                            (25)                        
 
The minimization of total urban costs j j jTC IC CC= +  then imposes: 
( )( )( )
( )
1 1
1
1
0
1 2 11 1
2 1j j j j
d I L
w
γ γ γγ γ ξ ξ
γξ θ
−
−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − −= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦                            
(26)                        
 
Equation (26) describes the combination of factors governing the dynamics of urban sprawl, 
beyond demography. In particular, the spatial extension jd  is inversely dependent on j jwθ , 
which represents the losses of income per unit of distance traveled. This captures the incentive 
to adopt more dispersed settlements when the commuting distance is less penalizing, either 
because of lower unitary commuting costs jθ  or lower wage rate ( or ‘value of time’) jw . To 
provide an interpretation of parameterξ , we measure the rental cost of land RCj paid by 
households in agglomeration j: 
0
1( ) 2
2
j
j j j j j j
x d
RC R x dx d w Lθ ξ≤ ≤
= = −∫                                                                  (27)                        
 
Combining (23) and (27) gives 1j
j
CC
RC
ξ= − : ξ is a measure of the distribution of urban costs 
between commuting and housing: the lowerξ , the more commuting costs are relatively 
important.  
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2. The rural economy 
 
2.1 Firms 
 
In the rural area, firms produce the traditional good under constant returns to scale. Letting 
Fw , Fr  be respectively the unitary returns of labor Fl  and capital FX , the total cost of 
producing Fq  for a firm in the rural area is expressed as: 
[ ]F F F F F FTC l w r X q= +                                                                          (28) 
 
Under the perfect competition assumption, the selling price pF is set at the marginal cost of 
production 
F F F F Fp l w r X= +                                                                          (29) 
 
2.2 Households 
 
a) Land demand 
Land in the rural area is conceived as a homogenous space, where the LA households consume 
the same amount of land at a price RA. 
 
b) Consumption of goods 
The consumption part of the utility of a household living in the rural area is given by: 
1( ) (0)( ) A ACA A A AU x U M f
δ δ−=                                                                          (30) 
Here, (0)AU is a constant, Aδ  is the share of the manufacturing good in households’ 
expenditures and Af  is the consumption of the homogenous good. Finally, AM is the 
aggregated consumption of the differentiated good, with an elasticity of substitution 1ε >
among the varieties. By noting kAc the demand in the rural area for a variety produced in 
agglomeration k, we have: 
[ ]
1
1
1
AN
A k kA
k
M n c
ε
ε
ε
ε
−
−
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑                                                                          (31) 
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By introducing the income Ay of a household living in the rural area, the consumer has to 
satisfy the following budget constraint: 
1
AN
A k kA kA F A
k
y n p c p f
=
= +∑                                                                          (32) 
 
Maximization of utility in (30) under budget constraint (32) leads to the conditions 
( ) ( ) [ ]1) 1 ; ) .kAAA A kA A A
F A
pyi f ii c y
p I
ε
εδ δ
−
−= − =                                     (33) 
 
 
Here we have introduced the price index of the differentiated good in agglomeration j 
( )
1
1
1
1
AN
A k kA
k
I n p
εε −−
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ .                                                                         (34) 
c) Income 
 
Households have three sources of income: wages paid to workers, dividends from capital 
investments and transfers from the government.  
Total labor-related and capital-related incomes are given respectively by: 
( )
( )
l
A F F F
K
A F F F
w l q
r X q
⎧ϒ =⎪⎨ϒ =⎪⎩
                                                                       (35) 
Finally, all rural households consume the same amount of land at the same price, and these 
land costs are fully compensated by equal redistribution of this rent value by the government. 
This means  ( ) 0TAy =  
Since households in the rural area are identical, each household receives an income Ay  given 
by: 
( ) ( )l K
A A
A
A
y
L
ϒ +ϒ=                                                        (36) 
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3. Interregional Trade 
 
In order to allow the model for the spatial dimension, trade is allowed across agglomerations, 
as well as between agglomerations and the rural area. We use the ‘iceberg’ form of transport 
costs associated with trade of the composite goods (Samuelson, 1952). In particular, if one 
variety i of manufactured goods is shipped from agglomeration j to agglomeration k (to the 
rural area), only a fraction jkτ ( jAτ ) will arrive at the destination, the remainder melting during 
the shipment.  To ensure that any unit produced in agglomeration j provides the same revenue 
independently from the location where it is sold, a variety sold at price jp  in its production 
location j will be charged in consumption location k at a price jkp given by: 
jk jk jp pτ=                                                                          (37) 
 
Similarly, a variety produced in agglomeration j and sold in the rural area will be charged at a 
price jAp  given by: 
jA jA jp pτ=                                                                          (38) 
 
 
 
We assume that this ‘traditional’ good is freely traded across regions, so that its selling price 
in agglomeration j, F jp , is identical in all agglomerations and equals the selling price in the 
rural area pF where it is produced: F j Fp p= .  
 
 
4. Equilibrium 
 
4.1 Market equilibrium for the differentiated good 
The production size jq  of a firm located in agglomeration j must equal the sum of local 
consumption and exports towards other regions of the variety it produces. The market 
clearance condition then imposes:  
1
( )
( )
kA
k
x dN
j jk jk jA jA A
kk x d
dxq c x c L
x
τ τλ
=
= =−
= +∑ ∫                                                    (39) 
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The first term and second terms on the right-hand side are the volume of goods exported 
towards agglomerations and the rural area, respectively, including the amount that melts 
during the shipment.8 
 
Under Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic market, firms set their price by assuming a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES), 1ε > , and profit maximization leads to a constant mark-up on 
variable cost:
1
j
j
j
TC
p
q
ε
ε
∂= − ∂ . With (3), this leads to:  
1
j j
j
j
l w
p
n α
ε
ε= −                                                               (40) 
 
As a consequence of the profit maximization behavior, the number of firms in agglomeration j 
is such that profits are zero, as an equilibrium condition of monopolistic competition. 
Therefore, by setting zero profit in (4), the return to capital jr at the equilibrium is: 
j j j
j j
j
q l w
r p
n αχ
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                                 (41) 
 
4.2 Market equilibrium for the homogenous good 
 
For the homogenous good produced in the rural area, market clearing imposes that: 
/2
1 /2
( )
( )
jA
j
x dN
F k A A
kk x d
dxq f x L f
xλ
=
= =−
= +∑ ∫                                                      (42) 
 
Here, the first term on the right-hand side is the consumption of the traditional good from 
households residing in agglomeration j, whereas the second term represents total consumption 
from households of the rural area.  
The assumption of perfect competition imposes marginal cost pricing: FF
F
TCp
q
∂= ∂ . With (28) 
this leads to: 
 
                                                     
8 We adopt the natural convention that 1jjτ = (no trade cost for a good produced and consumed in the same 
region) 
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F F F F Fp l w r X= +                                                        (43) 
 
 
4.3 Labor market equilibrium 
 
Total effective labor supply Sj in the j-agglomeration is given by: 
0
( ) 11 2
( ) 2
j
j
j j j j
jx d
s x dx
S L d
x
ξ θλ ξ≤ ≤
⎡ ⎤−= = −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦∫                                                       (44) 
Total labor requirement for production in agglomeration j is given by j j j
j
l
n q
n α
. At the labor-
market equilibrium, it must equal total labor supply in this agglomeration j: 
j
j j j
j
l
S n q
n α
=                                                                  (45) 
Total labor requirement for production of the homogenous good is given by F Fl q . At the 
labor-market equilibrium, it must equal the total labor effectively supplied AL  : 
A F FL l q=                                                                  (46) 
 
 
4.4 Land market equilibrium across regions 
Combining (11) and (14), the utility level jU%  in the j-agglomeration is equal to 
( )1
(0)
1
1 jj
j j
j j j j j
j j
jj F
p n q
U U
LI p
δδ
δ δ
δ δ −
−
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=%                                                  (47) 
 
Similarly, the utility level AU%  in the rural area is given by 
( )1
(0)
1
1 AA
A A
A A F F
A A
A F A
p qU U
I p L
δδ
δ δ
δ δ −
−
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦=%                                        (48) 
 
As it is standard in New Economic Geography models à la Krugman, workers have an 
incentive to move towards locations where they get the higher utility and migration decisions 
are based on utility differentials across different regions. At the equilibrium, workers have no 
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incentive to relocate, which imposes that they reach the same utility level in any of the NA+1 
regions. This means imposing : [ ]1 ,A j Aj N U U∀ ∈ =% % . With (47) and (48), this leads to : 
[ ] ( ) ( )
1 1
(0) (0)
1 1
1 1
1 ,
jj AA
j j A A
j j A Aj j j F F
A j A
j A F Aj F
p n q p qj N U U
L I p LI p
δδ δδ
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ− −
− −
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∀ ∈ =             (49)                        
 
This concludes the short-run model. 
 
II- Dynamics 
 
The set of equations (1)-(49) describes the equilibrium of the economy at a given date t9. We 
adopt a recursive structure in which the determinants of spatial locations are modified 
between dates t and t+1 by aggregate macroeconomic trends at the national/international level 
and firms’ location choices among the cities in interaction.  
1- Macroeconomic trends 
The spatial model is conceived to spatially disaggregate the economy of a (group of) 
region(s). The disaggregate economies at the urban scale and the aggregate macroeconomy at 
the country scale are consistent if each variable appearing in both the scale description are 
such that the aggregation of the former equals the latter. This imposes a set of consistency 
equations to ensure that, at each date t, the spatial economy, partitioned into a number of 
agglomerations and a rural area, is consistent with major aggregate macroeconomic trends. 
We introduce ( )V t , ( )S t , ( )w t , ( )Pop t the total value of production, total working force 
(effective labor), average wage rate and national population, respectively. Consistency 
between the two descriptions imposes a set of equations at each date t: 
1
( )
AN
k k k F F
k
p n q p q V t
=
+ =∑
                                                              
(50)                        
1
( )
AN
k F F
k
S l q S t
=
+ =∑        
                                                        
(51)                        
1
( ) ( )
AN
k k F F F
k
w S w l q w t S t
=
+ =∑
                                                      
(52)                        
                                                     
9 In the reminder of the paper, the time-dependence of spatial variables will be kept implicit to simplify the 
notations 
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1
( )
AN
k A
k
Pop Pop Pop t
=
+ =∑
                                                      
(53) 
                      
                       
 
2- Firms’ location choices 
The second dynamic mechanism comes from firms’ location decisions and induced changes 
in the spatial distribution of production and productive capital in the national economy. 
Agglomerations differ in labor force, infrastructure endowment and amenities as captured by 
labor productivity jl , unitary commuting costs jθ , and utility factor (0)jU , respectively. These 
j-specificities act as constraints on the local economies, and influence in particular the 
attractiveness of the j-agglomeration for productive capital. As a measure of investment 
profitability, this attractiveness jA  is expected to be principally dependent upon the return to 
capital jr . Section IV tests this hypothesis on past historical data. 
The agglomeration attractiveness ( )jA t  acts as a driving force of firms’ migration decisions, 
which have an incentive to settle in agglomerations with higher attractiveness. This dynamic 
effect is captured by assuming that the relative variation of the number of firms in a given 
agglomeration is an increasing function of its attractiveness index. Assuming linear 
dependence for the sake of simplicity, we have: 
( )( ) ( ) , 1( )j jj
n t
Max A t A
n t
Δ = − −
                                                     (54)
 
The condition
( )
1
( )
j
j
n t
n t
Δ > −  ensures positive number of firms, and A  is a parameter controlling 
the total variation of the number of firms nΔ : 
j j
j
j
j
A n n
A
n
−Δ
=
∑
∑
                                                      
(55)
 
 
The number of firms in agglomeration j at date t+1 is then given by: 
( 1) ( ) ( )j j jn t n t n t+ = + Δ                                                  (56)                        
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III- Base-year Calibration 
 
The purpose of carrying out the base-year calibration is to provide all the variables defining 
the model with numerical values that enables the economy to be representative of the reality 
at the baseline year (2001 in our case), both at the national/regional level and at the urban 
scale.  
 
The national/regional dimension is operationalized on OECD regions divided into four macro-
regions: USA, Canada, Europe10 (EUR) and OECD Pacific11. In each of them, the consistency 
of the disaggregated urban economies with global macroeconomic flows at the base year 
impose the following equations on the disaggregate variables at the base year  
(0)
1
AN
k k k F F
k
p n q p q V
=
+ =∑
                                                              
(57)                        
(0)
1
AN
k F F
k
S l q S
=
+ =∑        
                                                        
(58)                        
(0) (0)
1
AN
k k F F F
k
w S w l q w S
=
+ =∑
                                                      
(59)                        
(0)
1
AN
k A
k
Pop Pop Pop
=
+ =∑
                                                      
(60) 
         
 
 
This set of equation is similar to (50)-(53), but is applied at the base year when the total value 
of production, the total working force (effective labor), the average wage rate and the national 
population take their values at date 2001 (t=0), (0)V , (0)S , (0)w  and (0)Pop , respectively.  The 
macroeconomic aggregates (0)V , (0)S  and 
(0)w  are derived from the GTAP-6 database, which 
provides, for the year 2001, a set of balanced input-output tables of the world economy, 
detailed in 87 regions and 57 sectors (Dimaranan et al., 2006). Demographic data for total 
population (0)Pop are taken from (UN, 2005) (Table C-2 in Appendix). 
 
Equations (57)-(60) control the systems of cities in interaction as a whole, but are insufficient 
to provide a detailed differentiation of economic activity among the different agglomerations 
                                                     
10 EU-27+ Turkey 
11 Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand 
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that compose this urban system. To do so, the standard calibration process at the 
macroeconomic level is complemented by a calibration of the agglomeration-specific 
variables. This second stage of calibration consists in imposing that, for each agglomeration j, 
the crucial socio-economic variables at the agglomeration level are consistent with their 
values observed in the reality. We retain five local characteristics: the number of households 
(0)
jL , the spatial extension 
(0)
jd , the wage rate 
(0)
jw , the production 
(0)
jQ  and the commuting 
cost (0)jCC  . For any j-agglomeration of the urban panel under consideration, we impose the 
following fitting equations on local data: 
 
(0)
j jL L=                                                                       (61)                        
(0)
j jd d=                                                                      (62)                        
(0)
(0)
1 1
j jw w
w w
=                                                                    (63)                        
(0)
(0)
1 1 1
j j jn q Q
n q Q
=                                                                 (64)                        
(0)j
j
j
S
CC
L
=                                                                
  
(65)     
 
In this study, the agglomerations considered are taken from the Metropolitan Database of the 
OECD and include 74 among the most important OECD agglomerations, representing 37% of 
OECD population and 48% of OECD GDP (the complete list of those agglomerations is given 
in Appendix A). In equations (61)-(65), the number of households (0)jL , the spatial extension 
(0)
jd  and the relative production levels 
(0)
jQ  are given by the Metropolitan Database of the 
OECD, in accordance with their definition of the metro-regions12, and relative wages (0)jw  are 
derived from a study by UBS13 (see Table C-1 in the Appendix). 
 
                       
                                                     
12available at :  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=METRO 
13 available at : http://www.ubs.com/1/e/wealthmanagement/wealth_management_research/prices_earnings.html 
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IV- Dynamic Calibration 
 
We test the robustness of the model against historical data on development patterns at the 
local/urban scale for the 74 metropolitan regions under consideration. To this aim, starting 
from its calibration date 2001 (see section III), the model is run backwards over the period 
1980-2001 by following its endogenous dynamics for negative times. We represent 
respectively the macroeconomic trends and urban dynamics over the period by imposing at 
each date from 2001 to 1980: 
• the macroeconomic aggregates { }, , ,M V l w Pop∈ in equations (50)-(53), as 
recursively defined for negative times by the generic equation 
( )( 1)
1 ( )M
M tM t
g t
− = + , 
with Mg giving the average growth rate (Table A-3 in Appendix).  
• past demographic trends at the urban level, as derived from city-level population 
growth rates in the WUP Database of the UN (UN, 2007) (see Figure C-1 in 
Appendix) 
 
This analysis has the twofold objective of (i) validating the functioning of the model by 
demonstrating that its endogenous dynamics succeeds in reproducing past trends, and (ii) 
revealing the missing parameters of the attractiveness index that are consistent with past 
observed dynamics. This second step serves as a dynamic calibration procedure, since it helps 
to give value to parameters driving the dynamics.  
 
1. Validation of the functioning of the model on past trends 
The endogenous functioning of the model in this exercise on the 1980-2001 period gives the 
characteristics of local economies that are consistent with observed macroeconomic and 
population trends. Here, we compare the result on local production as predicted by the model 
with observed values over the period. 14 For the sake of simplicity, we limit our analysis to the 
ten largest US agglomerations (Figure 5.1) 
 
 
                                                     
14 Data for real production are derived from GDP statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/default.cfm?selTable=CA1-3&section=2) and price index statistics from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?cu). 
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Figure 5.1: Average growth rate of production for the ten largest agglomerations in USA 
 
 
The endogenous relocation of production triggered by firms’ migration decisions appears to 
be highly consistent with empirical data for real production growth available for US 
agglomerations. This result reinforces the credibility of model outcomes for long-term 
forecasts, since it demonstrates that the functioning of the model ensures a consistent 
description of the interactions between demographic and economic dimensions of the urban 
agglomerations and the spatial organization of economic activities at the national level.  
The gaps between model outcomes and observed values for some agglomerations (e.g. Los 
Angeles, San Francisco) are due to the assumption that macroeconomic productivity gains are 
homogeneously distributed among agglomerations and hence that productivity differentials 
remain unchanged during the dynamics. This ignores the agglomeration-specific drivers of 
labor productivity gains, which may trigger distortions of labor productivity levels and affect 
migration decisions.  Going further into this dimension would require entering into the details 
of productivity drivers in each agglomeration, which is far beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
 
 
0,0%
1,0%
2,0%
3,0%
4,0%
5,0%
6,0%
7,0%
NY LA CH PHI MIA WSH ATL DAL SF BOS
Average growth rate of production 
over the period 1980‐2001 
for the ten largest agglomerations of USA
Model outcome Observed value
202 
 
2. Revealing ‘missing’ parameters driving the dynamics 
 
The observation of past trends helps to reveal the determinants of urban dynamics and in 
particular of firms’ relocation decisions. Indeed, the population and production migrations are 
triggered by different levels of attractiveness among agglomerations, consistently with 
equation (54). The analysis of the attractiveness index during the period 1980-2001 helps 
identify its underlying determinants, and, in particular, test the assumption that it is mainly 
determined by the return to capital jr . To this aim, we introduce 
(0)
jA the residual of 
attractiveness discounted from the return to capital, as follows: 
(0) ( )( () )j jj A t rA tt = −                                                      (66) 
In equation (66), the return to capital jr  captures the incentive for investors to move to a 
location where profit expectations are higher, whereras parameter (0)jA captures the other j-
specificities that may either attract or discourage investments (infrastructure, local 
governance, nature of the working force…). We refer to this latter as the “external advantages 
for investors” parameter and measure its relative importance in driving attractiveness through 
the ratio 
(0)
j
j
A
r
: a value close to zero means that the return to capital is the major determinant 
of attractiveness indexes, whereas higher-than-one values correspond to a dominant 
importance of other factors. This ratio is calculated in equation (66) at each date of the 1980-
2001 period from the endogenous return to capital (equation 41) and the attractiveness index 
corresponding to endogenous firms’ migrations (equation 54), both being consistent with 
macroeconomic and urban population forcings. 
The results prove that the ration remains significantly below one, with a maximum value of 
0.23 and an average of 0.03 over all agglomerations and all dates between 1980 and 2001. 
This means that the return to capital explains on average 97% of the agglomeration 
attractiveness, and justifies the focus on this determinant when describing the attractiveness. 
Parameter (0)jA takes differentiated values across agglomerations with weak magnitude of time 
variations and Table 5.1 reports the average value of the (0)jA parameter over 1980-2001 for 
each agglomerations. 
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Table 5.1: Average values of (0)jA  for the largest agglomerations, over the period 1980-2001  
USA 
NY LA CH PHI MIA WSH ATL DAL SF BOS 
0.037  0.024  0.006  0.004  0.004  ‐0.014  ‐0.026  ‐0.04  0.054  ‐0.012 
Canada 
TOR MONT VANC 
 
0.001  0.005  ‐0.005 
Europe 
RH IST PAR RAND MIL LON MUN BER FKT MAD 
0.009  ‐0.016  0.029  0.003  ‐0.065  0.01  0.021  0.01  0.011  0.008 
OECD 
Pacific 
TOK SEO OSA AIC BUS FUK SYD MEL DEA AUC 
0.025  ‐0.059  0.030  0.024  ‐0.038  0.018  0.032  0.033  ‐0.059  ‐0.027 
 
 
In the remaining of the paper, we consider the above values of (0)jA as a constant-over-time 
additive component in the attractiveness index of each agglomeration. This parameter helps 
capture the effects on long-term dynamics of some dimensions that are not explicitly 
represented in the model but affect migration decisions in long-term forecasts. In this sense, it 
constitutes a dynamic calibration of the model in that it derives the value of a crucial 
parameter for the dynamics from the comparaison between the endogenous properties of the 
model and dynamic observations. 
V-Long-term equilibrium 
To characterize the model mechanisms in the long-term, we study the long-term equilibrium 
of the model resulting from firms’ migration decisions, everything else being kept constant. 
Here, we consider that both macroeconomic aggregates { }, , , ,M V l w X L∈  and 
agglomeration-specific parameters are constant and we analyze the number of firms in each 
agglomeration, which progressively evolves from its initial value to a long-term 
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agglomeration-specific level after arbitrary long time period15. This latter situation in which 
agents have no incentive to migrate defines the long-term equilibrium.  
In this section, we analyze the dependency of these long-term equilibria to trade barriers. For 
the sake of simplicity, we assume homogenous for (i.e., jkτ is identical for any pair of regions, 
j k≠ ) and we note τ this value. As it is standard in NEG analyses, we start by considering 
the two extreme cases, free trade ( 1τ = ) and autarky (τ →∞ ), before deriving the 
‘bifurcation diagram’ over the whole range of trade barriers. 
 1. Long-term equilibrium under free trade ( 1τ = )  
1.1 Numerical results 
We assume free trade and, starting from the calibration date 2001, we consider the dynamics 
driven by firms’ migration decisions towards the most attractive locations. Figure 5.2 
demonstrates ‘partial agglomeration’ equilibrium for Canadian agglomerations, with a long-
run distribution of firms across several agglomerations. Figures C-2, C-3 and C-4 in Appendix 
C illustrate the same outcome under the free trade assumption for the USA, Europe and 
OECD Pacific agglomerations, respectively. This is consistent with findings from Chapter 4 
which demonstrates that partial equilibria with dispersion of production at free trade are 
possible when considering the heterogeneity of intra-regional spatial organization. 
Figure 5.2: Dynamic trends of the three-region model of Canada over 1000 periods for 1τ =  
 
                                                     
15 Results are presented for 1000 time steps, which proves sufficient to reach the long-term equilibrium  for 1τ =  
. 
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Table 5.2 summarizes the numerical results under the free trade assumption by giving the 
spatial distribution of firms in the long-run equilibrium for the four macro-regions.  
Table 5.2: Share of the number of firms in the long-run equilibrium for 1τ = (%) 
USA* 
 
NY LA CH PHI MIA WSH ATL DAL SF BOS 
0.17  0.11  0.13  0.08  0.00 0.05  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.07 
Canada 
TOR MONT VANC  
 0.33  0.58  0.09 
Europe* 
RH IST PAR RAND MIL LON MUN BER FKT MAD 
0.23  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.12  0.07  0.08  0.01  0.05  0.00 
OECD Pacific 
TOK SEO OSA AIC BUS FUK SYD MEL DEA AUC 
0.34  0.25  0.22  0.08  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
*Note: the total does not sum up to 1 since only the results from the ten largest agglomerations (out of 23 and 38 
for USA and Europe respectively) are reported. 
 
1.2 Analytical solution 
To analyze more in-depth the determinants of these results, we provide an analytical solution 
of the long-run model in the specific case where 0α = (negligible agglomeration effect) and 
income shares on manufacturing goods are identical in all regions (we note δ this value). 
These assumptions are adopted to ensure analytical tractability of the model, but do not 
undermine the explanatory power of the analysis, which aims at making explicit the 
determinants of the number of firms at the long-term equilibrium.  
The free trade assumption implies that the price index is identical in all regions 
(agglomerations and rural area):  
( )
1
1
1
1
AN
k k
k
I n p
εε −−
=
⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑                                                     (67) 
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By introducing ϒ is the total households’ income, a direct calculation with equation (39) and 
(67) gives the production level:  
1
j
j
p
q
I
ε
ε δ
−
−= ϒ
                                                               
(68) 
From (40), (41) and (68), we derive the return to capital: 
 11j jr pI
ε
ε
δ
εχ
−
−
ϒ= . 
                                                         
(69) 
By introducing ( )(0)1 1A
A
UK
L
δεχ= − ϒ , equation (49) defining equilibrium among different 
locations can then be rewritten as: 
                                              
1
(0)
j
j j j
n K
L U r
=
                                               
 (70) 
Combining equations (26), (40), (46) and (68) and introducing the constant
( )( )( )
( )
1
1
2 0
1 2 11
1 2 1
K I
γ γ γγ ξ ξε ξ
ε ξ γξ
−⎡ ⎤− − −⎛ ⎞−= ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, the equilibrium on urban labor markets 
imposes condition: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 12 11j j j j j j j jL K L l p l n pI
γ γ εγ γ γ γ ε
δθ
− − − −
−
⎡ ⎤ ϒ− =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                           
(71) 
Combining (69), (70) and (71), and introducing the two parameters ( )
1
1 1
1
3 1
IK K
ε εε
εεχδ
− −
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ϒ⎝ ⎠
and
( )
1
1 1
4 2
IK K
ε γ εεχ
δ
− −⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ϒ⎝ ⎠
 , we obtain: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
3 (0)1
1 1 1
1
4
1 j j
j
j
j j j
l r
K
U
L
K l r
ε
γ
γ γ
γ γ γ εθ
−
−
−
−
−
=
                                                    
(72) 
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The long-term partial equilibrium is defined by the equality of all attractiveness indexes at a 
common value A . With (66), this means that the return to capital jr  at the long-term partial 
equilibrium satisfy 
(0)
jj Ar A= − . 
                                                         
(73) 
Plugging (73) into (72) gives the population in agglomeration j at the long-term partial 
equilibrium in function of the parameters characterizing the j-agglomeration: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )
1 1
1
3 (0)
11
1 1
0
4
(0)1
( )1 j
j
j
j
j
j j
l
K A A
U
L
K l A A
γ
γ
ε
γ εγθ
−
−
− −−
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦=
−                                             (74)
 
This equation represents the analytical solution of the model by providing an explicit relation 
between the population in agglomeration j at the long-term equilibrium and the parameters 
characteristizing this agglomeration, which are kept constant at their base-year value. A direct 
analysis of equation (74) demonstrates that the long-run population is higher in 
agglomerations where, everything else being equal, labor productivity is higher (lower jl ), 
unitary commuting costs are lower ( lower jθ ), amenities for households are higher (higher 
(0)
jU ) or external advantages for investors are higher  (higher 
(0)
jA ). The long-run outcomes in 
Table 2 result from the tradeoff between these four agglomeration-specific characteristics, as 
described in (74).  
2. Long-term equilibrium under autarky (τ →∞ )  
In autarky, the price index in agglomeration j and in the rural area, Ij and IA, can be 
approximated by: 
1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ; ( )
AN
j j j A k k
k
a I n p b I n pε ε ε ε ετ− − − − −
=
= = ∑  
                                 
(75) 
Equation (39) giving the production level jq  and equation (41) giving the return to capital jr  
in agglomeration j can be rewritten as: 
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1
1 1
1( ) ; ( )j jj j
k k k k
k k
p p
a q b r
n p n p
ε ε
ε εδ εχ
− −
− −= ϒ =∑ ∑                                    (76) 
From (75) and (76), the equilibrium condition (49) between the rural area and a given 
agglomeration j gives: 
[ ]
(0) (0)1
1
1
1
1 1j A
j j
j A
U Un r
L L
δ
ε δδ
ε
δ
τ δ εχ
+ −
+ −
−⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦  
                                 
(77) 
 
Let us assume that a partial equilibrium exists, so that at least two different agglomerations 
1 2j j≠ (with 1 2(0) (0)j jA A≠ ) are non-empty in the long-term ( 1 0jn ≠ and 2 0jn ≠ ). 
• Equation (77) then imposes 
1 2
0j jr r= =  (*) 
• The equilibrium condition in the long-term imposes 
1 2j j
A A= . With (66), this means 
1 21 2
(0) (0)
j jj jr rA A+ = + (**) 
• Combining (*) and (**), we have 
1 2
(0) (0)
j jA A= , which is in contradiction with the initial 
condition. This means that the assumption of a partial equilibrium is false and that the 
long-term equilibrium is necessarily a full agglomeration in a unique agglomeration. 
 
This result is opposite to the standard finding of the NEG literature that autarky corresponds 
to a symmetric distribution of production among the regions (Krugman, 1991). This 
difference is caused by a different representation of the location of production. In standard 
NEG approaches, all the regions considered produce both types of goods, so that local 
production can provide all the types of goods demanded by local households. At high trade 
costs, households have no incentive to demand goods produced in the other region and 
consume only the varieties of the manufacturing good that are produced locally. In our model 
on the contrary, we take into account the differentiation of production according to the region 
considered and manufacturing goods can be produced only in agglomerations. This means in 
particular that, even at high trade costs, it remains necessary to trade manufacturing goods 
produced in agglomerations in order to satisfy households’ demand in the rural area. This 
necessity to consume traded goods significantly increases the price index in the rural area in 
case of high trade costs (see equation 75(b)), and the concentration of all manufacturing 
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production in a single agglomeration is then a way to limit its production cost and then the 
rural price index. 
 
3. The bifurcation diagram  
We now investigate more generally the long-term equilibria over the whole range of trade 
freeness 1 εφ τ −=  ( 0 1φ≤ ≤ ), and summarize the results in a ‘bifurcation diagram’.16 Such 
representation is conventionnally used to summarize the outcomes of 2-region NEG models, 
and the present analysis extends this approach to the context of multiple regions (or 
agglomerations) 
The ‘bifurcation diagram’ for USA, Europe and OECD Pacific are provided in Appendix 
(Figures C-5, C-6 and C-7, respectively). These results demonstrate two common general 
characteristics. On the one hand, there exists a range of trade barriers (depending on the 
region considered) which is consistent with partial agglomeration favoring a distribution of 
economic activity over many of the agglomerations. On the other hand, the decrease of trade 
barrier Ԅ enhances the agglomeration process by favoring concentration into a more and more 
reduced number of agglomerations; this is consistent with the previous analysis, which 
demonstrates full agglomeration in the extreme case of autarky Ԅ=0. Due to the complexity of 
the interactions in these three regions (which include 23, 38 and 10 agglomeration in 
interaction for USA, Europe and OECD Pacific, respectively), we do not enter further into 
analytical investigation of the determinants of these results. We do so in the more simple case 
of Canada, which has the advantage of including a reduced number of agglomerations making 
it possible to disentangle the mechanisms at play. Figure 5.3 gives the ‘bifurcation diagram’ 
in this context. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
16 The numerical results are presented over the range 0.7 1φ≤ ≤ for the sake of readibility of the graphics. This 
range proves sufficient to illustrate the more important trends demonstrated by the analysis  
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Figure 5.3: Bifurcation diagram for Canada 
 
There exists a range of trade barriers over which we obtain a partial long-run equilibrium, 
where firms distribute over several agglomerations. The existence of such ‘partial 
equilibrium’ demonstrates a step-forward towards the empirical validity of NEG models, by 
making it possible that the multiple agglomeration interactions gives rise to an equilibrium in 
which production is distributed among a number of agglomerations, in line with empirical 
observations.  The consistency of this picture with empirical observations is reinforced by the 
fact that these partial equilibria are obtained for sufficiently high trade barriers, corresponding 
to low trade costs ( 0.95φ ≥ or 1.22τ ≤ ), in line with observed patterns of low obstacles to 
trade in the economy. To understand the respective shares of the three agglomerations in the 
long-run distribution, we go back to the inherent characteristics of the agglomerations, which 
remain constant-in-time in this analysis of long-run equilibria and determine firms’ location 
decisions: the unitary labor requirements for production lj (inverse of labor productivity), the 
unitary commuting costs θj , the amenity for households (0)jU and the external advantages for 
investors (0)jA  (Table 5.3).  
Vancouver is disfavored with respect to the other agglomeration for all the criteria, which 
explains why it aways take the smaller share of population and economic activity. Toronto 
performs best in terms of production costs by offering higher productivity (lower lj) and lower 
commuting costs (lower θj ), but Montreal is favored in terms of implicit determinants, both 
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for households’ amenities (higher Uj(0)) and external advantages for investors (higher Aj(0)). 
Toronto has lower costs ensuring a competitive advantage over varieties produced in other 
agglomerations, higher volumes of sales and higher return-to-capital; but, the low trade cost 
assumption limits the multiplying effect on the final price of goods and hence the gap in 
relative prices (see equation (37)) and the difference in return-to-capital. In this case, the 
exogenous parameters (which are in favor of Montreal) play a crucial role by more than 
offsetting the above endogenous effects in the attractiveness to foster migration towards 
Montreal, as demonstrated by the dominant share it takes for 0.95φ ≥ . 
Table 5.3: Characteristics of the Canadian agglomerations (arbitrary units) 
 
Unitary labor 
requirements for 
production 
jl  
Unitary 
commuting costs 
jθ  
Amenity for 
households 
(0)
jU  
External 
advantages for 
investors 
(0)
jA  
Montreal 9.7 5.2 0.86 4.6 
Toronto 8.4 4.4 0.70 0.5 
Vancouver 9.4 6.4 0.84 -5.1 
 
For lower trade barriers 0.95φ ≤ representing high trade costs, a full agglomeration pattern is 
obtained. Interestingly, the 3-region case of Canada demonstrates that the agglomeration 
which attracts all firms may depend on the level of trade freeness. For Ԅ-values (still lower 
but) close to 0.95, the tradeoff between determinants of migration are similarly in favor of 
Montreal like in the partial agglomeration case described above; the only difference is that 
higher trade costs foster full concentration of production allowing to satisfy urban 
consumption through local production, and hence avoiding losses due to inter-agglomerations 
trade. But, at sufficiently high trade costs, firms prove to concentrate in Toronto. This change 
in concentration patterns is an original outcome of our exercise and is related to the trade 
patterns between the agglomeration and the rural area. Indeed, the differentiated good is 
produced only in the agglomerations and part of them must be traded from agglomerations to 
the rural area to satisfy rural households’ demand even at high trade costs (low Ԅ-values). 
When the cost of trading urban goods towards the rural area is very high, producers have 
interest to reduce production costs to stabilize rural consumers’ price index and hence 
maintain the amount of goods sold in the rural area and the associated benefits. This means 
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favoring the agglomeration where production costs (and hence selling prices) are lowest, 
Toronto in our case.  
VI-Long-term forecasts 
 
Let us now turn to consider the effect of macroeconomic dynamics on urban development by 
solving recursively the urban model given by equations (1)-(49) on a yearly basis. This means 
that, at each date of the period 2001-2050, the macroeconomic aggregate variables 
{ }, , ,M V S w Pop∈ in consistency equations (50)-(53) are given by exogenous trends (see 
Table 5.4 for values in intermediate years) and that we investigate the effect of these 
macroeconomic variables on endogenous firms’ location decisions triggered by differences in 
attractiveness among agglomerations given by (54).  
We adopt three simplifying assumptions. First, we assume constant values of agglomeration-
specific parameters, which comes down to ignore any differentiated effect of macroeconomic 
trends on urban dynamics. This concerns the four above identified determinants, namely 
unitary commuting cost jθ , relative17 labor productivity jl , amenity for households (0)jU and the 
external advantages for investors (0)jA . We assume in addition that the intra-urban organization 
remains identical to its base year characteristics, as captured by constancy of parameter ξ  
controlling the shape of the city. Second, we do not consider any interplay between global 
energy dynamics and local trends, which comes down to neglect the effect of energy prices on 
local commuting costs and, conversely, to ignore the consequences of the spatial distribution 
of economic activity on global energy markets. These assumptions are adopted for the sake of 
simplicity, because the purpose here is not to provide realistic trends of urban dynamics but to 
investigate the mechanisms driving the functioning of the model. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 the average value of labor productivity evolves according to macroeconomic aggregates, but the productivities 
remain proportional to their base year value among agglomerations. 
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 Table 5.4: Macroeconomic aggregates in the four macro-regions for forecasts over 2001-2050 
 
We focus here only on the example of Canada, because the reduced number of 
agglomerations facilitates the presentation and helps identify the general mechanisms driving 
the dynamics of the model. 
Macroeconomic 
aggregates 
 Region 2001 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
Production value 1012$ 
USA 18.2 22.6 26.8 31.6 36.8 43.6
Canada 1.3 2.0 2.5 3.3 3.9 4.6
Europe 17.1 22.9 28.0 34.9 37.6 40.6
OECD Pacific 9.1 12.2 14.9 17.6 18.6 19.4
Effective labor 
Million 
workers 
USA 142.6 161.9 165.7 161.5 161.9 165.6
Canada 16.0 16.8 19.5 20.3 20.7 21.1 
Europe 299.4 287.4 294.8 293.7 282.3 267.3
OECD Pacific 105.5 100.1 104.1 100.3 93.7 85.8 
Average wage rate 103$/y 
USA 44.5 53.1 59.1 67.2 79.0 95.3 
Canada 23.3 29.8 43.7 61.5 75.0 88.5 
Europe 14.8 17.7 23.4 32.8 37.9 42.4 
OECD Pacific 25.0 31.0 44.7 60.1 69.3 78.7 
( )Pop t  millions 
USA 285.3 304.6 328.2 344.2 351.0 355.1
Canada 31.1 33.0 35.2 36.6 37.2 37.5 
Europe 588.2 596.6 600.2 597.6 587.8 574.0
OECD Pacific 204.7 208.7 208.2 204.0 198.6 190.2
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The dynamic mechanisms of urban development are driven by the attractiveness index Aj 
affecting firm migration decisions: agglomerations with higher attractiveness benefits from 
higher growth rates in market size (see figure 5.4). The number of active firms nj in turn 
influences the supply side of the market, as measured by a variation in the production size of 
each agglomeration, njqj as the amount of locally available firms varies (see figure 5.5(a)). 
The agglomerations with higher attractiveness then take a growing share of production. 
Figure 5.4: (a) Attractiveness index [left-hand panel] and (b) variations in the number of firms [left-hand panel] 
 
 
Figure 5.5: (a) Share of production among agglomerations [left-hand panel] and (b) households’ income [right-
hand panel]   
 
 
Changes in the size of production bring about modifications of the consumption behavior of 
individuals located in the agglomeration j via a modification of their purchase power, as 
defined by j
J jL P
β
ϒ
, where j
JL
ϒ
 represents average households’ income (Figure 5.5(b)). The 
price index jP , which measures the cost of living in each agglomeration, proves to remain 
almost homogenous across agglomerations. 
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Demographic trends are driven by the migration of the working force following the relocation 
of regional production towards the more attractive regions (Figure 5.6(a)). The consequences 
on the spatial structure of urban economies over the time is captured through the study of the 
city size dj , which is a proxy for the extension of the urban land area (Figure 5.6(b)).  
Figure 5.6: (a) Population migration [left-hand panel] and (b) city size [right-hand panel] 
 
VII-Conclusion 
 
This paper develops a modeling framework in light of the New Economic Geography for long 
term projections of socio-economic variables at the urban scale. To improve the empirical 
validity of those approaches, the standard 2-region framework is extended to a multiplicity of 
regions in interaction, each region representing an agglomeration.  The economic functioning 
within such region is described according to the principles of urban economy analyses, 
representing households’ location decisions as a tradeoff between commuting and housing 
costs.  
The model is calibrated on a set of empirical equations giving population, spatial extension, 
production, wage level and commuting costs for 74 of the largest OECD agglomerations. The 
dynamics is triggered by differences in attractiveness among regions, which capture the 
interplay between five determinants of agglomeration. Beyond the standard ‘market size’, 
‘cost-of-living’ and ‘market crowding’ effects, this framework introduces the ‘market density’ 
and ‘urban cost’ effects. The former corresponds to the positive impact of spillover effects at 
the industry level permitted by an increase of the number of firms in the form of lower 
production costs, whereas the latter captures the constraints imposed by land availability 
within an agglomeration in the form of commuting and housing costs.  
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The analysis of long-term patterns under constant macroeconomic forcing demonstrates the 
possibility of partial equilibria with a distribution of economic activity among several 
agglomerations. The resulting ‘bifurcation diagram’ extends the standard core-periphery 
structure towards more empirically valid description of economic agglomerations. Finally, the 
model is submitted to changes in the macroeconomic forcing triggered by projections of 
economic growth drivers. This means that we investigate the effect of the macroeconomic 
activity on local economies, but exclude the feedback of urban dynamics on macroeconomic 
activity. The result is a picture of economic activities in the 74 OECD agglomerations under 
consideration at a 2050 horizon, with a consistent description of local activity in terms of 
demography, production and consumption under changing global conditions.  
This analysis paves the way for quantitative long-term forecasts of consistent population and 
production trends at the urban level. This requires (a) embarking more detailed information on 
local economies and policies likely to affect agglomeration-specific development patterns and 
(b) considering the feedback effects of urban dynamics on global macroeconomic trends 
through the role of location choices on aggregate mobility needs and the investment 
requirements for urban infrastructures.  
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Chapter 6 
Urban dynamics and climate policy: 
Disentangling the interplay between 
carbon, oil and urban land  
 
 
This final chapter* brings together the pieces collected during this thesis to 
investigate the interplay between urban dynamics and the macroeconomy of low-
carbon futures. This is done by organizing a dialogue between the model of urban 
dynamics developed in Chapter 5 and the IMACLIM-R model used in Chapter 1, 2 
and 3 for the analysis of the interplay between carbon prices, oil prices and the 
macroeconomy. This coupled framework represents urban dynamics in changing 
macroeconomic conditions but also its feedback effect on long-term trends 
through transport and investment needs. We investigate the effect of a climate 
policy on urban dynamics in terms of spatial extension and housing prices 
(representing the value paid for the use of urban land). Conversely, we capture 
the influence of the urban transition on mitigation costs. In particular, additional 
urban infrastructure investments, while moderately reducing losses of economic 
activity (GDP), significantly soften welfare reductions imposed by the carbon 
constraint (households’ surplus).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
* A former version of this paper is given by: Grazi F, Waisman H (2009). Urban Agglomeration Economies in 
Climate Policy: A Dynamic CGE Approach. WP CIRED 2009-17  
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There is an increasing attention in climate policy literature towards the necessity of 
investigating the impacts of economic activities where they specifically arise (e.g., IPCC, 
2001; Tietenberg, 2003; OECD, 2006; Grazi et al., 2008). Urbanization, city growth, and 
economic development are strictly related phenomena that have many important implications 
on climate change through emissions and energy consumption from economic activities 
located in cities. Indeed, the spatial distribution of economic activities in urban areas and its 
counterpart in terms of mobility needs (commuting, intra- and inter-industry trade) is an 
important driver of carbon emissions; conversely, a context of rising cost of fossil fuels 
affects the tradeoff between transport and housing prices and hence the spatial organization of 
cities. These interrelations suggest extending the standard focus of climate policy analysis on 
carbon prices to investigate the mitigation potentials associated to the interplay between 
spatial patterns at the urban/regional scale and carbon emissions.  
However, the overwhelming majority of energy-economy models conventionnally used to 
assess mitigation costs focus essentially on the technological determinants of energy trends 
but do not capture explicitly the role of urban dynamics.1 We propose a step forward the 
representation of the interplay between energy consumption, carbon emissions and the spatial 
organisation of cities. This is done in a framework that represents both the impact of 
macroeconomic trends on urban dynamics and the consequences of urban/regional location 
choices on mobility needs, investments and production possibilities affecting macroeconomic 
trajectories and carbon emissions (Section I). 
We use this integrated description of global macroeconomic trajectories and location 
decisions in multiple agglomerations to carry out three types of analyses. First, we analyze the 
urban trends of a baseline scenario in which high short-term demand and resource constraints 
drive high long-term energy prices (section II). Second, we consider the effect of a climate 
policy on urban dynamics and we reassess the macroeconomic and welfare costs of a climate 
policy when considering the urban dimension. We focus more specifically on constrained 
mobility needs corresponding to daily commuting distances, investment constraints due to 
housing/transport infrastructure costs and housing prices representing the price paid to reside 
inside the city (section III). Third, we investigate the potentials offered by specific urban 
policies in addition to carbon pricing in an attempt to build a mix of policies apt to reduce the 
costs of the climate constraint. We demonstrate that the benefits of additional urban 
                                                     
1 see recent exercises compiled in (IPCC, 2007). 
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investments are rather moderate in macroeconomic terms (GDP, carbon tax), but significant 
in terms of welfare (households’ surplus) (section IV). 
 
I. Modeling the interplay between urban dynamics and the macroeconomy 
Numerical analysis techniques like computable general equilibrium (CGE) models developed 
for long-run forecasting of complex dynamic systems are seen as more reliable guides to 
address the relationship between determinants of economic development and forces inducing 
climatic variations (Böhringer and Löschel, 2006). They are based on multi-regional, multi-
sectoral frameworks describing how the world economy and the adjustments of production 
and consumption under counterfactual scenarios representing different visions of the world or 
policy intervention. They give insights on the economic impacts arising from specific policy 
interventions by comparison of different policy measures aimed at CO2 abatement (mainly, 
carbon taxes/subsidies and emission trading permits) in terms of economy’s efficiency, 
distributional effects and the cost (benefit) pressure exercised on its sectors by a tax (subsidy). 
The development of those frameworks has been mostly oriented towards the representation of 
the technical dimension of the economy (supply-side technologies, structural change). To this 
aim, in line with the ‘Elephant and rabbit stew metaphor’ which legitimates to treat the energy 
sector independently from the rest of the economy because of its small share in aggregate 
economic activity (Hogan and Manne 1977), the efforts have been focused on the details of 
the representation of the energy sector. This has led in particular to the emergence of hybrid 
frameworks combining an explicit representation of energy technologies informed by expert-
based assessments (bottom-up approach) and macroeconomic consistency in terms of money 
flows (top-down approach). These tools help to investigate the role of energy efficiency and 
technology availability when carbon price is introduced as the driver of decarbonizing 
economies. 
But, these assessments remain at a global level and do not represent the local dimensions of 
interaction, so that a firm basis for thinking the interplay between carbon emissions, energy 
trends and the spatial organisation of economic activities in cities is still missing. We propose 
a step in this direction by embarking, in a hybrid energy-economy model, a representation of 
location choices among multiple agglomerations and within urban areas. Section I.1 describes 
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the models used to analyse energy-economy interactions and urban systems, whereas section 
I.2 enters more into the details of the coupling process allowing a dialogue between them.  
 
1- The models 
1.1 The energy-economy model IMACLIM-R 
We adopt the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model IMACLIM-R that is designed to 
assess the impact of energy and climate policies on carbon emissions and their cost on the 
economy. It contributes to the literature on energy-economy modeling by considering growth 
patterns in second best worlds, which are often ignored in standard models. A complete 
description of the IMACLIM-R model and its general characteristics in terms of climate policy 
analysis are given in Annex A and Chapter 3. Here, we focus on the specificities of the model 
that make it suitable to analyze the interplay between location patterns and macroeconomic 
trajectories: 
- The IMACLIM-R model represents endogenous technical change determined by the 
volume and structure of cumulated investments given capital availability constraints. 
This allows in particular representing crowding-out effects on investments, and hence 
capturing the feedback of local infrastructure decisions at a global scale through 
capital availability.  
- The IMACLIM-R model relies on a consistent description of the economy in money 
values and physical quantities in “hybrid matrixes”. In addition to the preservation of 
energy quantities, which is commonly admitted as crucial for analysis of climate 
policy (Malcolm and Truong, 1999; Sands et al., 2005), this dual description is 
extended to cover transportation, as a prerequisite to investigate explicitly the 
macroeconomic effects of location choices through transport needs.2  
- The IMACLIM-R model represents the effect of imperfect foresight: at each date, agents 
have limited information about the future and form their anticipations on the 
extrapolation of past and current trends (adaptive anticipations). This structure allows 
representing the inertias on agents’ preferences and on the renewal of long-lived 
                                                     
2 The ‘hybrid matrix” at the initial date (2001) is constructed by modifying input-output tables from the GTAP-6 
dataset (aggregated according to the Imaclim-R mapping in 12 regions and 12 sectors) to make them fully 
compatible with 2001 energy balances from IEA (in Mtoe) and passenger mobility (in passenger-km) from 
(Schafer and Victor, 2000). 
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infrastructure defining the urban structures, and the imperfect expectations about the 
long-term economic context due to the uncertainty on the spatial behavior when 
multiple locations are available.  
- Finally, a specific effort has been done to represent the role of infrastructure in driving 
transport decisions by households. To this aim, utility-maximizing households are 
submitted not only to the standard income budget, but also to a time budget constraint, 
which limits the total time spent in transportation and drives modal allocation among 
four modes (automobile, public transport, air transport and non-motorized). 
Investments in transport infrastructure determine the efficiency of the different 
transport modes (i.e., the effective speed given saturation of available infrastructures) 
and, hence, the allocation of travel time budget across them. 
 
1.2 The model of urban systems 
The geographical dimension of economic activities is traditionally investigated by relying on 
analytical approaches stemming from the New Economic Geography, in line with the seminal 
paper by Krugman (1991). These approaches are successful in the representation of 
heterogeneous land uses by introducing the benefits and costs of agglomeration as driving 
forces of migration decisions. But, although negative environmental externalities have been 
included in extensions of the basic model (see discussions in Chapter 4), the stylized 
analytical models constitutive of the NEG approach fall short of rendering a complete picture 
of the complexity that animates the interplay between location choices and CO2 emissions. 
To overcome this limitation, we adopt a model of urban economies that extends the NEG 
principles to provide numerical analysis of location choices among multiple agglomerations 
and within urban areas, in line with both empirical evidence and microeconomic theory 
(Chapter 5).  
A national economy as a mass of NA+1 regions, where NA represents the number of 
agglomerations (or urban regions) under consideration and the latter is the rural area. Each 
agglomeration [ ]1 Aj N∈ comprises nj firms located in the Central Business District, which 
produce qj units of a variety of a composite good with two input factors: labor (with unitary 
requirements lj paid at wage rate wj) and capital (paid at a rate of return rj). The equilibrium 
price pj is determined by monopolistic competition à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977). The Lj 
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households are distributed within circular peripheral areas around the CBD where jobs are 
located, and experience commuting costs proportional to their distance x from the CBD with 
unitary commuting costs given by jθ . These commuting costs affect negatively total effective 
labor Sj supplied by workers: Sj < Lj. In the rural area, land is considered as an homogenous 
space and the LA households are strictly identical. Firms produce qF units of a homogenous 
good under constant returns to scale with two input factors: labor (with unitary requirements 
lF and wage rate wF) and capital. The equilibrium price pF is determined by perfect 
competition. The full set of equations describing the general equilibrium of this system of 
regional economies in interaction through trade is given by equations (1)-(49) in Chapter 5.  
 
2- The coupled model 
The IMACLIM-R model adopts recursive and modular structure, which allows incorporating 
sectoral expertise in dynamic modules and operationalizing the dialogue with macroeconomic 
trajectories through a systematic exchange of information with the static equilibrium (Figure 
6.1). We exploit this possibility to represent the interplay between macroeconomic trajectories 
and urban dynamics by embedding the model of urban systems as a dynamic module of 
Imaclim-R. 
Figure 6.1: Urban systems and the modular structure of IMACLIM-R 
 
 
This means that, at each time step t, the urban module receives information from the static 
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input-output coefficients resulting from changes in the urban structure to calculate the static 
equilibrium at date t+1. Due to data availability constraints, we implement this dialogue for 
the four OECD regions (USA, Canada, Europe and OECD Pacific) for which detailed 
information necessary to build the model of urban systems is fully available for the largest 
agglomerations.  
2.1 Spatial disaggregation of macroeconomic activity 
At date t, the model of urban systems receives information from previous static equilibrium, 
in the form of the average value of major macroeconomic variables at the regional level, 
which serve as boundary conditions for the model of urban dynamics. This first step of the 
dynamic interaction then consists in disaggregating the macroeconomic settings by revealing 
the system of urban economies that is consistent with the aggregate macroeconomic 
equilibrium. This means imposing that the average value of each spatially disaggregated 
variable equals the value of the corresponding aggregated variable at the regional level from 
the IMACLIM-R equilibrium. 
By introducing ( )V t  the total value of production, ( )S t  the total working force (effective 
labor), ( )w t  the wage rate and ( )L t  the national population coming from the static 
equilibrium at date t, the equations ensuring consistency between macroeconomic and local 
variables are given by: 
 1
( )
AN
k k k F F
k
p n q p q V t
=
+ =∑
                                                      
(1) 
1
( )
AN
k F F
k
S l q S t
=
+ =∑
                                                           
(2)
 
1
( ) ( )
AN
k k F F F
k
w S w l q w t S t
=
+ =∑
                                                  
(3)
 
1
( )
AN
k A
k
L L L t
=
+ =∑
                                                            
(4) 
In addition to these equations controlling the size of production, labor, income and production 
at the national level, we consider the dependence of the two crucial agglomeration-specific 
determinants of urban economies to macroeconomic trajectories, namely unitary commuting 
costs jθ  and labor productivity lj.  
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The losses of income experienced by households because of commuting amount to j jwθ  per 
kilometer. We introduce a dependence of those losses to the cost of energy for transportation, 
in turn related to the price of liquid fuels, ( )LFp t , and the unitary consumption of vehicles (per 
kilometer), ( )V tα , both calculated in previous static equilibrium. More precisely, we consider 
that commuting costs at the agglomeration level evolve in time proportionally to the unitary 
cost of transportation at the national level, ( ). ( )LF Vp t tα . This can be written as: 
( )( )( )( ) ( 1). 1 1
( 1)( 1) ( 1)
jVLF
j j
jLF V
w ttp tt t
w tp t t
αθ θ α
⎡ ⎤= − + − − +⎢ ⎥−− −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                           
(5) 
Macroeconomic trajectories consider aggregate labor productivity growth following a 
convergence hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), the parameters being calibrated on 
historic trajectories (Maddison, 1995) and ‘educated guess’ assumptions of long-term trends 
(Oliveira-Martins et al., 2005): USA remains the world leader in productivity per worker with 
a steady growth of 1.65% per year, whereas the dynamics of productivity in other countries is 
driven by a partial catch-up (the lower the absolute productivity per worker in a country, the 
higher its labor productivity growth). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that these gains of 
productivity are uniformly distributed among the agglomerations, so that the relative gains of 
local productivity are identical in all regional economies. By noting ( )l t the unitary 
requirement for production at the national level (ie. the inverse of labor productivity), we 
have: 
( )( ) ( 1).
( 1)j j
l tl t l t
l t
= − −                                                               
(6) 
For each region of the IMACLIM-R model, the first step of the dynamic model formally comes 
down solving the system of equations defining urban economies (equations (1)-(49) in 
Chapter 5) under the constraint of equations (1)-(6) defining the boundary conditions imposed 
by macroeconomic trends from the static equilibrium of the IMACLIM-R model. This ensures a 
spatial disaggregation of the economy into a set of urban agglomerations (and a rural area). 
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2.2 Urban dynamics and the feedback effect on macroeconomic trends 
The dynamics of the model of urban economies is enabled through firms’ location decisions 
taken in function of differences in attractiveness for investments among agglomerations, as 
measured by the return to capital rj. The resulting changes in the spatial distribution of 
production and productive capital in the national economy bring about migrations of 
households/workers to satisfy constraints on each local labor market. At the agglomeration 
level, the spatial distribution of households inside each agglomeration is decided according to 
a minimization of infrastructure and congestion costs.  
These dynamic mechanisms impose modifications of some important economic variables at 
the agglomeration level, which, when re-aggregated at the national level, result in modified 
constraints on the subsequent static equilibrium. In this exercise, we focus on the feedback 
effect of urban dynamics on four crucial determinants of the macroeconomic equilibrium: 
basic needs of transport, transport capacities, investments in urban infrastructure and labor 
productivity.  
(a) The basic needs of transport represent constrained mobility, ie the volume of transport that 
households have no choice but to do. We identify this constrained mobility with commuting 
distance, as given by the distance to the CBD in urban agglomerations. By introducing the 
land consumption by each household, ( )j xλ , the total of commuting distances Dj by all 
households residing in a given agglomeration j is given by 
( )
j
j
d
j
jd
xD dx
xλ−
= ∫
                                                              
(7) 
Under the assumption of a power functional form ( )j jx x
ξλ λ= , this can be rewritten as 
 ( )
2
2
2
j
j
j
d
D
ξ
λ ξ
−
= −                                                               
(8) 
The basic needs for transport at the national level, bn, are then given by the sum of 
commuting distances over all agglomerations: 
1
AN
j
j
bn D
=
=∑
                                                              
(9) 
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(b) The density of urban agglomerations also affects the modal distribution of transport 
capacities, which measures the availability of transport infrastructures. We consider indeed 
that denser agglomerations favor the deployment of public transportation at the expense of 
automobile. To capture this effect, we define the average density of urban settlements ρ as 
the ratio between urban population and the spatial extension of all urban areas:  
1
1
A
A
N
j
j
N
j
j
L
d
ρ =
=
=
∑
∑                                                                    
(10)          
The amount of transport capacities in public transportation, Cappublic, is then an increasing 
function of ρ , whereas transport capacities for private vehicles (urban roads), Capcars,  is a 
decreasing function of ρ . For the sake of simplicity, we assume these dependences to be 
proportional to changes in density. 
 
(c) The needs for investments in urban infrastructure depend on the density of settlements 
inside agglomerations in a way to capture higher marginal construction costs in the building 
sector and the need for more developed transport infrastructure in denser cities. By 
introducing 1γ > as a measure of the non-linearity of urban capital requirements, the amount 
of investment per capita I increases with density as given by the inverse of the land 
consumption by each household, ( )j xλ : 
1
0
1( )
( )j j
I x I
x
γ
λ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                              
(11)                        
where 0I normalizes the units of measurement. The total amount of investments mobilized in 
infrastructure in the j-agglomeration, jIC , is then given by: 
1
0
0
0
2.12
1
jd
j
j
j j
dIIC I dx
x
γ γξ
ξ γλ λ γξ
−⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠∫                                           (12)                        
The total of investments at the national level, DI, is in turn defined by the sum of investments 
over all agglomerations 
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(13) 
These investments are financed by the government, and ultimately affect households’ income 
by reducing public transfers. 
(d) Finally, the relocation of production among agglomerations of different productivities lj 
implies changes in the average productivity at the national level. The relative change in 
productivity l
l
Δ  resulting from firms’ migration decisions is given by: 
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II. Consistent urban trends behind the macrodynamics of the baseline 
scenario 
In absence of climate policy, demographic trends in OECD countries feature a small decrease 
of total population over 2010-2100 (from 1.15 to 1.07 Billion persons), but productivity gains 
are sufficient to ensure a steady increase of economic activity at an average growth rate of 
1.34% over 2010-2100. Total primary energy demand increases from 5.94 GTep in 2010 to 
7.45GTep in 2100, this rather moderate increase being permitted by annual energy efficiency 
gains of 1.08%. This period is marked by the depletion of oil reserves, which results in a 
sharp increase of oil prices (Figure 6.2(a)) and a progressive switch in the energy mix towards 
coal, which is the more abundant fossil energy, and renewable energies (Figure 6.2(b)). In this 
scenario, OECD carbon emissions increase from 15.5GtCO2 in 2010 to 21.5GtCO2 in 2100 in 
parallel with the diffusion of coal liquefaction as the major substitute to oil for liquid fuel 
production in the second half of the century.   
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Figure 6.2: (a) World oil price ($/Barrel) and (b) Primary energy demand (Gtoe) 
 
The coupled model allows giving the urbanization trends that are consistent with the above 
described macroeconomic trends in each of the four OECD regions (USA, Canada, Europe, 
OECD Pacific). In a given region, the distribution of production between the major urban 
agglomerations and the “rural area” (which encompasses small and medium-size cities and 
dispersed settlements) is driven by firms’ migration decisions and triggered by differences of 
attractiveness for productive investments. These endogenous mechanisms ultimately 
determine the redistribution of population between the “rural area” and the largest 
agglomerations, as summarized by the share of total population that resides in the major 
agglomerations (Table 6.1).  
Table 6.1: Share of total population in the largest urban agglomerations (%) 
 2010 2020 2030 2050 2100 
USA 39.1 39.4 39.0 37.3 34.4 
CANADA 36.5 35.6 34.8 32.2 31.7 
EUROPE 25.2 24.7 24.4 22.9 22.3 
OECD PACIFIC 51.2 49.5 48.5 45.4 41.1 
 
To interpret correctly this indicator, two points are worth noting. First, its absolute value 
depends on the range of agglomerations adopted in this study, which correspond to those with 
more than 1 Million habitants at the base year. The importance of those agglomerations in 
total population strongly varies across regions, as captured by differences in the initial share 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
World Oil price ($/Barrel)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Total OECD Primary energy demand, by fuel 
(in GToe)
Renewables
Nuclear
Hydro
Natural Gas
Oil
Coal
232 
 
of “urban” population, from 25% in Europe to 51% in OECD Pacific. Second, the decreasing 
trend of the share does not necessary reflect massive migrations towards rural zones, but 
rather a redispersion of population towards smaller urban units. 
Changes in the distribution of production among agglomerations also drive the evolution of 
population living in each location, since households constitute the working force that is 
necessary to ensure local production. This relation between production and population is even 
more direct under the assumption that all households must live in the very agglomeration 
where they have their work. To characterize the spatial distribution of population within 
agglomerations, we consider the average urban density and average urban land price (Figure 
6.3).3  
Figure 6.3: (a) City density and (b) Urban land price 
 
 
The general urban trends are logically similar in all regions, as a reaction to energy price 
variations and efficiency gains. The first half of the century features a stabilization of density 
at a slightly higher level than at its base year level as a consequence of energy price increases 
affecting transport costs and hence fostering denser settlements and an increase of urban land 
prices. After 2050, the diffusion of coal-to-liquid as an abundant substitute to oil helps 
maintaining a moderate price of liquid fuels despite the rise of oil prices and the cumulative 
effect of energy efficiency gains is sufficient to ensure a decrease of unitary commuting costs. 
This fosters urban sprawl and a moderation of urban land prices in more dispersed 
settlements.  
                                                     
3The average value is calculated as a weighted mean of the values over all agglomerations, in each OECD 
region. 
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III- Climate policy and urban systems 
We now turn to the implementation of an ambitious climate policy modeled, for the sake of 
simplicity, by a prescribed path for carbon emissions (Figure 6.4(a)). The targeted emission 
trajectory is chosen in category II of IPCC scenarios corresponding to a stabilization target of 
440-485 ppm CO2: global CO2 emissions peak in 2017 and are decreased by 20% and 60% 
with respect of 2000 level in 2050 and 2100, respectively (IPCC, 2007, Table SPM5). The 
model endogenously calculates the carbon tax to be imposed at each point in time to satisfy 
this emissions trajectory (Figure 6.4(b)). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the carbon 
tax is uniform across sectors, households and regions and exclude international redistribution 
of tax revenues.  
Figure 6.4: (a) CO2 emissions in the baseline and climate policy scenarios (G tCO2); (b) Carbon price ($/tCO2). 
 
Three phases of carbon price dynamics can be identified (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 
discussion). In the short-term, the carbon price increases rather sharply and reaches 
100$/tCO2 around 2030, because of the necessity to give a strong early signal to trigger 
emission reductions despite inertias on the renewal of technical systems and imperfect 
foresight. In the medium-term (2030-2060), the carbon price tends to decline, since carbon 
prices above 50$/tCO2 are sufficient to reach most of mitigation potentials in industry, 
residential and power sectors, which form the core of emission reductions. In the long-term, 
the carbon price features a sharp increase in order to reach the remaining high-cost mitigation 
potentials (especially in the transport sector).4  
 
 
                                                     
4 Note that this effect is even more pronounced, since we have adopted conservative assumptions on the 
diffusion of oil substitutes, like biofuels and Electric Vehicles. The sensitivity of the costs of the climate policy 
on these assumptions and a more in-depth analysis of the three phases of mitigation costs are given in Chapter 3 
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Figure 6.5: (a) World oil demand (MBarrel/day); (b) World oil price ($/barrel) 
 
The climate policy affects oil markets through an acceleration of oil-free technical change in 
the short-term and a reduction of the long-term dependence on oil (Figure 6.5(a)). This means 
in particular that the climate policy makes oil-importing economies less vulnerable to oil 
disruptions as captured by continuously lower oil prices than in the baseline case until 2050 
(Figure 6.5(b)).5 The long-term difference is particularly pronounced with complete 
divergence of price trajectories during the final phase of oil depletion (after 2060, total 
production is lower than 50 MBarrel/day). The high long-term oil prices in the baseline case 
are the symptom of an economy that remains rather dependent on oil and is then affected by 
the decrease of production capacities. On the contrary, under climate policy, cumulated low-
fossil technical change permits a lower dependence on oil, as measured by a 45% lower 
demand in 2100 than in the baseline case, so that supply capacities remain sufficient and 
depletion constraints are not binding. 
These changes affect urban dynamics through their effect on the cost of mobility in urban 
areas, as measured by the variations of unitary commuting costs (per km) due to the climate 
policy (Figure 6.6(a)). Until 2050, this variable remains rather close to its baseline levels, 
reflecting a moderate increase of the price of liquid fuels, since the additional carbon cost is 
partially compensated by the lowering of oil prices. During the second half of the century, 
unitary commuting costs are notably increased by the climate policy because of the 
concomitance of (i) a stagnation of long-term productivity and efficiency gains on vehicles 
and (ii) a sharp rise of carbon prices triggering high liquid fuel cost6. The increase of unitary 
commuting costs acts as an incentive for limiting the dependence on transport and hence 
                                                     
5 (Rozenberg et al, 2010) investigates more in-depth this effect, and Chapter 2 analyzes the consequences of 
these adverse effects of the climate policy from oil exporters’ point of view. 
6 liquid fuels production remains dependent on fossil energy, since one important substitute to oil is coal 
liquefaction, an even more-carbon intensive source of energy 
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adopting denser urban centers, as captured by the increase of average urban density (Figure 
6.6(b)).   
Figure 6.6: Variations under climate policy of (a) the unitary commuting cost; (b) the urban density. 
 
This densification process supposes a redirection of investments towards the infrastructure 
sector, which receives an annual average of 12 additional Billion$ to support the cost of 
capital-intensive investments in dense centers (high buildings, dense public transport).  Since 
competition for land is more intense in denser settlements, the densification process fostered 
by the climate policy goes along with a rise of land prices (Figure 6.7). This effect is 
particularly important in the second half of the century, with a 30-50% rise of land prices in 
2100.  
Figure 6.7: Variations of urban land price under climate policy 
 
The global economic effects of the climate policy on the production side are measured by 
GDP changes (Figure 6.8(a)), whereas surplus variations7 capture the welfare effects on 
                                                     
7 The surplus variations measure the amount of money that should be given to leave households’ utility identical 
in the two scenarios (see discussion in Chapters 1 and 2). Note that the surplus variations in Figure 6.8(b) are 
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households (Figure 6.8(b)). In line with the above analysis of the three phases of carbon 
prices, we obtain significant short-term economic and welfare losses, a medium-term partial 
GDP recovery during which households catch-up their baseline utility level and a final drop 
of economic and welfare indicators. 
Figure 6.8: Variations under climate policy of (a) OECD GDP (%); and (b) OECD Surplus (Billion$). 
 
IV- The contribution of urban planning to climate policy  
The above analysis demonstrates that the economic and welfare costs due to a climate policy 
remain important if it relies essentially on the implementation of a carbon price, especially 
after 2060. This section considers a broader architecture, in which this global approach is 
complemented by more local measures aimed at anticipating the increase of commuting costs 
fostering urban densification under climate policy. More specifically, we consider policies 
that consist in mobilizing investments for urban infrastructures in order to accelerate the 
changes towards more appropriate denser urban structures in a climate policy context. We 
consider that, after progressively entering in force, the total amount of annual investments 
(deducted from governments’ budgets) reaches 0.1% of OECD GDP and serves to accelerate 
the densification of urban areas.  
This urban policy decreases the dependence on mobility, and then contributes to decrease 
carbon emission from the transport sector by 0.1 GtCO2 in 2100 (Figure 6.9). The reductions 
of carbon emissions essentially come from the automobile sector, which is the dominant 
commuting mode and hence the more affected by the changes of urban structures. More 
indirectly, the denser agglomerations offer more importance to public transport and hence a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
calculated under the assumption that housing goods are incorporated in a composite aggregate and hence treated 
like any other good. This approach neglects some specificity of housing goods in households’ utility due to their 
limited substituability with consumption goods and the strong inertia constraints on the supply-side, notably due 
to urban infrastructure dynamics.  
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rebound of its emissions, while the promotion of low-speed modes affects indirectly air 
transport activity through the time budget constraint. 
Figure 6.9: Variations under urban policy of  transport CO2 emissions 
 
To investigate more in-depth the variations of carbon emissions from the automobile sector, 
we perform a ‘Kaya’ decomposition in order to identify the relative roles of mobility demand 
(in p-km), vehicles’ energy intensity (in l/km) and the carbon content of fuels (in gCO2/km): 
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Figure 6.10:(a) Kaya decomposition of the automobile sector;(b) variations of world oil price under urban 
policy 
 
Figure 6.10(a) shows relative variations of the three components of the Kaya identity when 
the urban policy is set in place. Expectedly, the major impact of the urban policy occurs 
through a reduction of the total volume of transport (measured in passenger-km) due to a 
decrease in average commuting distance by individuals in denser agglomerations (up to 14% 
reduction in 2100). However, indirect effects also simultaneously occur that affect carbon 
intensity and vehicle unitary fuel consumption in the long run. In particular, the decrease of 
liquid fuel demand due to lower commuting distances endogenously generates a fall of liquid 
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fuel prices (Figure 6.10(b)). This drop in turn slows down technical change towards more 
energy-efficient vehicles, and automobile vehicles are 1.1% less efficient in 2100 under urban 
policy. 
The 0.1 GtCO2 represent 8% of total emission reductions in the transport sector at this time 
horizon under climate policy and the urban policy then facilitates the climate policy, as 
captured by a relative decrease of the carbon tax to be imposed for the same stabilization 
objective (Figure 6.11a). However, this direct effect of the urban policy on carbon emissions 
remains moderate with regard to the global effort. This is confirmed by the analysis of global 
economic activity, which features a moderate increase of GDP with respect to the “carbon 
price only” policy (up to 0.2% in 2100), especially when compared to the total mitigation 
costs (-3.7% in 2100) (Figure 6.11b). 
Figure 6.11: Variations under urban policy of (a) carbon price ($/tCO2); (b) OECD GDP (%)  
 
This evaluation changes when considering surplus variations (Figure 6.12): the 
implementation of urban policy helps reducing OECD surplus losses by 18% in 2100, with a 
notable effect from 2050.  
Figure 6.12: OECD Surplus variations under climate policy (Billion $) 
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The magnitude of this effect can be understood because of the interplay between urban 
dynamics and constrained mobility associated to daily commuting, which acts as a crucial 
constraint for households and undermines their purchase power. In a context of climate policy 
fostering high fuel costs, this constrained mobility is particularly expensive and explains the 
important welfare losses in the long-term. Under additional infrastructure investments 
towards, denser urban settlements reduce this constrained mobility and promote low-cost 
public transport modes, hence easing the burden imposed by mobility needs on households’ 
income and ultimately improving their purchase power.  
 
V- Carbon price, oil price, land price: the drivers of macroeconomic costs  
Here, we synthesize the results obtained in section III and IV, which correspond to different 
architectures of climate policies, where carbon pricing is either the only policy adopted for 
carbon emissions reductions or is complemented by local urban infrastructure policies. Our 
analysis demonstrates that these two architectures correspond to different sets of 
carbon/oil/land prices with different effects on the cost of climate policies. To represent the 
OECD tradeoffs at different time horizons, we synthesize the results for two discount rate 
values, 7% representing short-sighted decisions and 1% long-term focused approaches (Table 
6.2). 8 
Unsurprisingly, urban policies have hardly any effect in the short-term (discount rate 7%), 
because of inertias on the deployment of infrastructures. Considering a 1% discount rate, the 
set of prices is modified by the implementation of the urban policy, which fosters a 2% 
decrease of carbon and oil prices versus a 13% increase of urban land prices. This latter trend 
is associated with denser settlements, which foster a reduction of mobility constraints. These 
changes have limited effect on GDP losses but affect importantly surplus losses, which are 
reduced by 20% for the same stabilization objective.  
 
 
                                                     
8 These values of the discount rates are adopted to provide an appraisal of economic effects at different time 
horizons. A 7% value boils down to considering essentially the effects during the first 20 years  (the weighting 
factor is lower than 0.25 for all years after 2030); on the contrary, with a 1% discount rate, one “sees” the 
trajectory over the whole period 2010-2100 since the weighting factor is always higher than 0.4 even in 2100. 
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Table 6.2: Economic and welfare indicators under different climate policy architectures 
 
discount rate = 7% discount rate = 1% 
carbon 
price only 
carbon price & 
urban policy 
carbon 
price only 
carbon price & 
urban policy 
Carbon price 
($/tCO2) 
56.2 55.8 225.0 219.8 
Oil price  
($/Barrel) 
69.4 69.2 61.2 60.0 
Land price 
(index 1 =baseline) 
1.31 1.37 1.70 1.93 
GDP variations  
(Trillion $) 
- 6.24 - 6.23 - 68.9 - 67.5 
Aggregate surplus 
variations (Trillion $) - 4.27 - 4.20 - 39.1 - 31.1 
 
 
 VI- Conclusion  
This paper has presented an innovative modeling framework for a consistent analysis of the 
feedback mechanisms between urban, regional (country) and global (world) economies in the 
context of climate change. This is done by embarking a model of urban systems 
disaggregating production, consumption and trade among multiple cities into the recursive 
dynamic, computable general-equilibrium model IMACLIM-R. This offers an innovative 
framework, which differs from earlier work by allowing a spatially disaggregated 
investigation instead of the global approach conventionally adopted for climate policy 
analysis. 
This model is used to analyze the effects of macroeconomic trends, oil price trajectories and 
technical change on the long-term dynamics of urban systems. We demonstrate in particular 
that the rise of energy prices increases commuting costs in urban areas and hence fosters a 
urban densification process during the next decades, whereas the diffusion of energy 
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efficiency decreases the commuting costs and favors a dispersion of urban settlements in the 
long term. When a climate policy is adopted, the higher cost of fossil fuels triggers a 
densification process in urban areas, which tend to increase the welfare losses due to the 
climate policy.  
We finally test the implementation of explicit policies at the urban scale, in the form of 
investments devoted to improve the compatibility of urban systems to the climate policy. 
These urban policies prove to reduce the cost of climate policy by facilitating the decrease of 
transport-related carbon emissions, but have the indirect effect of forcing further densification 
with losses of housing welfare. The overall effect however remains positive and such local 
policy adopted at the urban scale ensures a 20% decrease of welfare losses. Here, it is worth 
recalling that the magnitude of the effects can be undestood as a lower bound since (i) the 
urban policies envisaged involve only OECD agglomerations at the exclusion of major urban 
cities in the developing world and (ii) the amount of investments devoted to these policies is 
limited to 0.1% of OECD GDP 
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This thesis contributes to the on-going effort of assessment of the consequences of climate 
policies in support to political negotiations towards a climate agreement. It is more 
particularly focused on the constraints imposed by scarce natural resources, which are mostly 
ignored by existing analyses but play a crucial role in the context of climate policies. This is 
particularly true for oil and urban land use, which are both crucial drivers of emissions from 
the transport sector. As noted in the introduction, the effect of accounting for the limitations 
imposed by these natural resources is a priori ambiguous since it suggests both the risk of 
enhanced costs if carbon limitations reinforce the sub-optimalities caused by pre-existing 
constraints, but also, conversely, the possibility of co-benefits if the climate policy helps to 
correct some pre-existing imperfections.  
The answers to these questions are built upon the elaboration of a modeling framework able to 
capture the specificities of oil and urban land uses and their interplay with global 
macroeconomic interactions. This has been done through the coupling of the general 
equilibrium framework IMACLIM, designed to represent energy-economy interactions for 
climate measures assessment, with two innovative models capturing the determinants of oil 
supply constraints and location decisions among a system of cities in interaction: 
• The model of oil supply constraints accounts for geological, geopolitical and 
economic constraints on the deployment of oil production capacities. This is done by 
representing explictly different categories of oil, distinguished by their cost of 
exploration/exploitation, and by imposing, for each of them, a yearly maximum rate 
of increase capturing depletion constraints. Non-Middle East producers deploy all 
production capacities that are profitable given selling price at their maximum rate, 
whereas Middle-East producers can adapt freely their production capacities within 
these limits in function of their price objective. 
• The model of urban agglomerations in interaction represents location decisions 
among a system of several agglomerations and within urban areas in function of 
economic tradeoffs. The agglomerations are in interaction through interregional trade 
and firms’ migration decisions which can decide to move from one location to 
another according to profitability prospects. Households’ location decisions within 
urban areas result from a tradeoff between commuting and housing costs, in astylized 
vision of a monocentric, axysymmetric city. 
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Our findings can be summarized in three points: 
• The date of Peak Oil is sensitive to short-term oil price only in case of high reserves 
but this date is not necessarily informative for the time profiles of oil prices, rent 
formation and growth patterns. In particular, inertia and imperfect foresight create the 
possibility of a sudden and potentially long lasting acceleration of oil price increases at 
the Peak Oil Period. This effect is amplified if the economy is very oil-dependent like 
after long periods of low energy prices and creates the possibility of an important 
economic crisis. On the contrary, low oil price in the short-term may be in the interests 
of oil producers bacause it fosters a steady increase of exportation revenues over the 
long term in absence of climate policy 
• The macroeconomic losses due to a climate policy for major oil exporters are rather 
important in the short term but moderate in the long term. Despite significant 
reductions of long-term exportation revenues, structural readjustment towards local 
industrialisation instead of oil exportations proves benefitial in the long-term in a 
formalization of the “Dutch Disease” mechanisms. At the global level, the cost of 
climate policies is driven by the ratio energy-to-labor costs, which measures the 
energy intensity of the economy. Technical inertias under imperfect foresight and 
reduced vulnerability to Peak Oil (energy security effect) explain the important short-
term losses and the medium-term partial recovery. At a long term horizon, the major 
driver is the mitigation potentials in the transport sector, either through low-carbon 
options or reduced mobility needs through spatial reorganisation. 
• Location decisions depend on a tradeoff between centripetal forces fostering 
agglomeration (market size, diversity of goods, economies of scale) and centrifugal 
forces fostering dispersion of activities (congestion, environmental pollution). 
Empirically, urban dynamic trends are well reproduced when assuming that firms’ 
relocation decisions are driven by the return to capital. Urban infrastructure policies 
aimed at controlling urban mobility through spatial reorganisation have almost no 
effect as a complementary measure to carbon pricing in the short term because of 
inertias on the deployment of infrastructures. In the long-term, on the contrary, they 
help to reduce significantly the welfare costs of climate policies thanks to lower 
carbon and energy prices but this comes at the cost of an increase of urban land prices. 
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These analyses suggest some policy messages on important dimensions of climate 
negotiations: 
• Oil-importing economies are vulnerable to Peak Oil and face the risk of a deep crisis if 
the oil dependency is not reduced significantly. It may thus be in their interest to 
correct potentially misleading price-signals by using complementary measures to 
secure steady technical change. Among them, climate policies help to soften the cost 
of the oil transition by accelerating fossil-free technical change and can act as a 
hedging strategy against the uncertainty on oil supply. 
• The monetary compensations to oil exporters for the adverse impacts of climate 
policies are unacceptable if based on losses of oil exportation revenues, but they 
become more debatable if losses of economic activity are considered. Indeed, in this 
latter case, the transfers pass through a peak but then decline over time to be almost 
zero in 2050. 
• In the short-term, the curbing of carbon emissions make necessary a steep increase of 
the carbon price signal to accelerate technical change depsite inertias and imperfect 
expectations. This causes important transitory losses, especially in developing regions, 
if implemented with a carbon tax and lump-sum recycling. This calls for the adoption 
of complementary measures on labor market to soften this transition through, e.g., 
carbon revenue recycling  
• Over the long run, the major issue concerns the transport sector and important losses 
may be experienced in the pessimistic case of low availability of carbon-free vehicles 
(like Electric Vehicles) and continuation of current trends in terms of mobility. 
Because of the weak sensitivity of the transport activity to energy price signals, this 
highlights the importance of complementary policies to carbon pricing designed to 
tackle transport-related emissions through a combination of incentives for technical 
progress on vehicles and changes in the spatial organization helping to reduce mobility 
needs. 
• Urban policies adopted in climate policy frameworks to limit the increase of 
constrained mobility need have indirect effect on investment availability (crowding-
out effects), energy prices and urban land prices, which are essential to provide a 
complete assessment of the desirability of such measures. The analysis proves that, 
when taking into accoutnall these effects, a moderate mobilization of investments for 
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specific urban policies (around 0.1% of GDP) helps to significantly reduce the long-
term welfare losses  
 
The modeling framework developed in this thesis constitutes a methodological advancement 
that allows widening the discussions about climate policy to the investigation of issues raised 
by urban dimensions under carbon constraints. This work opens the way for further research 
in echo with modeling developments aimed at improving the representation of some specific 
aspects of the three spatial scales in interaction:  
• At the local scale, the priority will be to improve the representation of urban 
infrastructure to reach a more precise description of location decisions and transport 
choices than with the current stylized description of a monocentric city. This means in 
particular representing the possibility of polycentric settlements and explicit modal 
choice for constrained mobility in line with available transport infrastructures. 
• At the regional scale, the major limitation of inter-city interactions concerns the 
description of trade barriers, which are currently modeled with a ‘iceberg’ structure 
instead of an explicit transport sector. To overcome this shortcoming, the model will 
be extended to represent exlicitly freight transport associated with the spatail 
organization of economic activity and populations, as well as inter-agglomeration 
passenger mobility. 
• At the global scale, the major advancement to be undertaken concerns the 
representation of macroeoconomic effects associated with the circulation of land rents 
in terms of investments. This means in particular relaxing the conventional assumption 
of equilibrated balance of payments to consider alternative assumptions on 
governments’ budget and international capital flows. This means also revisiting the 
way investments are allocated among sectors to represent the possibility of positive 
effects permitted by rent captation, which could help redirecting investment towards 
more efficient uses compared to the options adopted by rent-seekers. 
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Annex A 
 
This technical appendix complements the descriptions of the IMACLIM-R model used in 
Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6 by providing detailed information on modeling assumptions in the 
static equilibrium (section I), on the Nexus describing technical change in the energy sector 
(section II), on data defining the calibration date and ‘natural’ growth drivers (Section III), the 
regional and sectoral disaggregation (Section IV). In Section V, we discuss the assumptions 
and calculations supporting the analytical analysis of the drivers of mitigation costs used in 
Chapter 3. 
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I- Variables, parameters and equations of the static equilibrium 
We distinguish between endogenous variables (marked in bold) and fixed parameters of the 
static equilibrium at date t. For the sake of readability, indexes i and j are used for sectors, and 
index k is reserved for regions 
1. Table of variables  
Table A-1 details the list of variables calculated by the static equilibrium.  
Table A-1: Variables of the static equilibrium. 
Incomek Households’ total revenues in region k 
transfersk Transfers from States to households in region k 
pk,i Production price of good i in region k 
pCk,i Final consumption price for households for good i in region k 
pGk,i Final consumption price for States for good i in region k 
pIk,i Price for investments for good i in region k 
pICj,i,k Intermediate consumption price for sector i for good j in region k 
pindk Households final consumption price index in region k 
wpi International price of good i 
,
imp
k ip  Import price of good i in region k 
wk,i Unitary salary in sector i in region k 
Ωk,i Increasing cost factor in sector i in region k 
Qk,i Volume of production of good i in region k 
Ck,i Households final consumption volume of good i in region k  
Sk,mobility Households’ demand for mobility services 
pkmk,mode Passengers.kilometers travelled per mode (air transport, public transport, 
private vehicle, non motorized mode) in region k 
Ik,i Volume of good i purchased for Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(Investment) in region k 
zk Unemployment level in region k 
Mk,i  Volume of imports of good i in region k 
Xk,i Volume of exports of good i from region k 
Xi Volume of the international market of good i 
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Table A-1(continued): Variables of the static equilibrium. 
,
X
k iMS  Market share of exports from region k in the international market of good i 
/
,
imp dom
k ishareC  Imports (/Domestic production) share in households final consumption of 
good i in region k  
/
,
imp dom
k ishareG  Imports (/Domestic production) share in States final consumption of good i 
in region k 
/
,
imp dom
k ishareI  Imports (/Domestic production) share in investments of good i in region k 
/
,
imp dom
k ishareIC  Imports (/Domestic production) share in sector i intermediate consumption 
of good j in region k 
NRBk Net regional savings of region k 
GRBk Gross regional savings of region k 
InvFink,i Investment allocated to sector i in region k 
pCapk,i Price of one unit of productive capital in sector i and region k 
ΔCapk,i New productive capital in sector i and region k 
 
 
2- Table of parameters 
Table A-2 details the parameters, which are fixed in each static equilibrium and are modified 
in the recursive framework by dynamic modules 
 
Table A-2: Parameters of the static equilibria. 
Gk,i States final consumption of good i in region k 
ICj,i,k Sector i intermediate consumption of good i in region k 
Lk Total active population in region k 
lk,i Quantity of labour per unit of output in sector i in region k 
awk,i Wage curve parameter for sector i in region k 
πk,i Markup rate in sector i in region k 
ptck Households propensity to spend (one minus saving rate) in region k 
divk,i Share of profits in sector i in region k given as revenues to households 
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Table A-2(continued): Parameters of the static equilibria. 
bnk,i Basic need of consumption of good i in region k 
,
cars
k Eiα  Mean consumption of energy Ei per passenger.kilometer by car in region k 
2
,
m
k Eiα  Mean consumption of energy Ei per square meter of residential buildings in 
region k 
Tdispk Total households travel time in region k 
Capk,i Productive capacity of sector i in region k 
Captransportk,j Total capacity of transport mode j in region k 
,
w
k itax  Labour tax rate in sector i in region k 
,
M
k itax  Tax rate on imports of good i in region k 
,
X
k itax  Tax rate on exports of good i from region k 
,
domC
k itax  Tax rate on households final consumption of domestic production of good i 
in region k 
,
impC
k itax  Tax rate on households final consumption of imports of good i in region k 
shareExpKk Share of gross regional savings of region k exported to the international 
‘pool’ of capital 
shareImpKk Share of the international ‘pool’ of capital imported in region k 
shareInvFink,i Share of net regional savings of region k allocated to sector i 
βj,i,k Quantity of good j necessary to build one unit of productive capacity of 
sector i in region k 
,
it
k init  Transport need in mode it for imports of good i in region k 
,
C
k iξ , ,Sk iξ  Parameters of the utility function 
bk,mode Calibration parameters for the constant elasticity of substitution function 
giving the transport service in function of passengers.kilometers per mode 
in region k 
ηk 1s
s
η −= , with s the elasticity of substitution of the function giving the 
transport service in function of passengers.kilometers per mode in region k 
wrefk,i Salaries at calibration date in sector i in region k 
pindrefk Households final consumption price index in region k at calibration date 
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Table A-2(continued): Parameters of the static equilibria. 
zrefk Underutilization of the labour force at the calibration date for region k 
ρk,i 1 σρ σ
−=  
σk,i Armington elasticity for good i in region k 
bdom, bimp Calibration parameters for Armington expression for good i in region k 
θi 1 λθ λ
−=  
λi Armington elasticity in the international market for good i 
ψk,i Calibration parameter for Armington expression for exports of good i from 
region k in the international market ‘pool’ 
,
imp
k iη  Parameter for the expression of the imports (/Domestic production) share in 
households final consumption of good i in region k 
,
X
k iη  Parameter for the expression of the market share of exports from region k in 
the international market of good i 
 
3. Core equations of the static equilibrium 
Income formation 
, , ,
  
k i k i k i
sectors i sectors i
l div π= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +∑ ∑k k,i k,i k,i k,i k,i kIncome Ω w Q p Q transfers
     
(1) 
Governments’ budget 
,
 
k i k
sectors i
G InvInfra= ⋅ + +∑ ∑ k,i ktaxes pG transfers  
The sum of taxes corresponds to the total of tax revenues, i.e. the tax rates (parameters) 
applied to the taxable amounts (often endogenous in the equilibrium). 
Utility maximisation  
( ) ( ) ( ) ,,, ,
goods 
,
SC
k jk i
k i k mobility
i
bn bn
ξξ⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦Πk k k k,i k,mobilityU C S C S
r r
                   
(2) 
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, , , ,
kk k k k
1
k air k public k cars k nonmotorizedb b b b
ηη η η η⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
k,publick,air k,cars k,nonmotorized
k,mobility
pkmpkm pkm pkm
S
 
(3) 
 
Income constraint 
( )² ², ,
  
cars m m
k k k Ei k k Ei
sectors i Energies Ei
ptc Sα α⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅∑ ∑ carsk,i k,i k,Ei kIncome pC C pC pkm
   
(4) 
Travel time budget constraint 
,
means of transport j ,0
k k j
k j
uTdisp du
Captransport
τ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∫
k,jpkm
 
,            (5) 
where τj represents the marginal efficiency in transport time (the time necessary to travel an 
additional passenger.kilometer with mode j) :  
,
, , ,( ) k j
ktrans
k j k j k jx a x bτ = ⋅ + .                                (6) 
The first order conditions give N+S equations, with N the number of consumption goods and 
S the number of mobility services, and add two unknowns, the Lagrange multipliers for both 
constraints. 
Sector budget (supply curve) 
( ), , , , ,
 
(1 )wj i k k i k i k i
sectors j
IC l tax π⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅∑k,i j,i,k k,i k,i k,ip = pIC Ω w p
                  
(7) 
k,i
Ω
Cap
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
k,i
k,i
Q
Ω represents an increasing cost (or decreasing returns) function of the 
productive capacities utilisation rate. The functional form for Ω  is:  
tanh 1 Qa b c
CapΩ Ω Ω
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − ⋅ ⋅ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠k,i
Ω
                  
(8) 
 
 
262 
 
Labor market (wage curve) 
,
 1
k i
sectors i
k
l
L
⋅
= −
∑ k,i
k
Q
z
                                    
(9) 
 
,
,
k i
k i
k k
wref
aw f
pindref zref
⎛ ⎞= ⋅ ⋅ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
k,i k
k
w z
pind                             
(10) 
 
Equilibrium constraints on physical flows 
, ,[ ]
imp
k,i i j k
sectors j
G IC= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅∑imp imp imp impk,i k,i k,i k,i k,i k,i k,j i,j,kM shareC C shareG shareI I Q shareIC
 
(11) 
, ,[ ]k,i i j k
sectors j
G IC= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ +∑dom dom dom domk,i k,i k,i k,i k,i k,i k,j i,j,k k,iQ shareC C shareG shareI I Q shareIC X
 
(12) 
 
 
Investment formation 
'
 '
( )k k k
countries k
1- shareExpK shareExpK shareImpK⎛ ⎞= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑k k k'NRB GRB GRB (13) 
 
( ) ( ), ,
 
1k k j k j
sectors j
1- ptc divπ= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −∑k k k,j k,jGRB Income p Q
         
(14) 
 
          k,ishareInvFin= ⋅k,i kInvFin NRB                             (15) 
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( ), ,
 
j i k
sectors j
β= ⋅∑k,i j,i,kpCap pI
                                      
(16) 
 
= k,ik,i
k,i
InvFin
ΔCap
pCap                                          
(17) 
 
, ,
sectors 
j i k
i
β= ⋅∑k,j k,iI ΔCap
                                       
(18) 
4. Intermediate variables for international trade 
 
Armington goods 
( ) ( )( ), , ,1, ,k i k i k idom impk i k ib bρ ρ ρ−− −= ⋅ + ⋅dom impk,i k,i k,iC C C
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Similar equations to (-19)–(-22) are valid for public consumptions, investments and 
intermediate consumptions. 
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( ) ( )1= −dom impk,i k,ishareC t shareC t                                    (30) 
 
Similar equations to (27)–(30) are valid for public consumptions, investments and 
intermediate consumptions. 
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II- The dynamic modules of IMACLIM-R 
 
The purpose of this section is to describe the NEXUS of Imaclim-R, which determine 
technical change through the evolution of production costs and end-use equipments. We start 
by describing the evolution of the constraints on fossil fuel production (oil, coal, gas) before 
turning to energy transformation (liquid fuels and electricity). Finally, we turn our attention to 
the technical coefficients driving final energy consumption in both stationary uses (industry 
and residential uses) and non-stationary uses (freight and passenger transportation).  
 
1 Modelling primary supply of fossil fuels 
 
1.1 Oil supply 
 
The ‘oil supply’ Nexus embarks three crucial specificities of oil supply: 
(a) a small group of suppliers benefits from a market power. 
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(b) the geological nature of oil reserves imposes a limited adaptability of oil supply.  
(c) uncertainties on the technical, geopolitical and economical determinants of oil markets 
alter agents' expectations. The assumption of perfectly optimizing atomistic agents, which 
remains a useful analytical benchmark, fails to provide a good proxy for the oil economy. 
 
We distinguish seven categories of conventional and five categories of non-conventional oil 
resources in each region. Each category i is characterized by the amount of ultimate 
resources1 ,iQ∞  and by a threshold selling price above which producers initiate production,
(0) ( )p i . This price is a proxy for production costs and accessibility.  
Each oil category is submitted to geological constraints (inertias in the exploration process 
and depletion effects), which limit the pace of expansion of their production capacity. In line 
with (Rehrl and Friedrich, 2006), who combine analyzes of discovery processes (Uhler, 1976) 
and of the “mineral economy” (Reynolds, 1999), we impose, at each date t, an upper bound 
max ( , )Cap t iΔ  on the increase of production capacity for an oil category i : 
   
( )
( )
0,
0,
( )
max
( )
. 1( , )
( , ) 1
i i
i i
b t t
i
b t t
b eCap t i
Cap t i e
− −
− −
−Δ = +                                             (36) 
The parameter bi (in t-1) controls the intensity of constraints on production growth: a all (high) 
bi means a flat (sloping) production profile to represent slow (fast) deployment of production 
capacities. The parameter t0,i represents the date at which production capacities of the 
concerned oil category are expected to start their decline due to depletion effects. It is 
endogenous and varies in time since it depends on the amount of oil remaining in the soil 
given past exploitation decisions. 
The production decisions of non-Middle-East producers are those of ‘fatal producers’ who do 
not act strategically on oil markets and invest in new production capacity if an oil category 
becomes profitable given the selling oil price oilp . They develop production capacities at their 
maximum rate of increase in eq (1) for least-cost categories ( (0) ( )oilp p i> ) but stop 
investments in high-cost categories ( (0) ( )oilp p i< ). If prices continuously increase, production 
capacities of a given oil category follow a bell-shape trend, whereas their deployment profile 
passes through a plateau if prices decrease below the profitability threshold.  
                                                     
1 Ultimate resource of a given category is the sum of resources extracted before 2001 and recoverable resources. 
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Middle-East producers are ‘swing producers’ who fill the gap between fatal producers’ supply 
and global oil demand. The stagnation and decline of conventional oil in the rest of the world 
temporarily reinforces their market power and they can control the time profile of oil prices 
through the utilization rate of production capacities (Kaufmann et al, 2004). They can decide 
to slow the development of production capacities down (below the maximum increase given 
by eq (1)) in order to adjust the oil price according to their rent-seeking objective. 
Total oil production capacity at date t is given by the sum over oil categories with different 
production costs (captured by different (0) ( )p i  threshold). This means that projects of various 
merit orders coexist at a given point in time, consistently with the observed evidence2 and 
theoretical justifications3. 
 
1.2 Gas supply 
 
The evolution of worldwide natural gas production capacities meets demand increase until 
available reserves enter a depletion process. Distribution of regional production capacities in 
the ‘gas supply’ Nexus is made using an exogenous distribution key calibrated on the output 
of the POLES energy model (LEPII-EPE, 2006), which captures reserve availability and 
regional production facilities. Gas markets follow oil markets with a 0.68 elasticity of gas to 
oil price. This behavior is calibrated on the World Energy Model (IEA, 2007) and is valid as 
long as oil prices remain below a threshold poil/gas. At high price levels reflecting tensions due 
to depletion of reserves, gas prices are driven by production costs and the increased margin 
for the possessors of the remaining reserves. 
 
1.3  Coal markets  
Unlike oil and gas markets, cumulated coal production has a weak influence on coal prices 
because of large world resources. Coal prices then depend on current production through 
elasticity coefficients. To represent the asymmetry in coal price response to production 
variations, we consider two different values of this elasticity, η+coal and η-coal , the former 
(latter) corresponding to a price reaction to a production increase (decrease). Tight coal 
                                                     
2for example, low-cost fields in Saudi Arabia and high-cost non-conventional production in Canada are 
simultaneously active on oil markets 
3(Kemp and Van Long, 1980) have indeed demonstrated that, in a general equilibrium context, the lowest-cost 
deposits are not necessarily exploited first. (Holland, 2003) even demonstrates that least-cost-first extraction rule 
does not hold in partial equilibrium under capacity constraints, like those envisaged for geological reasons here. 
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markets exhibit a high value of η+coal (i.e the coal price strongly increases if production rises) 
and low value of η-coal (the price decreases only slightly if production drops). 
 
2. Energy transformation 
 
2.1 Liquid fuels 
 
The ‘Substitutes to oil ‘nexus considers two large-scale substitutes to oil for liquid fuel 
production. 
The first large-scale substitute to oil for liquid fuels production consist in first and second 
generation biofuels from renewable land resources. Their diffusion is controlled by supply 
curves: at each date, biofuels’ market share is an increasing function of oil price, carbon tax 
included, Sbio(t,poil).4 This captures, although in a simplistic manner, the competition between 
biofuels and oil-based liquid fuels: everything else being equal, the former are more 
competitive and their penetration into the market is more prominent when higher oil price 
make the latter more expensive. The supply curves include asymptote representing explicit 
limits on production due to constraints on land availability and competition with other 
biomass uses. They are modified from one date to the other to account for learning-by-doing 
improvements. The diffusion of biofuels is in addition submitted to the constraint of a time 
delay, Δtbio, which captures inertia on the deployment of raw products (biomass) and of 
refining capacity. 
The second alternative to oil is Coal-To-Liquid (CTL). We consider it as an inexhaustible5 
backstop technology but submitted to capacity constraints. In line with Amigues et al (2001), 
production of the inexhaustible substitute starts before all the least-cost deposits of the 
exhaustible resource are exploited. To capture competition with oil-based fuels, Coal-To-
Liquid becomes competitive (and then enters the market) as soon as oil prices (carbon tax 
included) exceed a threshold value pCTL. To determine their market potential at a given date, 
CTL producers form (imperfect) anticipations about future agents’ endogenous decisions in 
terms of liquid fuel demand D(t) and supply by other sources (refined oil and biofuels) S(t). 
CTL producers are then willing to fill the expected gap by targeting a production level [D(t)-
S(t)]. But, CTL production may be limited by constraints on delivery capacity due to past 
                                                     
4This captures in a simplistic manner the competition between biofuels and oil-based liquid fuels: everything else 
being equal, the former are more competitive and their penetration into the market is more prominent when 
higher oil price make the latter more expensive.  
5We assume that coal is a sufficiently abundant input factor  
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investment decisions if, due to imperfect foresight, profitability prospects for CTL were 
underestimated. These prospects are an increasing function of oil prices at each point in time6 
and cumulative investment on CTL over time is then a function of the sum of past oil prices: 
( )
2010
( )
CTLt t
cum oil
i
p t p i
−Δ
=
= ∑ , where the time delay ΔtCTL represents investment inertia. The dynamics 
of investment affects the availability of production capacity and imposes limits on the share s 
of the targeted CTL production that can be realized at a given date. We adopt a linear 
dependence between s and cumulative investments measured by ( )cump t . As soon as the oil 
price exceeds pCTL , the contribution of CTL to the supply on liquid fuel markets is given by:  
 ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) S( ) .cumCTL t s p t D t t= −                (37) 
2.2 Electricity generation 
 
The ‘power generation’ Nexus represents an explicit set of 16 standard technologies, either 
already active or close to maturity.7 Each of them is characterized by its technico-economic 
parameters determining the average production discounted cost per kilowatt hour produced. 
These parameters are: capital costs (dollars per kilowatt installed), energy efficiency (in 
percentage, for technologies functioning with fossil fuels), exploitation and maintenance 
costs, fixed or variable costs (respectively in dollars per kilowatt and in dollars per kilowatt 
hour). The discount rate incorporates capital opportunity cost and a risk factor, which covers 
both the risk of defect and the social risk associated to controversial technologies (nuclear, 
CCS). The technico-economic parameters are calibrated either on sectoral technological 
models (for example the POLES model) or on information from the literature (Grubler et al, 
2002; Rao et al, 2006; Sims et al, 2007). They evolve in time according to technical progress, 
including learning-by doing processes. 
Technological choices are based on a minimization of the average production total cost 
compatible with future electricity demand across six segments of the load curve, representing 
                                                     
6 Indeed, higher oil prices drive higher prices of liquid fuels, including those produced from coal, and then higher 
profitability prospects for CTL. 
7 five coal-powered units (Coal Conventional Thermal, Lignite Conventional Thermal, Super Critical Pulverised 
Coal, Integrated Coal Gasif. Comb. Cycle), two gas-powered units (Gas Conventional Thermal, Gas Turbines 
Combined Cycle), two oil-powered units (Oil Conventional Thermal, Oil Fired Gas Turbines), two nuclear 
technologies (standard and new design), three renewables (large hydro, onshore wind, offshore wind). In 
addition, one technology with CCS is available for coal- and gas-powered units, respectively 
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the annual fluctuations of electricity demand.8 This optimal planning procedure for choosing 
power generation technologies under imperfect anticipations is decomposed into four steps:  
• projecting future demand and fuel prices with adaptive anticipations of electricity 
demand growth over the coming ten years and with future fossil fuels prices. 
• choosing renewable production capacities distinguished between hydroelectricity and 
on-shore and off-shore wind9, given competition with conventional technologies. The 
share of each renewable energy in total electricity production is an increasing function 
of the ratio between its complete production cost per kWh and of the more profitable 
conventional technology. This share is bounded by the saturation of production 
potentials and the limits of intermittent production. 
•  projecting the optimal conventional production park under demand constraint at a 10-
year horizon by comparison of unitary discounted production costs among 
technologies. 
• allocating investments to reorient the existing production park towards the ideal 
anticipated production park by the end of the decade, under the constraints of available 
capital. 
 
New investment choices affect total production capacity only at the margin, given the inertia 
in the renewal of the park. We represent the park in capital vintages, and a formerly installed 
production unit remains available for a certain period in function of its life time. However, 
available capacities are not necessary mobilized for actual production, which is allocated to 
production units ensuring lower operational costs. This choice is differentiated along the 
seven segments of the load curve to represent the different mix of technologies for base and 
peak production. This assumption allows representing operational flexibility through early 
retirement of those capacities that, although installed, are not profitable in current economic 
conditions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 The six segments are divided according to broad categories of annual load length defined by six threshold 
values between 0h and full year operation (8760h):  8030h, 6570h, 5110h, 3650h, 2190h,. 730h 
9 Wind is the only non-hydraulic renewable energy explicitly represented in the NEXUS. However, solar energy 
is implicitly represented in “very low energy” .buildings  
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3. Final energy demand 
 
Historically, the literature on the decoupling between energy and growth has focused on 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements (implicitly encompassing end-use energy 
efficiency and structural changes) and on the energy efficiency gap, i.e. the difference 
between the most energy efficient technologies available and those actually in use.  
 However important it may be, energy efficiency is not the only driver of energy 
demand. Indeed, the rate and direction of technical progress and its energy content depend, 
not only on the transformation of the set of available techniques, but also on the structure of 
households’ demand. This is why the NEXUS endogenize both energy efficiency stricto 
sensu, and the structural change resulting from the interplay between consumption, 
technology and localization patterns. This enables us to capture the effect of non-energy 
determinants of energy demand, such as the prices of land and real estate, and political 
bargaining (set exogenously) over urban infrastructure to be represented. This endogenization 
of technical change is made for both stationary uses (industry and services, buildings) and 
non-stationnary uses (freight and passenger transportation). 
 
 3.1 Stationnary uses 
 
3.1.1 Industry and services 
 
The industrial and services sectors are represented in an aggregated manner, each of them 
covering a large variety of economic sub-sectors and products. Technical change then covers 
not only changes and technical progress in each sub-sector but also the structural effects 
across sectors. In addition to autonomous energy efficiency gains, the “Industry’ and 
‘services’ Nexus represent the structural drop in energy intensity due to a progressive 
transition from energy-intensive heavy industries to manufacturing industries, and the choice 
of new techniques which results in both energy efficiency gains and changes in the energy 
mix.  
On the one hand, the progressive switch from industry to services is controlled by saturation 
levels of per capita consumption of industrial goods (in physical terms, not necessarily in 
value terms), via an asymptote at κind multiplied by its level in 2001. For developing 
countries, these saturation levels represent various types of catch-up to the consumption style 
in developed countries.  
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On the other hand, changes of techniques are driven by operational costs, including energy 
costs and the other costs linked to their use (capital, maintenance, variable costs). The share of 
each energy in the new capacities is decided in a logistic function with arguments the total 
cost of using each energy source and a market heterogeneity parameter measuring the 
substitutability potentials. In these sectors, these decisions affect the selection of new 
production capacities but do not influence existing ones. This putty-clay assumption implies 
that changes in final energy use are dependent on the turnover rate of production capacities, 
defined by their lifetime Δtind .  
 
3.1.2 Buildings 
 
The ‘Housing and Buildings’ nexus represents the dynamics of energy consumption as a 
function of the energy service level per square meter (heating, cooling, etc.) and the total 
housing surface.  
The former is represented by coefficients encompassing the technical characteristics of the 
existing stock of end-use equipment and buildings and the increase in demand for energy 
services: heating, cooking, hot water, lighting, air conditioning, refrigeration and freezing and 
electrical appliances. The evolution of resulting energy-needs per square meter is captured by 
coefficients for coal αrescoal(t), gas αresgas(t), liquid fuels αresfuel(t) and electricity αreselec(t). 
These parameters evolve according to the exogenous trajectories calibrated on the outputs of 
the POLES energy model, which encompass changes in residential energy consumption due 
to (i) cost variations of the services either due to efficiency gains or energy price variations, 
(ii) increase in household’s income driving access to certain energy services beyond basic 
needs and (iii) the physical characteristics of buildings (surfaces, insulation, architectural 
conception). 
We also account for the diffusion of “Very Low Energy” buildings at very high energy price, 
carbon price included. They are represented by a unique alternative housing with annual 
energy consumption at 50kWh/m2 (80% electricity and 20% gas). The diffusion of this 
technology in rupture with current trends represents implicitly a multiplicity of advancements, 
including the autonomous production of energy, the efficient insulation of buildings but also 
large plans of thermal renovation and regulations reforms in developing countries. 
 
Housing surface per capita has an income elasticity of ηH, and region-specific asymptotes for 
the floor area per capita, hmax. This limit reflects spatial constraints, cultural habits as well as 
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assumptions about future development styles (including the lifestyles in emerging countries 
vis-à-vis the US, European or Japanese way of life). In the constitution of scenarios, the 
hypotheses about these asymptotes are made coherent with those concerning the 
infrastructures of transport, keeping in mind that all are linked to territorial and urban zoning 
policies. 
 
3.2 Non-Stationnary uses 
  
3.2.1 Freight transport 
 
In the “Transportation NEXUS”, the dynamics of the energy intensity of freight transport is 
driven by an exogenous trend μf (t) and a short-term fuel price elasticity εf. They capture 
autonomous and endogenous energy efficiency gains as well as short-term modal shifts, with 
the long-term price response resulting from the sequence of those short-term adjustments.  
 
Total energy demand is then driven by freight mobility needs, in turn depending on the level 
of economic activities and their freight content. Even though the share of transportation in 
total costs is currently low, decoupling freight mobility demand and economic growth is an 
important determinant of long-term mitigation costs. In the absence of such a decoupling 
(constant input-output coefficient), and once efficiency potentials in freight transportation 
have been exhausted, constraining sectoral carbon emissions from freight transportation 
would amount to constraining economic activity.  
 
3.2.2 Passenger transport 
 
Passenger mobility needs and their modal breakdown across four travel modes (ground-based 
public transport, air transport, private vehicles and non-motorized modes) result from the 
maximization of households’ utility under the assumption of constant travel time (Zahavi and 
Talvitie, 1980) and budget constraints. This helps to represent two crucial determinants of the 
demand for passenger transportation, namely the induction of mobility demand by 
infrastructure and the conventional rebound effect consecutive to energy efficiency gains on 
vehicles (Greening et al, 2000).  
 The former effect operates through the travel time budget constraint. Indeed, the 
attractiveness of each transportation mode is determined by vehicle performance and the 
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degree of infrastructure saturation. When mobility demand exceeds the normal load 
conditions of a given type of infrastructure (e.g., road, airport), speed decreases. In the 
absence of further investment, households will reallocate their travel time budget to other, 
more efficient, modes in order to restore efficiency. We can represent the effects of the 
deployment of alternative infrastructure: a policy in which the building of transportation 
infrastructure follows the evolution of modal mobility favoring roads for private car mobility 
vs. public policies that redirect part of the investment to railways and other public transport 
infrastructure. 
 A drop in mobility costs (mainly the user’s car costs), along with progress in the 
energy efficiency of vehicles, endogenously generates a rebound effect on mobility demand as 
a result of utility-maximization under income budget constraint. Energy efficiency in private 
vehicles results from households’ decisions on the purchase of new vehicles, based on a mean 
cost minimization criterion between different types of available technologies (including 
standard, hybrid and electric vehicles). These vehicles types are differentiated by their capital 
costs and unitary fuel consumption, the former decreasing in function of the learning-by-
doing process at the rate γ for each doubling of cumulated investment in the technology.  
 
In addition to the availability of transportation infrastructure and energy efficiency, mobility 
needs are dependent upon agents’ localization choices (Grazi et al., 2008). This is captured by 
differences in regional households’ motorization rates, everything else being equal (income, 
energy prices), with dispersed spatial organizations implying a higher dependence on private 
transport. In each region, the motorization rates increase with disposable per capita income 
through variable income-elasticity ηmot: (a) low for very poor people whose access to 
motorized mobility relies on non-motorized and public modes; (b) high for households with a 
medium per capita income with access to private motorized mobility (c) low again, because of 
saturation effects, for per capita income level comparable to that of the OECD. In addition, 
the impact of local location choices is represented through basic needs of mobility, which 
represent the travels imposed by daily journeys (especially, for commuting to work and access 
to services).  
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III- Data 
1. Calibration 
 
Calibration of the IMACLIM-R model is based on the GTAP database, which provides a set of 
balanced input-output tables of the world economy. Given the launch date of the RECIPE 
project, we did not calibrate IMACLIM-R with the more recent GTAP-7 database, but used 
instead GTAP-6 database (Dimaranan, 2006) which details the world economy in 87 regions 
and 57 sectors for the year 2001. From this basic material, calibration is done by aggregating 
the GTAP database according to the IMACLIM-R mapping in 12 regions and 12 sectors and by 
embarking information from external datasets giving physical quantities for energy and 
passenger transportation sectors. The elaboration of this hybrid matrix ensuring consistency 
between money flows and physical quantities is done by modifying input-output tables from 
the GTAP-6 dataset to make them fully compatible with 2001 energy balances from IEA (in 
Mtoe) and passenger mobility (in passenger-km) from (Schafer and Victor, 2000). This is 
done by assuming uniform production prices across uses in each region and for each energy 
and transport sectors, and substituting money flows reported for those activities in the GTAP-
6 database by the expenditures for physical quantities valued at their end-use price, including 
consumption taxes. This forcing ensures that energy and mobility quantities are preserved, but 
brings about some adjustments in the input-output tables to restore sectoral supply-use 
equilibrium conditions in monetary values. This last step is done by reporting the gap in 
equilibrium conditions in the composite sector. 
2. ‘Natural Growth’ drivers 
 
The natural growth rate of the economy defines the growth rate that the economy would 
follow if it produced a composite good at full employment, like in standard neoclassical 
models developed after Solow (1956). It is given by exogenous assumptions on active 
population and labor productivity growth. Demographic data for active population are derived 
from (UN, 2005) medium scenario (Table A-3). Labor productivity growth is built upon a 
convergence hypothesis (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), the parameters being calibrated on 
historic trajectories (Maddison, 1995) and ‘educated guess’ assumptions of long-term trends 
(Oliveira-Martins et al., 2005). Basically, we assume that USA remains the world leader in 
productivity per worker with a steady growth of 1.7% per year, whereas the dynamics of 
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productivity in other countries is driven by a partial catch-up. This means that regions with 
lower absolute productivity per worker in a country experience the faster labor productivity 
growth (see Table A-4). 
 
Table A-3: Active population in the IMACLIM-R model (Millions) 
 2001 2010 2030 2050 2100 
USA 178 195 203 207 205 
Canada 20 22 22 23 20 
Europe 374 384 359 330 320 
OECD Pacific 132 131 116 100 46 
Former Soviet Union 169 178 168 155 126 
China 824 930 958 895 827 
India 572 702 925 1034 1128 
Brazil 104 124 154 167 173 
Middle-East 93 122 173 203 250 
Africa 397 534 894 1224 1668 
Rest of Asia 496 582 706 756 713 
Rest of Latin America 193 230 286 309 321 
 
Table A-4: Average labor productivity growth in the IMACLIM-R model (%) 
 2010-2030 2030-2050 2050-2100 
USA 
1.9 1.7 1.7 
Canada 
1.8 1.9 1.7 
Europe 
2.4 1.9 1.7 
OECD Pacific 
2.0 1.8 1.7 
Former Soviet Union 
3.9 2.3 1.7 
China 
5.8 3.4 1.8 
India 
5.2 4.2 2.0 
Brazil 
3.3 2.4 1.7 
Middle-East 
2.0 2.0 2.0 
Africa 
2.0 2.0 2.0 
Rest of Asia 
3.9 3.6 1.8 
Rest of Latin America
3.1 2.6 1.8 
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IV- Regional and sectoral disaggregation 
The version of the IMACLIM-R model used in this study divides the world in: 
• 12 regions: USA, Canada, Europe, OECD Pacific, Former Soviet Union, China, India, 
Brazil, Middle-East, Africa, Rest of Asia, Rest of Latin America  
• 12 sectors: coal, oil, gas, liquid fuels, electricity, air transport, water transport, other 
transport, construction, agriculture, energy-intensive industry, services & light-
industry. 
V- An analytical analysis of the drivers of mitigation costs in second-best 
economies  
We detail here the simplified model used in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 to identify the major 
determinants of mitigation costs in the IMACLIM-R model. To this aim, we incorporate the 
core specificities of second-best macroeconomic interactions in the static equilibrium of the 
IMACLIM-R model: imperfect competition and imperfect labour markets. To ensure analytical 
solvability, we consider an economy producing a composite good with energy and labour as 
input factors.  
Imperfect competition is represented through a mark-up pricing rule for the composite good 
resulting in a margin rate π over production costs:  
( )1E Ep p e wl pτ π= + + +                                       (38) 
where e and l are the unitary energy and labour requirements for production, pE the price of 
energy, Eτ  a tax on energy (taken as a proxy for a carbon tax in case of climate policy) and w 
the wage rate.10   
Imperfect labour markets are described by a wage curve introducing an inverse relationship 
between the real wage rate and unemployment (or under-utilization of the labour force).11 
With Q the total production and L the total labour force, the unemployment rate z is: 
                                                     
10 Equation (38) is a simplified version of the price equation in IMACLIM-R, which incorporates a term of 
decreasing static returns when production capacity approaches saturation (see equation (8)). 
11 Microeconometric evidence for such formulation was given in a seminal contribution by (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1995) and extensive theories have been developed to support such representation of the labour market 
(see (Layard et al., 2005), (Lindbeck, 1993) and (Phelps, 1992) for an overview). The basic idea is that high 
unemployment represents an outside threat that leads workers to accept lower wages as from either the 
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1 lQz
L
= −
                                                             
(39) 
The wage curve is then given by: 
w az
p
α−=                                                          (40) 
where, a is a constant and 0α > is the elasticity of the wage curve: the higher α , the more 
flexible the labour markets.  
We introduce  Q0, w0 and z0 as the production level, the real wage rate and the unemployment 
rate in absence of carbon tax. They are implicitly defined by: 
( ) 01E E Ep e wl p e w lτ+ + = +                                   (41) 
0 0
1E Ep e z
w l z
ατ −⎛ ⎞+ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠                                                  
(42) 
 
0
01
QL
l z
= −                                                              
(43) 
Combining equations (38)-(43), the production level Q can then be derived as: 
1
0
0
0 0
. .. 1 1
1
E EQ p eQ z
z w l
ατ −⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                     
 (44) 
The variation of activity 0Q Q QΔ = − is then given by: 
 
1
0
0 0 0
.. 1 1
1
E
E
z p eQ
Q z w l
ατ
−⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞Δ ⎢ ⎥= − −⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥− ⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
                                        (45) 
This corresponds exactly to equation (1) in Chapter 3. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
bargaining approach (Layard and Nickell, 1986) or the wage-efficiency approach (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). 
The former emphasizes the weakening of the power of workers’ unions in wage setting negotiations at high 
unemployment. The latter adopts firms’ point of view, who set wages so as to discourage shirking; this level is 
lower when the threat of not finding a job after being caught shirking gets higher.  
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Annex B 
 
This appendix provides detailed proofs of the analytical results and discusses the numerical 
assumptions adopted in Chapter 4. 
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I. Long-Run Equilibrium Conditions for Symmetric Spatial Configurations 
Proof of Proposition 1: From (25) it follows that: 
( )2 2
CP
2
1
1 1
1
2
m
δ
ε
δ δ φ φσ ε ε
φ φ + −
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠=∂ ; with: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1m
ε δ ε δφ ε δ ε δ
− − −= + − + . The value 
CPσ
φ
∂
∂  
is then negative for mφ φ< , while it is positive for 
mφ φ> . This leads to CPσ  being decreasing for mφ φ< while increasing for mφ φ> . The CPσ  
function reaches its minimum at mφ φ= , and the minimum value minCPσ  of CP ( )σ φ  is given by 
CP ( )mσ φ : 
 
1 11 1
2 1 2 1min
CP
1 1 .
1
δ δ
ε εε ε δ ε δσ ε ε δ ε δ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− − − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  
In addition, CP0lim ( )φ σ φ→ = +∞ and CP ( 1) 1σ φ = = . Figure B.1 gives a graphical illustration 
of CP ( )σ φ . 
 
Figure B-1: Graphical Illustration of the Core-periphery Pattern: Three Cases. 
 
 
The stability pattern of the core-periphery depends on the value of 1(1) (1) εψ −Θ : 
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• If 1 minCP(1) (1) εψ σ−Θ < , then we have 1 CP(1) (1) ( )εψ σ φ−Θ < for any φ . According to 
Condition 1, this means that the core-periphery is never an equilibrium. This 
corresponds to case CP–i in Proposition 1; 
•  If min 1CP (1) (1) 1εσ ψ −< Θ < , then there exist two φ -values over [ ]0;1φ∈  such that 
1
CP(1) (1) ( )
εψ σ φ−Θ = . By noting these sφ  and sφ , the condition 1 CP(1) (1) ( )εψ σ φ−Θ >
is satisfied if and only if ;s sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . According to Condition 1, this means that the 
core-periphery is an equilibrium if and only if ;s sφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . This corresponds to case 
CP–ii in Proposition 1; 
• If 1(1) (1) 1εψ −Θ > , then there exist only one φ -value in the interval [ ]0;1φ∈ such that 
1
CP(1) (1) ( )
εψ σ φ−Θ = . By noting this value sφ , the condition 1 CP(1) (1) ( )εψ σ φ−Θ > is 
satisfied if and only if ;1sφ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . According to Condition 1, this means that the core-
periphery is an equilibrium if and only if ;1sφ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . This corresponds to case CP–iii 
in Proposition 1. 
This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 2: From equation (28), SSσ  can be rewritten as a second-order 
polynomial in φ , as follows: ( ) 2SS 0 1 2a a aσ φ φ φ= + + . Coefficients 0a , 1a , 2a  can be 
expressed in terms of the constants of the model δ ,ε , fa , fm , L and the intensity of the 
agglomeration and environmental effects ( 0.5)hdψ
=
 and
( 0.5)hd =Θ : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( 0.5)
0
2
( 0.5) 2 ( 0.5) ( 0.5)
1
( 0.5)
2
1 4 1
;
2 1
4 4 1 1
2 1 4 1 ;
1 2
1 4 1
.
2 1
h
f
h h h
h
d
a
a L
a d d d
d
a
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ
ε δ δ ε ε δ
ε
δ ε ε δ ε εδ ε ε εε γ ε δ
ε δ δ ε ε δ
ε
=
= = =
Θ
=
⎡ ⎤− − − − −⎣ ⎦= −
+ − −⎡ ⎤= + + − − + −⎣ ⎦− −
⎡ ⎤+ − + − +⎣ ⎦= − −
 
The coefficient 2a  of the polynomial ( )SSσ φ  is negative, so that ( )SSσ φ  is a concave 
function. The sign of ( )SSσ φ  over [ ]0;1φ∈  is dependent on its signs at 0φ =  and 1φ = . Four 
cases must be distinguished: 
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1) If ( )SS 0 0σ >  and ( )SS 1 0σ > , the concave polynomial ( )SSσ φ  remains positive over 
the whole range [ ]0;1φ∈ ; 
2) If ( )SS 0 0σ <  and ( )SS 1 0σ > , the polynomial ( )SSσ φ  has a single root bφ  over 
[ ]0;1φ∈ ; ( )SSσ φ  is negative over [ ]0; bφ φ∈ , while positive over [ ];1bφ φ∈ ; 
3) If ( )SS 0 0σ > and ( )SS 1 0σ < , the polynomial ( )SSσ φ  has a single root bφ  over 
[ ]0;1φ∈ ; ( )SSσ φ  is positive over [ ]0; bφ φ∈ , while negative over [ ];1bφ φ∈ ; 
4) If ( )SS 0 0σ <  and ( )SS 1 0σ < , the polynomial ( )SSσ φ  has either zero or two roots 
according to the sign of the discriminant 21 0 24a a aΔ = −  
a) If 0Δ > , ( )SSσ φ  has two roots bφ  and bφ  ( b bφ φ< ); ( )SSσ φ  is positive 
;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , while negative for bφ φ<  and bφ φ> . It can be demonstrated that 
for 0 1b bφ φ< < < : 
i. 0Δ >  leads to ( )SS 0 0σφ
∂ >∂ . With ( )SS 0 0σ < , this means that 0bφ > ; 
ii.  ( )SS 1 0σ <  leads to ( )SS 1 0σφ
∂ <∂ . With ( )SS 1 0σ < , this means 1bφ < .  
Then, ( )SSσ φ  is positive over ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , while negative over [ ]0;1 \ ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ ;  
b) If 0Δ < , ( )SSσ φ  has no root and remains negative over the whole range 
[ ]0;1φ∈ .  
c) From eq. (25) and (26) it follows that:  
 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
(0.5)
SS
(0.5)
,0
(0.5)
SS
(0.5) (0.5)
0 0
1
;
0 ,
0 ;
d
d d
d
d
d
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψσ
ζ
σ ζΘ
Θ Δ
> ⇔ >
<Δ > ⇔
> ⇔ <  
where the symbols denote the following mathematical expressions: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
,0
(0.5)
(0.5)
2(0.5)
(0.5) (0.5)
2 (0.5)
2
222 2 (0.5) 2 2 2 (0.5)
4 1
;
( 1)
4
;
4 1
2 4 1 4 1
.
1 4 1
. .
4 4 1 1 4 1 4 1
f
f
d
d
a L d
d
d d
a L d
d d
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ
ψ ψ
ψ
ψ ψ
ε δ
δ ε
γ ε δ ε δζ δ ε
γ ε δ ε ε εζ ζ ε ε δ ε
δ
δ ε ε δ ε ε δ ε δ ε
Δ
− −= −
− −= + −
⎡ ⎤− − + + −⎣ ⎦= + ⎡ ⎤− + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − + − + − − − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
The above conditions (1 to 4) can then be re-stated in a simpler way, as follows: 
1) If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < , ( )SSσ φ  is positive over the whole range 
[ ]0;1φ∈ . With Condition 2, this corresponds to case SS–i in Proposition 2; 
2) If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ<  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ < , ( )SSσ φ  is negative over [ ]0; bφ φ∈  and positive 
over [ ];1bφ φ∈ . With Condition 2, this corresponds to case SS–ii in Proposition 2; 
3)  If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > , ( )SSσ φ  is positive over [ ]0; bφ φ∈ , and 
negative over [ ];1bφ φ∈ . With Condition 2, this corresponds to case SS–iii in 
Proposition 2; 
4)  If (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ< , and ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ > : 
a) If ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζ ΔΘ < , then ( )SSσ φ  is positive over ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , and negative 
over [ ]0;1 \ ;b bφ φ φ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ . With Condition 2, this corresponds to case SS–iv in 
Proposition 2; 
b) If ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζ ΔΘ > , then ( )SSσ φ  remains negative over the whole range 
[ ]0;1φ∈ . With Condition 2, this corresponds to case SS–v in Proposition 2. 
This concludes the proof. 
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II. Long-Run Partial Agglomeration in Symmetric Spatial Configurations 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: For a given φ  satisfying 0 1φ≤ ≤ , we define a function gφ  such 
that: [ ]0;1 , ( ) ( , )h g h hφ φ∀ ∈ =Ω . Let us consider case (PA– i). This means that the φ -value is 
chosen so that: 
• The core-periphery 1h =  is a stable equilibrium. According to (19-b), this means that: 
(1) 0gφ > ;  
• The symmetric spreading 0.5h =  is a stable equilibrium. According to (19-a), this 
means that: (0.5) 0gφ =  and (0.5) 0gφ′ < .  
By continuity of function gφ  the last two conditions mean that there exists a value h  
such that 0.5 1h< <  and ( ) 0g hφ < . Conditions ( ) 0g hφ <  and (1) 0gφ >  mean that there 
exists a value 0h  such that:  
 ( )
( )
0
0
0
1
0 .
0
h
g h
h
g h
φ
φ
⎧ ⎫< <⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪=⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪′ >⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
This value 0h  is then an unstable partial agglomeration equilibrium. The proof is similar 
for case (PA– ii). This concludes the proof. 
 
III. Long-Run Partial Agglomeration in Non-Symmetric Spatial 
Configurations 
Proof of Proposition 4: For a given φ  satisfying 0 1φ≤ ≤ , we define a function gφ  such 
that: [ ]0;1 , ( ) ( , )h g h hφ φ∀ ∈ =Ω . Let us consider case (PA’ –i). This means that the φ -value is 
chosen so that: 
• The core-periphery 1h =  is a stable equilibrium. According to (19-b), this means that: 
(1) 0gφ > ; 
• The core-periphery 0h =  is a stable equilibrium. According to (19-c), this means that: 
(0) 0gφ < . 
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By continuity of function gφ , this mean that there exists a value 0h  such that:  
 ( )
( )
0
0
0
0 1
0
0
h
g h
g h
φ
φ
⎧ ⎫< <⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪=⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪′ >⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
. 
This value 0h  is an unstable partial agglomeration equilibrium. The proof is similar for case 
(PA’–ii). This concludes the proof.  
IV. Dependence of Environmental and Agglomeration Effects on Trade 
Barriers 
 
Here, we demonstrate the following three results regarding the dependence of 
agglomeration and environmental effects on the value of trade barriers φ : 
The agglomeration effect is more intense at low trade barriers: This comes down to 
demonstrating that ( )( )SSψσ φ  in (28) is increasing in φ . The function ( )( )SSψσ φ  is a second-
order polynomial in φ . Its dominant term ( )1
2
δ ε δ− + is negative, so that ( )( )SSψσ φ  is a 
concave function. It reaches a minimum at ( )m
ψφ φ= , implicitly defined by ( )( ) ( )SS 0mψ ψσ φφ∂ =∂ . 
Function ( )( )SSψσ φ  is increasing for ( )mψφ φ< , while decreasing for ( )mψφ φ> . From equation 
(28), it follows that ( )( )
2
( ) 4 1 2
2m
ψ ε ε δφ δ ε δ
− += + . With the “no black hole” condition 1ε δ− > , we 
have ( )( )
24 1 2
1
2
ε ε δ ε
δ ε δ ε δ
− + > ++ + , so that 
( ) 1m
ψφ > . This means in particular that ( )( )SSψσ φ  is 
increasing over [ ]0;1φ∈ . This demonstrates the result. 
The environmental effect is more intense at low trade barriers: This comes down to 
demonstrating that function ( )( )SSσ φΘ  in (28) is increasing in φ . The function ( )( )SSσ φΘ  is 
linear in φ , with a positive multiplicative term ( )( ) (0.5)
1 12
2
fa L
dψ
δε ε ε
γ ε δ
− −⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠ , so that ( )
( )
SSσ φΘ  
is uniformly increasing. This demonstrates the result. 
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The environmental effect is stronger than the agglomeration effect at low trade barriers: 
This comes down to demonstrating that the ratio ( )( )
( )
SS
( )
SS
ψ
σ φ
σ φ
Θ
 is increasing in φ . From equation 
(28) it follows that the ratio ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
(0.5
(
)
)
2
SS
( )
SS
1
4 1
14 1 2
fa L
dψ
ψ
δε ε εγ ε δ
ε ε δ δ
σ
ε δ δφ εφ
φ δ
φ
σ
Θ
− + −−=
⎡ ⎤− + + − − +⎣ ⎦
. Since the 
denominator is a decreasing function in φ , ( )( )
( )
SS
( )
SS
ψ
σ φ
σ φ
Θ
 is increasing in φ . 
 
V. Values of Model Parameters and Exogenous Variables 
 
Parameters and exogenous variables defining the economy: In line with the literature 
[Grazi, van den Bergh and Rietveld (2007)], the exogenous variable total unskilled labor 
availability L is set equal to 5. We normalize the global skilled population to 1, i.e. 
1 2 1H H H= + = . Whenever possible, the values of the economic parameters have been taken 
from the literature on spatial and trade economics [e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables 
(1999); Fujita and Thisse (2002); Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003)]. The share of 
income spent on manufactured goods in eq. (1) is set equal 0.4δ = . The elasticity of 
substitution in eq. (1) is 3ε = . Finally we assume a one-to-one production structure in the 
energy sector (one unskilled worker produces one unit of energy), which comes down to 
setting the labor requirement parameter in (6) 1γ = . 
Parameters defining local pollution LjE  and global pollution 
G
jE : Concerning the local 
pollution parameters, the parameter La  in eq. (13) is normalized to 1, as a definition of the 
unit of measure of pollution-externality flow arising from manufacturing production. As for 
the parameters defining the global pollution GjE  in eq. (27), 
Ga is normalized to 1. The 
numerical value of parameter Gb  is calibrated on empirical data for manufacturing production 
and trade. Based on estimates by the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, 
respectively, trade of manufacturing goods Mtotτ  amounted to 8, 257 Billion$ in 2006, and total 
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industrial production Mtotx  to 13,428 Billion$.
120 These two activities represent, respectively, 
3.5% and 25% of world greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from energy use considered as the 
stock pollutant under consideration [International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008)]. According 
to (27), the amount of emissions associated with production Mtotx  and trade 
M
totτ  are given by 
G M
tota x  and 
G M
totb τ , respectively. The above figures on relative GHG emissions then lead to 
3.5% 0.14
25%
G M
tot
G M
tot
b
a x
τ = = . This gives 0.23Gb = . 
The market-form parameter jβ : The parameter jβ  captures the exogenous spatial 
characteristics of region j in terms of the degree of (transport and electricity) infrastructure 
development characterizing the economy’s configuration (see Section II.A). Regional spatial 
structure alters the energy intensity of production activities that are located in j. Two types of 
regional spatial structure are considered: one is characterized by an ‘urbanized’ region, with a 
high degree of infrastructure development (as captured by a low value of jβ ); another by a 
less urbanized, ‘undeveloped’ region, with little land development (high value of jβ ). When 
considering configurations with symmetric spatial structure, the jβ  parameters enter the 
indirect utility differential only through the multiplicative term 
j
δβ
′Γ  (see eq. (21) and eq. (22) 
in the case 1 2β β= ). This term is constant and strictly positive and, hence, a change in the β-
value does not modify the stability conditions in (19). When asymmetric configurations are 
considered, the β-parameters enter the indirect utility differential through the ratio 
1
2
1
εβ
β
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
(see eq. (19) and eq. (20) in the case 1 2β β≠ ). In this case, long-run development patterns 
driven by the utility differential depend entirely on the relative numerical values of the 
parameters. Without loss of generality, we set 1 1β =  and let the numerical value of the ratio 
2
1
β
β  be calibrated over some alternative trend of energy-intensity of the domestic economy 
between two comparable regions, such as, e.g. the USA and Europe. For the year 2006, 
official data from the EIA give an energy intensity of economic activity (amount of energy 
                                                     
120 Data from the International Trade Statistics 2007, published by the World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2007_e/its07_toc_e.htm.  
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used per unit of value added) of 8840 Btu/$ in the USA and 6536 Btu/$ in Europe.121 The β-
parameters capture these differences in energy intensity, so that we obtain 2
1
8840 1.35
6536
β
β = ≈ . 
With 1 1β = , this leads 2 1.35β =  and ( )
1
12
1
1.35 0.55
ε
εβν β
−
−⎛ ⎞= ≈ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
 
Table B-1:Values of the agglomeration parameters in the spatial configurations 
Spatial Configuration 1β (Region 1) 2β (Region 2) 
A (both regions with undeveloped land) 1.35 1.35 
B (both regions with urbanized land) 1 1 
C (one region urbanized, other undeveloped) 1 1.35 
 
VI. Functional Specifications 
 
The market-density effect function ( )jnψ : Function ( )jnψ  captures the decrease of 
energy-related production costs resulting from agglomeration of firms in the j region. By 
assumption, this function is decreasing in nj and satisfies condition: ( )0 1ψ = . Given the 
relation between the number of active firms in region j and the amount of skilled workers 
regionally employed (see eq.(9)) and defining 1Hh
H
=
 
as the share of the regional population, 
the ‘market size effect’ ( )jnψ  can be re-written as a function of h: ( )hψ . We choose to 
adopt an exponential mathematical form: ( ) hh e ψμψ −=  where ψμ  is a positive constant. Such 
a function satisfies ( ) 0hψ ′′ >  so that the agglomeration effect features decreasing returns to 
agglomeration: production costs are less reduced by a marginal increase in the degree of 
agglomeration if production is already intensely agglomerated. This exponential mathematical 
form is convenient since it leads to simple analytical expressions for (0.5)dψ  providing a 
straightforward interpretation of parameter ψμ . Indeed, since (0.5) 2dψ ψμ=  it follows that ψμ  
measures directly the intensity of the market size effect, ψ . We choose numerical values of 
                                                     
121 See http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energyconsumption.html. 
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ψμ  that allow for considering non-trivial cases in which the effect of agglomeration is strong 
enough to affect agents’ location choices. This comes down to assuming a strong 
agglomeration effect, which corresponds to the analytical condition (0.5) ,0d dψ ψ>  (see section 
II-A), with (0.5) 2dψ ψμ= . This can be rewritten as ,02
dψ
ψμ > . Taking 0.4δ = and 3ε = , and 
recalling ( ),0 4 1( 1)dψ
ε δ
δ ε
− −= −  gives ,0 8dψ =  and hence 4ψμ > . For the ease of computation, 
we take 5ψμ = . We are then able to study cases where positive agglomeration effects play an 
important role. Such cases have never been investigated in the literature because of the 
inherent limitations of existing frameworks in which the agglomeration effect is not 
measurable. 
The environmental-externality function ( )LjEΘ : It captures the decrease of utility due to 
the effect of negative local environmental externalities. We posit this function to be 
decreasing and satisfy condition ( )0 1Θ = . We set ( ) 2 LjELjE eμΘΘ = −  where μΘ  is a positive 
constant capturing the intensity of the negative environmental effect. This function satisfies 
the condition: ( ) ( )2 0LjELjE eμμ ΘΘ′′Θ = − < , to capture the non-linear response of 
environmental damage to pollution. We choose numerical values of μΘ  that allow 
consideration of non-trivial cases in which the environmental effect is not fully dominating 
the agglomeration and trade effects, as this case is of little relevance to a thorough analysis of 
sustainability, in which agglomeration and trade do matter. Recalling that ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ >  
corresponds to a ‘strong’ environmental effect, whereas ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ <  captures a ‘weak’ 
environmental effect (see section II.1), we retain the case ( )(0.5) (0.5)d dψζΘ = , which 
corresponds to the environmental effect taking a moderate, mean intensity on utility. This 
analytical condition leads to setting a numerical value of 0.45μΘ = . 
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Annex C 
  
 
This appendix provides a list of all 74 agglomerations considered in Chapter 5 and displays 
the details of the results obtained for all of them. 
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I-List of agglomerations 
 
USA: Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los 
Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, San 
Diego, San Francisco, Seattle, St.Louis, Tampa Bay, Washington. 
Canada: Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver. 
Europe: Ankara, Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Birmingham, Brussels, Budapest, Copenhagen, 
Dublin, Frankfurt, Hanburg, Helsinki, Istanbul, Izmir, Krakow, Leeds, Lille, Lisbon, London, 
Lyon, Madrid, Manchester, Milan, Munich, Naples, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Rand-Holland, 
Rhine-Ruhr, Rome, Stockholm, Stuttgart, Turin, Valencia, Vienna, Warsaw, Zurich. 
OECD Pacific: Aichi, Auckland, Busan, Deagu, Fukuoka, Melbourne, Osaka, Seoul, Sydney, 
Tokyo. 
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II- Data for calibration 
Table C-1: Numerical value of calibration variables at the agglomeration level 
EUROPE USA 
 (0)
jL  
(0)
jd
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jQ  (0)jw  
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jCC   (0)jL  
(0)
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(0)
jQ  (0)jw  
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jCC  
Units 
th
ou
sa
nd
s km
 
In
de
x 
(1
=
Pa
ri
s
) 
In
de
x 
(1
=
Pa
ri
s
) %
 
Units 
th
ou
sa
nd
s km
 
In
de
x 
(1
=
N
ew
 
Yo
rk
) 
In
de
x 
(1
=
N
ew
 
Yo
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) 
%
 
Rhine-Ruhr 5894 72 0.81 1.14 15 New York 8285 54 1.00 1.00 11 
Paris 5510 62 1.00 1.00 15 Los Angeles 6265 43 0.56 0.69 11 
Istanbul 4730 55 0.25 0.43 13 Chicago 4390 55 0.44 0.72 11 
Rand-Holland 3896 51 0.54 1.05 15 Philadelphia 2775 39 0.27 0.68 11 
London 3624 22 0.65 1.17 15 Miami 2550 44 0.20 0.58 11 
Milan 3360 63 0.59 0.88 15 Washington 2426 44 0.29 0.81 11 
Berlin 2759 98 0.29 1.07 15 Atlanta 2418 52 0.23 0.69 11 
Munich 2723 99 0.48 1.14 15 Dallas 2393 54 0.28 0.72 11 
Madrid 2560 51 0.36 1.02 15 San Francisco 2287 33 0.26 1.01 11 
Frankfurt 2491 73 0.41 1.14 15 Boston 2232 38 0.26 0.77 11 
Barcelona 2317 50 0.29 0.99 15 Houston 2186 57 0.26 0.72 11 
Hanburg 2023 84 0.32 1.14 15 Detroit 2146 37 0.20 0.72 11 
Athens 1645 35 0.22 0.74 15 Phoenix 1720 68 0.14 0.60 11 
Rome 1621 41 0.28 0.69 15 Minneapolis 1547 45 0.16 0.69 11 
Brussels 1620 45 0.29 1.05 15 Seattle 1478 45 0.17 0.77 11 
Ankara 1575 88 0.07 0.37 13 San Diego 1409 38 0.13 0.65 11 
Izmir 1462 62 0.07 0.39 13 St.Louis 1352 55 0.11 0.61 11 
Zurich 1395 39 0.19 1.22 15 Baltimore 1274 31 0.11 0.63 11 
Lisbon 1379 31 0.15 0.89 15 Denver 1245 52 0.12 0.72 11 
Warsaw 1287 49 0.15 0.65 13 Tampa Bay 1218 33 0.09 0.54 11 
Copenhagen 1286 54 0.16 1.00 15 Pittsburgh 1197 41 0.10 0.59 11 
Budapest 1231 47 0.13 0.61 13 Cleveland 1047 36 0.09 0.60 11 
Stuttgart 1223 34 0.21 1.14 15 Portland 912 47 0.09 0.55 11 
Manchester 1201 20 0.14 0.85 15 CANADA 
Prague 1200 60 0.12 0.58 13 
Toronto 2709 43 1.00 1.00 11 
Birmingham 1169 17 0.15 0.90 15 
Stockholm 1165 69 0.18 0.95 15 Montreal 1854 37 0.58 0.82 11 
Vienna 1083 38 0.18 1.10 13 Vancouver 1113 30 0.36 0.84 11 
Naples 1079 19 0.12 0.58 15 OECD PACIFIC
Lille 1067 43 0.12 1.00 15 Tokyo 18238 65 1.00 1.00 15 
Valencia 1034 59 0.10 0.96 15 Seoul 10555 61 0.37 0.90 15 
Leeds 1019 25 0.12 0.84 15 Osaka 8695 68 0.42 0.88 15 
Krakow 987 50 0.05 0.52 13 Aichi 4926 58 0.25 0.94 15 
Turin 978 46 0.15 0.76 15 Busan 3635 63 0.14 0.95 15 
Helsinki 965 79 0.13 1.02 15 Fukuoka 2568 39 0.11 0.79 15 
Oslo 918 89 0.17 0.87 15 Sydney 2168 62 0.12 1.19 15 
Dublin 773 47 0.12 1.24 15 Melbourne 1833 50 0.10 1.14 15 
Lyon 717 32 0.12 1.00 15 Deagu 1177 17 0.03 0.58 15 
Lyon 717 32 0.12 1.00 15 Auckland 602 38 0.03 0.82 15 
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Table C-2: Numerical value of macroeconomic aggregates in 2001 for the four macro-regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III-Validation on past trends 
 
Table C-3:  Average growth rate of macroeconomic variables over the period 1980-2001. 
a- Bureau of Economic analysis (http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Popular=Y) 
b- Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?pr) 
c- UN Population Division (http://esa.un.org/unup/) 
d- OECD statistics (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx) 
Macroeconomic 
aggregates in 2001 
Units USA CAN EUR 
OECD 
PACIFIC 
Value Added (0)V 1012$ 18.2 1.3 17.1 9.1 
Effective labor (0)S  106worker 142.6 16.0 299 105.5 
Wage rate (0)w  103$/worker 45.5 23.3 14.8 25.0 
Population (0)Pop  106 persons 285.3 31.1 588.2 204.7 
Average annual growth rate of macroeconomic aggregates (%)  
Macro 
economic 
aggregate 
Variable 
name Region 
Time period Data 
source
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2001 
Value added 
V(t) gV 
USA 2.5 3.7 2.6 3.9 a 
Canada 2.3 3.4 1.5 3.7 d 
Europe 1.9 2.6 1.4 2.8 d 
JANZ 3.2 4.4 2.4 0.9 d 
Labor 
productivity 
l(t) 
gl 
USA 1.4 1.8 1.8 2.2 b 
Canada 1.1 0.7 1.2 1.9 d 
Europe 2.0 2.3 2.1 1.8 d 
JANZ 2.6 3.6 1.5 1.2 d 
Wage rate  
w(t) gw 
USA 7.0 4.7 4.1 4.1 d 
Canada 8.2 4.7 3.4 2.8 d 
Europe 9.2 7.7 11.8 9.8 d 
JANZ 4.5 3.7 2.7 0.6 d 
Population 
L(t) gL 
USA 1.03 1.05 1.08 1.06 c 
Canada 1.06 1.40 1.13 0.93 c 
Europe 0.38 0.41 0.20 0.00 c 
JANZ 0.90 0.67 0.59 0.47 c 
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Figure C-1: Urban population for the metro-regions of USA, Europe and OECD Pacific over 1980-20011 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 For the sake of legibility of the graphs, we report results only the ten largest agglomerations in the USA and 
Europe. 
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IV- Long term equilibrium 
Figure C-2: Dynamic trends of the urban model of USA over 1000 periods for 1φ = 2 
 
 
 
Figure C-3: Dynamic trends of the urban model of Europe over 1000 periods for 1φ = 3 
 
 
                                                     
2 For the sake of legibility of the graphs, we report results only the ten largest agglomerations in the USA and 
Europe. 
3 For the sake of legibility of the graphs, we report results only the ten largest agglomerations in the USA and 
Europe. 
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Figure C-4: Dynamic trends of the urban model of OECD Pacific over 1000 periods for 1φ =  
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Figure C-5: Bifurcation diagram for USA 
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Figure C-6: Bifurcation diagram for Europe  
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Figure C-7: Bifurcation diagram for OECD Pacific 
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V- Forecasting exercice 
 
Table C-4: Average growth rate of macroeconomic variables over the period 2001-2050. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic 
aggregates 
 Region 2001 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Production value 1012$ 
USA 18.2  22.6  26.8  31.6  36.8  43.6
Canada 1.3  2.0  2.5  3.3  3.9  4.6
Europe 17.1  22.9  28.0  34.9  37.6  40.6
OECD Pacific 9.1  12.2  14.9  17.6  18.6  19.4
Effective labor Million 
workers 
USA 142.6 161.9 165.7 161.5  161.9  165.6
Canada 16.0  16.8  19.5  20.3  20.7  21.1 
Europe 299.4 287.4 294.8 293.7  282.3  267.3
OECD Pacific 105.5 100.1 104.1 100.3  93.7  85.8 
Average wage rate 103$/y 
USA 44.5  53.1  59.1  67.2  79.0  95.3 
Canada 23.3  29.8  43.7  61.5  75.0  88.5 
Europe 14.8  17.7  23.4  32.8  37.9  42.4 
OECD Pacific 25.0  31.0  44.7  60.1  69.3  78.7 
( )Pop t  millions 
USA 285.3 304.6 328.2 344.2  351.0  355.1
Canada 31.1  33.0  35.2  36.6  37.2  37.5 
Europe 588.2 596.6 600.2 597.6  587.8  574.0
OECD Pacific 204.7 208.7 208.2 204.0  198.6  190.2
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Table C-5: Population forecasts for the 74 metro-regions over the period 2001-2050. 
 POPULATION (million) AAGR (%)  POPULATION (million) AAGR (%) 
 2001 2010 2025 2050 00/ 10 
10/
25 
25/
50  2001 2010 2025 2050 
00/ 
10 
10/ 
25 25/50 
EUROPE USA 
Rhine-
Ruhr 13.4 14.3 15.5 13.1 0.7 0.6 -0.7 New York 18.5 21.5 20.5 18.4 1.7 -0.4 -0.4 
Paris 11.1 11.3 11.6 9.9 0.2 0.2 -0.7 Los Angeles 12.6 15.1 14.9 14.1 2.1 -0.1 -0.2 
Istanbul 11.6 10.7 9.1 5.5 -0.9 -1.2 -2.1 Chicago 9.2 11.9 13.1 14.2 2.9 0.7 0.3 
Rand-
Holland 7.4 7.3 6.9 4.7 -0.2 -0.4 -1.5 
Philadelphi
a 5.7 7.6 8.6 9.8 3.2 0.9 0.5 
London 7.3 7.5 7.9 6.8 0.3 0.3 -0.6 Miami 5.1 5.5 4.5 3.3 0.8 -1.4 -1.4 
Milan 7.4 8.0 9.3 9.9 0.9 1.1 0.3 Washington 4.9 6.2 6.4 6.4 2.6 0.3 0.0 
Berlin 6.0 6.0 5.6 3.5 0.0 -0.5 -1.9 Atlanta 4.4 4.1 2.6 1.2 -0.8 -3.1 -3.1 
Munich 6.0 6.3 6.8 5.9 0.5 0.5 -0.5 Dallas 5.3 6.8 7.0 6.9 2.7 0.2 -0.1 
Madrid 5.2 5.1 4.8 3.4 -0.2 -0.4 -1.4 San Francisco 4.2 4.5 3.8 2.8 0.7 -1.2 -1.2 
Frankfurt 5.5 5.7 5.8 4.7 0.3 0.2 -0.9 Boston 4.4 5.8 6.5 7.1 3.1 0.8 0.4 
Barcelona 4.7 4.6 4.2 2.7 -0.4 -0.7 -1.8 Houston 4.8 6.2 6.5 6.5 2.8 0.3 0.0 
Hanburg 4.6 4.6 4.5 3.3 0.0 -0.2 -1.3 Detroit 4.5 5.9 6.6 7.5 3.0 0.9 0.5 
Athens 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.3 0.5 0.6 -0.1 Phoenix 3.4 3.3 2.2 1.2 -0.4 -2.7 -2.6 
Rome 3.7 4.1 5.2 6.7 1.2 1.6 1.1 Minneapolis 3.0 3.9 4.2 4.4 2.9 0.5 0.2 
Brussels 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.2 0.2 0.2 -0.8 Seattle 3.1 3.8 3.9 3.7 2.4 0.0 -0.2 
Ankara 4.0 3.6 2.9 1.6 -1.2 -1.6 -2.5 San Diego 2.9 3.2 2.8 2.3 1.3 -0.9 -0.9 
Izmir 3.4 3.0 2.3 1.2 -1.5 -1.9 -2.8 St.Louis 2.7 3.5 3.7 3.8 2.6 0.4 0.2 
Zurich 2.2 1.8 1.1 0.3 -2.4 -3.4 -5.1 Baltimore 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.3 0.1 -0.1 
Lisbon 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 Denver 2.2 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.4 -0.8 -0.8 
Warsaw 3.0 3.1 3.6 4.6 0.5 1.0 1.0 Tampa Bay 2.4 2.7 2.3 1.8 1.1 -1.1 -1.1 
Copenhage
n 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.0 -0.6 -1.2 -2.6 Pittsburgh 2.4 3.3 3.9 4.7 3.5 1.3 0.8 
Budapest 2.8 3.2 4.2 7.3 1.3 2.1 2.3 Cleveland 2.1 3.1 4.0 5.2 4.3 1.8 1.1 
Stuttgart 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.3 0.3 0.2 -0.8 Portland 2.0 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.5 0.9 0.4 
Manchester 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.3 0.4 0.3 -0.7 CANADA 
Prague 2.3 2.6 3.2 4.1 1.2 1.6 1.1 Toronto 4.9 5.4 5.7 5.1 1.2 0.4 -0.5 
Birmingha
m 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 0.4 0.4 -0.6 Montreal 3.5 4.2 5.1 5.7 2.0 1.4 0.5 
Stockholm 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.3 -0.4 -0.6 -1.6 Vancouver 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.2 1.1 0.4 -0.4 
Vienna 2.1 2.2 2.2 1.7 0.2 0.0 -0.9 OECD PACIFIC
 
Naples 3.1 3.4 4.2 5.3 1.2 1.5 1.0 Tokyo 33.7 32.4 27.8 14.2 -0.4 -1.1 -2.8 
Lille 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.2 -0.5 -1.0 -2.3 Seoul 22.1 24.2 31.9 37.5 1.0 2.0 0.7 
Valencia 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.1 -0.4 -0.8 -2.0 Osaka 17.0 16.9 15.4 8.7 -0.1 -0.7 -2.3 
Leeds 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.8 0.3 0.2 -0.8 Aichi 9.0 8.5 7.1 3.5 -0.6 -1.2 -2.9 
Krakow 2.1 2.4 3.0 4.0 1.2 1.6 1.2 Busan 7.8 8.6 11.4 13.4 1.1 2.0 0.7 
Turin 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.0 1.0 1.2 0.4 Fukuoka 5.0 4.6 3.5 1.5 -1.1 -1.8 -3.5 
Helsinki 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.5 -1.5 -2.1 -3.4 Sydney 4.1 3.8 2.8 1.1 -1.0 -2.0 -3.8 
Oslo 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.1 -0.2 -0.4 -1.4 Melbourne 3.5 3.2 2.4 1.0 -0.9 -1.9 -3.7 
Dublin 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.7 -0.6 -1.1 -2.4 Deagu 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.1 -0.6 0.3 -0.6 
Lyon 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 0.0 -0.1 -1.1 Auckland 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -1.8 
 
309 
 
Table C-6: Production forecasts for the 74 metro-regions over the period 2001-2050. 
Share of production in each agglomeration for the four OECD regions (%) 
Agglomeration 2001 2050 Agglomeration 2001 2050 
EUROPE USA 
Rhine-Ruhr 10.1 12.0 New York 20.3  17.4 
Paris 8.6 9.4 Los Angeles 10.6  10.3 
Istanbul 2.4 1.4 Chicago 7.8  10.3 
Randstad-Holland 6.2 4.8 Philadelphia 4.6  6.8 
London 5.9 6.8 Miami 3.6  2.0 
Milan 4.6 7.5 Washington 4.8  5.4 
Berlin 4.5 3.2 Atlanta 4.1  1.0 
Munich 4.7 5.6 Dallas 4.2  4.7 
Madrid 3.6 2.9 San Francisco 5.7  3.3 
Frankfurt 4.3 4.4 Boston 4.2  5.8 
Barcelona 3.2 2.2 Houston 3.9  4.5 
Hanburg 3.5 3.0 Detroit 3.8  5.4 
Athens 1.7 2.3 Phoenix 2.5  0.8 
Rome 1.7 3.8 Minneapolis 2.6  3.2 
Brussels 2.7 2.8 Seattle 2.8  2.8 
Ankara 0.7 0.3 San Diego 2.2  1.5 
Izmir 0.7 0.3 St.Louis 2.0  2.4 
Zurich 3.7 0.6 Baltimore 2.0  2.1 
Lisbon 1.5 1.4 Denver 2.2  1.6 
Warsaw 0.6 1.2 Tampa Bay 1.6  1.0 
Copenhagen 2.7 1.4 Pittsburgh 1.7  2.9 
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